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* 
The International Monetary Fund was initially formed 
to maintain world monetary stability among the world's 
developed countries. 
Jamaica is one of the many developing countries that 
has accepted IMF terms because of its increasing monetary 
problems. This research analyzes the relationship between 
the IMF and Jamaica. To this end, the history of the IMF 
and its operations will be examined along with the Jamaican 
economic and political development, including a detailed 
study of the Manley years and the IMF. A questionnaire was 
administered to get the pulse of Jamaican leaders and their 
understanding of the IMF. 
By 1976, Manley's government needed help and applied 
for an IMF loan. On examining the IMF, one finds that its 
articles of agreement are not conducive for third world 
development, nor has it been successful in the developed 
countries. The IMF is heavily influenced by the United 
States both by its contributions (30$ in 1940's and 20$ in 
the 70s and 80s,) and its leadership of the Western world. 
The Group of Ten led by the U.S., controls over 60$ of the 
Fund total. This Group consists of the United States, 
Britain, West Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Canada, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. 
In Jamaica's case, the U.S. undermined the Manley 
government by hostile propaganda about crime and her 
relationship with Cuba. Loans from the U.S. dried up almost 
completely in 1976 and the tourist trade slowed to a 
trickle. The Carter government was not as hostile, but as a 
condition for improved relations, Jamaica had to agree to 
IMF conditions. 
The government's stress on public sector expansion 
rather than the private sector activity favoured by the IMF 
laid the foundation for disagreements between the two. 
After the failure of the first IMF test, the conditions of 
the loan became even more stringent. Ultimately, the Manley 
government broke off its IMF agreement. 
The ensuing elections saw a vast swing and the 
opposition won by a majority of 51 to nine. The U.S. 
government and the IMF were immediately brought in and loans 
that were not forthcoming for the Manley government were 
made available promptly, indicating that the U.S. and the 
IMF were instrumental in dictating what happened in Jamaica. 
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was formed in 
1944 to stabilize the economies of member countries. At its 
inception, its membership was composed primarily of European 
and North and South American countries. In the last twenty 
years the membership has tripled and the developing 
countries are now a majority.1 The less developed countries 
(LDCs) have become increasingly disenchanted with the 
operation of the IMF because their situation since the 1960s 
has grown steadily worse under IMF conditions.2 The IMF was 
formed essentially to expand international trade, increase 
employment, promote exchange stability, and develop a system 
of multilateral transactions between members.3 
Now that the membership has changed, one has to 
question its fundamental strategy of emphasizing short-term 
balance of payment adjustments as compared to the more 
pertinent long-term requirements favoured by the developing 
countries. The former was more appropriate to the developed 
11MF Report, 1982, p. 134. 
2Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab, (eds.) Beyond 
Depenency: The Developing World Speaks Out (New York: 
Praeger, 1975), pp. 193-194. 
3Appendix A, Article 1. 
1 
2 
countries* needs and met with an element of success in 
revitalizing the war-torn economies of Europe and Japan. 
Those societies had the necessary and sufficient conditions 
to implement IMF short-term policies. Their infrastructures 
were already established; the war had merely damaged them.4 
The developing countries in contrast, by and large, have 
poorly developed infrastructures. 
The world economic system had been in disarray since 
World War I. British dominance in world trade and the gold 
standard functioned well from 1870 to 1914. The First World 
War caused a breakdown of that system. During the 1920s the 
attempt to return to a gold standard failed. The 1930s saw 
a period of fluctuating exchange rates and the use of 
pounds, dollars, and francs to back gold, but these efforts 
failed.5 
The major developed countries met at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire to work out an international agreement dealing 
with trade balances, exchange control, and fiscal policy. 
Two plans were in contention: The Keynes Plan and The White 
Plan. The former stressed the need for exports and 
^Benjamin H. Beckhart, Federal Reserve System, 
suggests many nations first joined the IMF in order to be 
able to borrow from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development inasmuch as membership is a 
prerequisite to membership in the World Bank. As Governor 
Rooth (IMF) pointed out in a memorandum, many nations, at 
the time they joined the Fund, were actually insolvent and 
should not have been admitted to membership. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 428. 
5Franklin Root, International Trade and Investment 
(New York: Southwestern Publishing Co., 197Ô) , p~! 164. 
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expansion of the economy and the latter focused on stabilizing 
exchange rates. The White Plan was adopted. 
The White Plan had to take into consideration the 
mood of the American Congress and the public. They lacked 
experience in leadership and participation in important world 
organizations. The isolationist mind-set was influenced by 
the need to protect United States industries which had pros¬ 
pered during WWII. The White Plan was limited to the setting 
up of exchange rates to ensure an orderly and stable world 
exchange of the major currencies. It did not address the 
need for development or trade; it merely wanted the "status 
quo" to remain and for countries to trade on the given pari¬ 
ties that were worked out.6 
The Keynes Plan essentially expressed the need for an 
International Clearing Union, with its corresponding currency, 
"bancor." The main feature of the plan was that international 
trade would be no more than historical bartering supplemented 
by the currency system for transactions. The principal 
benefit of the system would be equilibrium between trading 
partners. There would be penalties for prolonged deficits 
as well as surpluses; over time, countries would be trading 
equal amounts with each other and neither an extended deficit 
nor surplus would be allowed in such an arrangement. 7 
^Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic 
Disorder (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1977) , pp. 42-66. 
7lbid., p. 66. 
4 
The IMF, from its inception, had problems of too much 
influence by America, Britain, and Canada (ABC). Over the 
years, the Group of Ten, led by the United States, has 
dominated the organization.8 The United States in 1946 
loaned Britain a substantial sum of money outside of the 
auspices of the IMF in return for trading areas. This had 
the effect of undermining the multilateral transactions that 
the IMF was founded to perform. Thus, the precedent was set 
for bilateral arrangements between friendly developed 
countries operating outside the IMF, indicating that the old 
system among developed countries was the order of the day.9 
Not that bilateral arrangements would be outlawed, but for 
the IMF to be functional, a better initial example by the 
two major powers was needed. 
Concurrently, the U.S. dollar became the dominant 
monetary force because of the weakened economies of Europe 
and Japan. The United States started to rebuild and lend 
monies to these depressed economies. The United States 
dollar, therefore, became the major world currency. It had 
become so powerful that the U.S. was able to insist that 
the dollar be backed by gold at thirty-five dollars an 
ounce. This and the dollar as major currency laid the 
foundation for the international monetary crisis.^ 
8Ibid., p. 48 
9lbid., p. 52. 
lORobert Trifflin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The 
Future of Convertibility (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
Press, 1960), pp. 2-3. 
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The recovery of the European and Japanese economies 
adversely affected United States supremacy in industrial 
production. The early American deficits of the later ’50s 
and ’60s became chronic by the mid-60s. The recovered 
economies of Europe and Japan were not willing to revalue 
their currencies because in so doing they would lose their 
trade advantage. So the American deficit that was caused by 
its military expenditure, policing the world, and the giving 
of aid to counter the communist threat became a chronic 
deficit.The United States responded to the situation by 
printing more dollars and floating the U.S. dollar in the 
international market. 
The other developed countries became concerned about 
accepting U.S. dollars; they were, in effect, supporting its 
deficit spending.12 France, under De Gaulle in 1966, made 
the first real objections to that policy by demanding gold 
for the United States dollar, a proposition that was 
realistic, but which the United States thought preposterous 
and ungrateful of the French. From that point on, everyone 
questioned the strength of the United States’ economy and 
the dollar. That doubt culminated in a 1971 dollar crisis 
when the United States broke away from gold backing the 
dollar at thirty-five dollars an ounce. 
The IMF was adversely affected by these developments. 
111 bid., p. 4. 
12pred Block, p. 54. 
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The U. S. dollar had taken over the role the IMF should have 
played. (Loans were given bilaterally to the other industrial 
countries rather than under the auspices of the IMF.) The 
General Agreement of Trade and Tarriffs (GATT) was activated 
to relieve the pressure.13 It made some gains for the indus¬ 
trial countries, but the Third World was not included. 
In addition, the membership of the IMF was changing; 
its initial forty-four members grew to one hundred forty-six 
by 1982. The majority of new members were small, dependent 
states that were relying on the generosity of European and 
North American developed countries. The IMF goals and prin¬ 
ciples were not directed at these states and any adjustments 
to aid them have been miniscule. The problem was compounded 
by those small states demanding true independence and an end 
to their dependence on the North. The first real protest of 
the LDCs came at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 
1955 followed by the non-aligned nations meetings in 
Belgrade in 1961, Cairo in 1964, Lusaka in 1970, and Algiers 
in 1973. The first major breakthrough was the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.1^ It 
13secretary of State Hull had proposed an International 
Trade Organization (ITO) to solve the world's problem. But 
the IMF concept won over the (ITO). However it was felt 
that there should be a systematic international trading body 
in the GATT. It functions to provide guidelines regarding 
international trade and tariff restrictions. 
I^Diego Cordovez, "The Making of UNCTAD: Institutional 
Background and Legislative History," Journal of World Trade 
Law (May-June, 1967), pp. 253-254. 
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was limited because it was directly influenced by the major 
powers in the United Nations. A more radical Third World 
response was the formation of the Group of 77 which 
culminated in the 197^ demand for a New International 
Economic Order. Some of the demands of the Third World 
were: (1) the establishment of a common fund which would 
finance international commodity stocks; (2) the setting up 
of international stock for several commodities; (3) the 
improvement and enlargement of facilities for compensatory 
financing, which would help to offset fluctuations in the 
export earnings of developed countries; (4) multilateral 
trade commitments on individual commodities; (5) the removal 
of trade barriers and other impediments to the expansion of 
commodity processing capacity in developing countries. 
Another area of concern for developing countries was 
the problem of debt repayment and they proposed: (a) 
cancellation of debts owed by the twenty-nine least 
developed countries; (b) postponement until 1980 of interest 
payments and capital payments of loans owed by the most 
seriously affected countries; (c) rescheduling of short-term 
commercial debt into long-term obligations of twenty-five 
years; (d) refinancing of debts owed to international 
institutions like the IMF; (e) convening of an international 
15joan E. Spero, The Politics of International 
Economic Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), p. 
TW. 
8 
debtor-creditor conference to discuss the entire problem.^ 
All of these concerns fell on deaf ears; subsequently there 
was a world debt crisis which worsened (See Table 1.1): 
At stake is a gargantuan debt, a $706 billion lien held 
by banks, governments and international financial 
institutions around the world against a group of deeply 
troubled developing and East bloc countries.'7 
16c. Fred Bergsten, "The Threat from the Third 
World," Foreign Policy (Summer 1973), PP• 102-104. 
^Charles Alexander, "Bracing for a Showdown," Time 
(January 10, 1983), p. 42. 
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Table 1.1 
THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISES AS OF MAY 1983 
The Major Third-World Trouble Spots 
DEBT* 
NATION (in billions Status 
of dollars) 
Mexico $80-90 3-year, $3-7 billion IMF loan 
approved Jan. 1. Also received $5 
billion from banks and rollover of 
1983-84 principal of public debt. 
Current in payments on public debt; 
beginning to pay private sector 
interest. Some bankers expect Mexico 
to need more money later this year, 
but officials disagree. 
Brazil $80-90 $4.6 billion, 3-year IMF loan 
approved March 1, but now seeks 
"flexibility” on conditions. 
Negotiated package with banks that 
is breaking down as banks fail to 
provide all cash promised. Acute 
liquidity squeeze causes substantial 
arrears and new push on banks to 
provide another $3 billion. May 
seek help from U.S. and other 
governments. 
Argentina $35-40 $1.6 billion, 15-month IMF loan 
approved 3rd Jan. 24; reportedly in 
compliance with terms. Negotiating 
new $1.5 billion medium-term loan 
with banks; wants to roll over about 
$11 billion of debts due this year 
or overdue from 1982. 
Venezuela $25-35 Has postponed payment through July 1 
on about $9 billion of debt due in 
1982; trying to negotiate longer- 
term stretch-out with banks. 
Bankers want nation to go to IMF for 
loan and agree to austerity 
measures, but with election in 
December, officials resisting. 
10 







Chile $15-20 2-year IMF loan approved Jan. 10, 
but out of compliance with terms and 
didn’t get March 31 installment. On 
’’shadow" IMF program aiming to reach 
compliance. Negotiating rollover of 
1983-84 public debt plus $1.3 
billion in new funds. 
Peru $12 In midst of 3-year IMF program and 
in compliance. Negotiating new $450 
million loan from banks; negotiating 
through Paris Club for stretch-out 
of debt to other governments. 
Nigeri a $15 Like Venezuela, hurt by lower oil 
prices. Unwilling to go to IMF, but 
very early talks under way. In 
substantial arrears on trade and 
suppliers credit; talking with banks 
about stretch-out of short-term 
debt, estimates of which vary 
widely. Current on long-term debt. 
Pol and $25 Has worst prospects of regaining 
solvency. Reportedly asked banks to 
stretch out over 20 years its 1983- 
85 debt. Talks in Paris Club over 
official debt stalled because of 
U.S. opposition. 
Yugoslavia $15-20 In last year of 3-year IMF loan; 
forced to tighten program to cope 
with reduced bank financing after 
Polish crisis. In drawn-out talks 
with IMF, governments, and banks 
about 1983 financing. Sources say 
these close to successful 
conclusion. 






Romani a $8-10 Case similar to Yugoslavia's. 
Signed 3-year loan in June 1981, had 
to change terms to cope with reduced 
bank financing. Banks and suppliers 
stretched out 1982 debt; talks under 
way on 1983; also seeks new bank 
loans. 
Hungary $7-9 Also hurt by Polish crisis. 13- 
month IMF loan approved last 
December; talking with banks for 
small new loan this year. 
SOURCE: The Washington Post, May 15, 1983, p. F 1. 
*Debt totals are estimates; bankers caution that actual 
amounts may vary by 10 percent or more. 
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Jamaica was one of the vanguard countries in 
demanding the NIEO, not because her politics were 
revolutionary, but because she could easily become one of 
the desperate, downtrodden and further undeveloped 
countries. Her historical dependency on Great Britain, and 
lately the United States, showed no marked improvement in 
her development; this trend highlighted that Jamaica is a 
country with limited mineral resources, a growing population 
accompanied by a low level of education, high unemployment 
and poverty, and increasing inequality. 
The Jamaican government, led by Michael Manley's 
People's National Party (PNP), sought to stop that trend and 
to redress these ills. Greater control over the most 
substantive natural resource (its population) was advocated; 
the educational system was geared for free education from 
birth to university level; the public works sector began 
employing a great number of previously-unemployed people; 
sugar cane lands were turned into cooperatives and there was 
a general desire to lessen the inequities in the society. 
The government (PNP) lists as its achievements: (a) 
increased social justice; (b) pursuit of economic 
independence within a New International Economic Order; (c) 
more democracy for the people; (d) more rights for the 
workers.1® 
Apolitical Education Programme, Canvasser's Training 
1979/80, part I, p. 5. 
13 
TABLE 1.2 




Advances for women 
Advances for children 
Jamaica Adult Literacy 
More school places 
More youth programmes 
Social Justice 
Bauxite levy 
Economic cooperation with 
other Third World Countries 
A Fairer deal for Third 
World countries in the inter¬ 

















Trade union advances 
through labor legislation, e.g., 
law to compel employers to 
recognize and negotiate with the 
union of the workers’ choice; 
law to compel employers to rein¬ 
state wrongfully dismissed 
workers; law to guarantee notice 
and severence pay to innocent 
workers who have lost their jobs; 
law to make money owed to workers 
a priority claim on employers who 
are closing down.1° 
The rights of 
workers 
18ibid., p. 9. 
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In 1974, the Jamaican government adopted a non- 
aligned foreign policy. This included closer ties with Cuba 
and the visits of revolutionary leaders, Samora Machel of 
Mozambique, Mr. Lopo de Nascimento (Neto) of Angola, and 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. The government had developed a 
strategy for getting help from any source. Lines of credit 
and loans poured in from the British, South Koreans, French, 
Venezuelans, Trinidadians, Canadians, Norwegians, and 
several others. At the same time relations with the United 
States were deteriorating. In July 1973 Prime Minister 
Michael Manley declared U.S. Ambassador Vincent W. de Roui et 
as "personna non grata." ( See Chapter IV). Poor relations 
with the U.S. were further exacerbated by Jamaican support 
for Cuban intervention in Angola in 1974 and by subsequent 
allegations of U.S. involvement in "destabilization 
activities in Jamaica similar to those that had led to the 
ouster of the Allende regime in Chile."20 
The 1976 elections were won by an increased majority 
from thirty-five to eighteen to forty-seven to thirteen 
giving the government of Prime Minister Michael Manley a 
mandate for its democratic socialist policies. 
The balance of payments problem, in the meanwhile, 
had become chronic (see Table 1.3). 
20u.S. Information Report on Jamaica (January 1983), 
p. 149. “ ' 
TABLE 1.3 
JAMAICA - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1970-1981 
(U.S. $ million) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981^/ 
Exports (FOB) 342 371 374 399 605 760 630 724 792 815 961 990 
Imports (CIF) 522 553 587 677 936 1,123 913 747 857 994 1,161 1 ,440 
(of which oil) (33) (52) (56) (73) ( 195) (215) (204) (235) (194) (33D (451) (450) 
Trade Balance -180 -182 -213 -278 -331 -363 -283 -23 -65 -179 -200 -420 
Non-factor 
Services, net 96 110 124 113 110 97 -55 85 128 159 193 225 
(of which 
tourism) (80) (93) (110) ( 100) (97) (76) (47) (93) (130) (185) (230) (255) 
Investment 
Income, net -98 -103 -121 -58 21 -52 -112 -129 -179 -203 -293 300 
Transfers, net 22 21 27 27 24 26 6 20 26 80 91 115 
Current Account -160 -154 -183 -196 -176 -292 -334 47 -90 -143 -298 -410 
Direct Foreign 
Inves tment 161 175 94 75 23 -2 -1 -7 -27 -26 -11.0 8.0 
Table 1.3 (Continued) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19813/ 
Public Capital, 
net 9 23 37 137 173 179 86 26 103 76 128 277 
(D isbursements ) (15) (33) (54) (157 (203) (210) (143) (116) (224) (178) (195) (454) 
(Amortizations) (6) (10) (17) (20) (30) (3D (57) (90) (121) (102) (66) ( 177) 
Other Capital13^ 5 -23 23 46 50 34 35 -32 -125 -59 7.0 40 
SDR Allocations 6 5 4 - - - - - - 10 10 10 
Capital Account 181 180 159 166 246 211 120 -14 -48 1 134 335 
Change in Reserves 
(- increase) -21 -26 25 30 -70 81 214 60 139 142 75 75 
(Of which Change 
in arrears) (27) (36) (-8) (58) (-57) 
^Preliminary. 
b/lncludes errors and omissions. 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, IMF and IBRD Estimates. 
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The wage gains and lack of foreign capital saw the 
first real significant drop in the gross national product in 
the election year of 1976. Previously, the government was 
able to offset increased oil prices by the additional 
revenue obtained from the bauxite levy (see Table 1.4). 
Also, in 1976 the government program of increased exports 
and decreased imports began to take effect, which helped to 
alleviate the problem. 
The Manley government sought alternate sources of 
capital, but was unable to raise the necessary funds. The 
manufacturers and industrialists were threatening massive 
lay-offs if foreign exchange continued to be short. The 
Manley government had no alternative but to accept IMF 
conditions.21 
2lThese conditions are analyzed in Chapter III. 
Table 1.4 
JAMAICA EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES, 1974-81 
(million of 1974 J $) 
PROVISIONAL Estimate 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Consumpt i on 1866.7 1904.6 1945.2 1918.5 1799.3 1706.7 1666.5 1667.6 
Private 1479.6 1505.3 1499.0 1467.4 1330.7 1231.5 1210.0 1224.8 
Public 386. 1 398.7 446.2 451.1 468.6 475.2 456.5 442.8 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 478.2 482.3 339.0 234.4 239.6 289.4 224.4 236. 1 
Increase in Stocks 63.4 55.6 42.4 15. 1 21.5 16.5 -11.9 24.0 
Exports of Goods NFS 759.0 598.0 514.4 568.7 599.4 624.4 761.5 777.9 
Imports of Goods NFS -996.7 -1024.2 -821.3 -622.2 -686.4 -753.6 -728.5 -833.5 
Statistical Discrepancy - 60.5 -34.6 -67.0 -98.7 -117.3 -64.0 
Gross Domestic Product 2169.6 2156.7 2026.1 1987.3 1982.0 1953-4 1848.0 1872.1 
Source: Department of Statistics and World Bank Mission Estimates 
* NFS: Non-factor Services 
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Statement of the Problem 
There are many who believe that the IMF is a bank of 
last resort and as such is not meant for development needs. 
But if one examines the formation of the IMF, it and the 
World Bank were supposed to be guiding forces in the recon¬ 
struction and development of the broken-down economies of 
Europe and Japan. The research asserts that the IMF was not 
formed to aid development of the Third World countries, and 
despite its present claim to be the most efficient advisor 
to LDCs, it has not changed its Articles of Agreement to 
reflect an appreciation of the problems of LDCs. Second, 
that political considerations, as well as economics, were 
the major factors in deciding the form of Jamaica's agreement 
with the IMF and that the IMF is not politically neutral but 
is an extension of United States foreign policy. Thirdly, 
that the Jamaican government was concerned with the historical 
struggle of the Jamaican people for land, employment, and 
equality. With this in mind, the Manley government set about 
to alleviate these ills. But the IMF program and recom¬ 
mendations which were geared to the private sector, indus¬ 
trialization, and exports, conflicted with the government's 
plans. The IMF, influenced by similar U.S. concerns, laid 
the foundation for a confrontation between the IMF and Jamaica 
that resulted in a change of government heavily influenced 
by IMF dictates. Although Manley had the mandate of the 
people, there were powerful forces working within Jamaica 
that were resistant to these changes. These forces were 
pro-IMF and therefore thwarted the Manley plans. 
20 
Theoretical Concerns 
There are two major theoretical concerns of this 
research: (1) what rules govern IMF actions when confronted 
with a set of development objectives somewhat at variance 
from its own? In other words, can the IMF be used for 
development and economic prosperity of LDCs?; (2) what scope 
does the typical LDC (Jamaica) have for charting its own 
course while at the same time operating within an international 
capitalist framework? 
The IMF is an international organization charged with 
managing international monetary problems. It operates under 
the aegis of the western capitalist system and is dominated 
by the Group of Ten. In a broad generalization, there are 
three worlds in the capitalist mold. The first consists of 
those countries that can attract international commercial 
loans mainly because of the structure and strength of their 
economies. The second world comprises those countries that 
cannot attract these loans because they are relatively under¬ 
developed. They have limited infrastructures and their 
economies are weak. Then there are those grey area countries 
that lie in-between the two extremes. 
The present IMF policy is to treat all member countries 
alike : 
The Fund has always avoided dividing its members into 
categories and has sought to preserve the principle of 
uniform treatment of all members. This is attractive if 
it can be done without jeopardizing the interests of 
either group. But can it?22 
22John Williamson, The Lending Policies of the Inter¬ 
national Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, August 1982), p. 13. 
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Nowzad has summarized the philosophy of the Fund towards 
LDCs: 
The Fund (as is evident from the Articles) has a market- 
oriented, pro-free enterprise, pro-capitalist, 
antisocialist philosophy, with a pronounced bias in 
favour of free trade, private investment, and the price 
mechanism. This reflects a "vision of the world” 
inspired and imposed by industrial countries, in 
particular the United States, on debtor (implicitly 
developing) countries. Many economists and politicians 
genuinely believe that the policies implied by this 
philosophy are in the best interests of developing 
countries. It must be recalled, however, that these 
officials are Western-trained and believe in the 
efficiency of the market. The imposition of this 
philosophy is facilitated by the dominant voting power 
of the industrial countries; in this way, the Fund 
serves the interests of creditor countries and helps to 
preserve their resources from claims by developing 
countries to larger resource transfers. In brief (as 
one Head-of-State has put it), the Fund is a "device by 
which the rich countries increase their power over the 
poor."23 
The Fund has two major philosophies that express the 
above view in its "Low Conditionality" and "High 
Conditionality." The former applies to the developed 
countries which are characterized by high industrialization, 
relatively full employment, and strong economies that might 
suffer periodic "balance of payments needs." What these 
countries need from the IMF are small adjustments of their 
currency and small loans relative to their economies to make 
these adjustments. "High Conditionality" loans are large 
loans relative to the economy of the debtor country. These 
loans address major financial problems characterized by 
repayment of former loans and the building up of some basic 
infrastructure. (Britain is an exception). 
23Bahran Nowzad, The IMF and its Critics (Princeton 
University, December 1981), p. 7. 
22 
The real difference between Low Conditionality and 
High Conditionality is the level of IMF influence. Low 
Conditionality countries have access to commercial banks, so 
the percentage of the money needed to correct their balance 
of payments deficit from the IMF only allows for nominal IMF 
advice to correct the problem. "High Conditionality" countries 
with a greater dependency on the IMF have to undergo more 
stringent IMF dictates. 
The Fund clientele has shrunk to this second group of 
countries, in which the commercial banks seek, to avoid 
exposure, . . . low income countries, which currently 
. receive two-thirds of the Fund's total commitments, account 
for a mere 7 percent of the banks' exposure in non oil 
developing countries.24 
The IMF increasingly has the responsibility of managing the 
LDCs' financial problems. IMF insistence on "High 
Conditionality" causes severe shocks to the economies of the 
LDCs. However, the organization would become an aid donor 
if there was no conditionality. The LDCs not only want loans 
at lower rates, but they also advocate a reorganization of 
the IMF to reflect the present realities of its functions. 
It was funded to adjust world monetary policies, but today's 
main influence is on the economies of LDCs. 
The above IMF responses are general economic solutions, 
but there is a political aspect to IMF conditions. Sharpley 
is of the opinion: 
24john Williamson, The Lending Policies of the Inter¬ 
national Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, August 1982), p. 13- For countries 
under High Conditionality see John Williamson's 
Conditionality. 
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. . . that there is a relationship between the ability 
and willingness of developing countries to accept Fund 
conditionality and the amount of resources the Fund is 
able to make available. While the Jamaican authorities 
had allowed the economy to deteriorate dramatically 
before going to the Fund, the conditions for this 
agreement were out of all proportion to the resources 
the Fund made available. Even if the agreement was seen 
by the Fund as a test of the government's determination 
to implement tough stabilization measures, the size and 
conditionality of Fund resources provided little scope 
and encouragement for the government to adhere to this 
goal.25 
The Jamaican position was not unlike Britain's situation. 
The British, because of their deteriorated economy, were 
granted an IMF "High Conditionality" loan of $3.9 billion. 
The British complained bitterly about the stipulations, but 
were spared IMF harsh terms by: 1) the increasing revenues 
of North Sea Oil; and, 2) influencing the IMF because of her 
unique relationship with the United States. 
Even making due allowance for the fact that the British 
ministers mistakenly sought U.S. involvement in an 
attempt to avoid conditionality, this involvement was 
most unfortunate. It is the Fund's mission not that of 
the U.S. treasury secretary, or even the under secretary 
for monetary affairs, nor the chairman of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Board to assess the outlook, drawing 
requirements, and necessary conditions pertaining to the 
applicant country. Such involvement can place pressure 
on the Fund's managing director, even if the advice of 
another government is not directly made to him, and 
could wrongly influence his decision. It should be 
strictly avoided in the future.26 
The point to be made is that developed countries are 
resistant to "High Conditionality," and Britain used her 
25jennifer Sharpley, "Economic Management and IMF 
Conditionality in Jamaica" in John Williamson, op. cit., p. 
260. 
26Malcolm Crawford, "High Conditionality Lending: The 
United Kingdom" in John Williamson, op. cit., p. 433. 
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political influence in the IMF to avoid harsh terms. 
Britain was able to do this because she had the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of a developed economy, and was 
able to stabilize her economy with an increase in revenue. 
However, LDCs like Mexico and Nigeria, even with their new¬ 
found oil wealth, were unable to balance their economies. 
The problem was even worse in small countries like Jamaica. 
The Manley Government’s Policies 
The Jamaican government policy was limited by the 
size of the economy and the great need of the majority. 
Contrary to the press reports of Jamaica’s radical change 
towards socialism, the government's position had always been 
reformist rather than revolutionary. In declaring his 
government democratic socialist in 1973, Manley was very 
careful in differentiating between communism and democratic 
socialism. 
The democratic was to be given equal emphasis with the 
socialist, because we were committed to the maintenance 
of Jamaica's traditional and constitutional plural 
democracy; and more importantly, because we intended to 
deepen and broaden the democratic process of our party 
and in the society at large ... In addition, we 
intended to pursue what is now termed a non-capitalist 
path of development to distinguish experiments like ours 
from the neo-colonial capitalist model of the Puerto 
Rican type and the Marxist Leninist model of the Cuban 
type.27 
These new directions meant that the relationship between 
Jamaica and international organizations dominated by western 
27Michael Manley, Jamaica Struggle in the Periphery 
(London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society 
LTD, 1982), p. 123. 
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capitalist philosophy would have to be reconsidered. 
The Manley government's declaration of democratic 
socialism is based on a belief in dependency theory. 
Manley, like Nkrumah and Rodney, believed that the internal 
problems of the LDCs cannot be solved without changes in the 
international order. The present structure has changed 
little since colonialism; the granting of political 
independence was not accompanied by economic independence. 
Manley’s position is close to Gunder Frank’s 
anal ysis: 
. . . our ignorance of the underdeveloped countries' 
history leads us to assume that their past and indeed 
their present resembles earlier stages of the history of 
the new developed countries .... Further, most 
studies of development and underdevelopment fail to take 
account of the economic and other relations between the 
metropolis and its economic colonies throughout a world¬ 
wide expansion . . . development of the capitalist 
system as a whole and to account for its simultaneous 
generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts, and 
of economic development in others.28 
The position is compared to the other adherents of 
the dependency school: Dos Santos, Furtado, and Cardosa. 
They are of the view that despite dependency there is 
development. Dos Santos is of the view that there are three 
forms of dependency: colonial, financial, and 
technological. 
Colonial dependency is based on an export economy and 
colonial control of the primary sectors of mining and 
agriculture and the exploitation of cheap labor. Financial 
^^Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 23- 
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dependency is characterized by the export of capital and the 
extraction of raw materials for capitalist production in the 
center. Technological dependency is the adoption of import 
substitution which uses the technological innovation of the 
DCs to produce goods for the local domestic market.29 
Furtado does not see it in as dismal a light: 
It was the process of industrialization aimed at the 
substitution of imports, that reproduced the split in 
the structure of the productive apparatus characterized 
by the coexistence of capital intensive industries, 
catering to the modernized minority, with traditional 
activities (rural and urban) catering to the mass of the 
population and to foreign markets . . . Furthermore, 
taking into account that dependence is permanently 
reinforced through the introduction of new products 
whose production require the use of sophisticated 
techniques and higher levels of capital accumulation, it 
becomes evident that industrialization will only proceed 
if the rate of exploitation increases, that is, if 
income distribution keeps concentrating.30 
Cardosa shows that there are structural changes in 
the LDCs, and although change is slow it is definite. These 
trends are shifting the perspective of LDCs: 
1. In the Capitalist Center 
a. Financial capital is no longer in control of 
banking and industry. 
b. The rate of profits in the LDCs is not 
declining but tending to increase in the 
long run. 
Investment is shifting from raw materials 
and primary commodities to the manufacturing 
sector. 
2. Due to participation in production, Third World 
countries can develop along with the capitalist 
center. 
29Thestonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of 
Dependence,” American Economic Review, May 1970, pp. 20-40. 
30c. Furtado, Underdevelopment and Dependence: The 
Fundamental Connection (Cambridge University, November 22, 
1973) mimeo, pp. 3-4. 
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3- Internal markets are developing manufactured 
commodities. 
4. Local savings are increasingly due to joint 
participation and less profit reparation. 
5. The periphery is absorbing less and less trade from 
the center. 
6. The technological dependence means that the center 
still produces the means of production while the 
periphery produces other commodities.31 
The dependency school of thought is diverse, ranging from 
Frank to Cardosa. 
U.S., BRITAIN (1ST WORLD) 
SOCIALIST BLOC, JAPAN, 
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Key: The center circle, the most exploitative countries. 
: Outer circle the most exploited countries (closest to 
Frank's analysis. 
: Third circle the bulk of the Third World (varies from 
Dos 
Santos to Cardosa depending on the level of 
development ) 
: Second circle the socialist countries they tend to 
trade with each other, generally tending to equitable 
trade (Canada, Australia, etc.) The level of 
expolitation is less than that of the center - also 
their trading patterns with LDCs are less 
exploitative. 
31F. H. Cardosa, "Dependency and Development in Latin 
America," Left Review, July-August 1972 , pp. 83-95. 
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Each analysis has some merit because the LDCs are 
heterogenous and are at varying stages of development. One, 
then, has to adopt the proper analysis from these authors to 
fit the particular country. See Table 1.5. 
In trying to break the strangle-hold of the developed 
countries, Manley supported the OPEC cartel, 
nationalization, and public sector spending. Manley was 
determined that the OPEC strategy should work. The LDCs 
over the years were making gains, but OPEC had the most 
possibilities. 
OPEC merely demonstrated that in one particular area in 
which the West was very dependent, the existing rules of 
the game could be changed by some enhanced degrees of 
Southern strategy. 32 
Jamaica was adversely affected more than most LDCs by 
the oil increases: 
Jamaica is 97ï dependent on oil for energy. In 
addition, it is a surprisingly big use»" of energy per 
capita for a Third World country. This is so because of 
the substantial growth in manufacturing which had taken 
place during the previous thirty years.33 
Manley understood that OPEC needed all the help it could get 
because it is a heterogenous group that had different 
demands. Although OPEC was receiving these new revenues its 
capacity to utilize them was markedly different. The OPEC 
countries, too, are dependent on the industrial west, and 
they do not have the political will to act as a body to 
alleviate the oil problems of the other LDCs. But even so, 
32ui Haq, op. cit., p. 19. 
33Michael Manley, op. cit., p. 149. 
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sacrifices had to be made in the first efforts to change the 
international system. The efforts of Manley in forming the 
bauxite cartel and his support of OPEC, although dramatic, 
were reformist rather than revolutionary. He wanted 
restructuring of the international system, not its 
destruction or refusal to participate. 
The Manley government programs were a step-by-step 
approach to change. His most revolutionary effort was the 
initial rejection of IMF terms in January of 1971. (See 
Chapter IV.) Manley's achievements: reducing unemployment, 
women rights, better labor relations, land reform, the 
attempt to eradicate illiteracy, and an improved educational 
system were all reformist. His insistence that internal 
reforms without addressing the international inequalities 
would not alleviate the plight of Jamaica is attributable to 
the dependency school of thought. 
The dependency theory argues that the world inter¬ 
national system is inequitable. The international trading 
system benefits the developed countries. It is the Liberal 
contention that the present system serves as an engine of 
growth and provides capital, technology, and education which 
will improve the lot of the LDCs. Those in the dependency 
school and the Marxists are convinced that the present 
international system promotes underdevelopment of the LDCs. 
The dependency trend of thought falls under the 
Structuralist school, which differs from the Marxists in 
that it believes the international system can be reformed, 
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while the Marxists advocate its destruction 34 
Research Concerns 
The problem faced by LDCs in financing their 
development has become increasingly more difficult with the 
twin problems of deteriorating terms of trade with the DCs 
and contraction of the LDCs' economies since the OPEC 
formation (in Chapter II we will analyze OPEC’s efforts to 
address this problem). 
Increases in the petroleum prices have added over $10 
billion to the import bill of the non oil-exporting 
countries of the developing world. Attendant increases 
in food and fertilizer prices add another $24 billion. 
The net impact has been to double their balance of 
payments deficits from $10 billion in 1973 to $20 
billion in 1974. offsetting the flows of concessionary 
loans and grants from the developed countries. 35 
The specific research concerns to be investigated are (a) 
the development and role of the IMF, (b) the development 
plans of Jamaica, particularly reform of the society and the 
conflict over these reforms between the Jamaican ruling 
class and the IMF. 
We will investigate the original purpose of the IMF. 
While the LDCs dominate the membership they are, in many 
cases, in desperate need for funds. Can the IMF help in the 
development of LDCs when the development concerns are never 
articulated by the IMF? Have there been any changes within 
the organization to address the LDCs' development plans? 
34Spe ro, op. cit., pp. 138-141. 
35Nazki Chourchi and Vincent Ferraro, International 
Politics of Energy Interdependence (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1976), pp. 66-74. 
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Jamaica had a definite development plan. The IMF had 
its own set of plans and in order to get IMF assistance 
Jamaica had to comply with IMF conditions. It will be 
instructive if we analyse the Jamaican plans by asking 
specific questions. What were the policies adopted by the 
Manley government to ensure Jamaica’s development? (Jamaica 
experienced negative growth for the majority of the Manley 
years as indicated by Table 1.4.) Were the social changes 
enacted by the government responsible for the decline? Was 
the Manley government correct in its' assessment of 
Jamaica's situation in the international economic system? 
Did Jamaica's call for a new economic order adversely affect 
her relationship with the major industrial countries and 
international organizations? 
Jamaica is beset by internal conflict. The 
population is predominantly black, with a small ruling class 
of white and brown men. There is a very small middle class 
in each of the above classes or groups that copies United 
States consumerism. The masses of the people live below the 
poverty level. The Manley government decided that they 
should be brought into the mainstream of the society. The 
public sector was thought to be the most effective and 
immediate vehicle to make this possible. This meant that 
the ruling class would have to pay more in taxes on land and 
other income. The present system is inequitable because it 
taxes the entrepreneurs and working people more heavily. 
They have the pay as you earn (income tax) system as well as 
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taxes on consumer goods (sales tax). There are many who 
escape the direct tax system such as independents, 
professionals, artisans and the urban petty traders, (the 
latter have become a viable force in the economy and yet 
unlike the rich they are not taxed adequately). 
Because of the increased taxes on them the middle 
class became disenchanted with the Manley government. The 
questions had to be asked, what role did they play in the 
political arena? Were they sufficiently aware of the on¬ 
going conflict between Jamaica and the IMF? How much 
influence did they have on the final outcome between the IMF 
and Jamaica? (See Chapter IV.) 
A major concern of the IMF was the fiscal management 
of the economy. Another was the role of the Bank of 
Jamaica; they were concerned about the Bank's financing of 
large public expenditures. This laid the foundation for 
political conflict. The government held on to its political 
philosophy, while the IMF insisted on its prescribed 
economic plan, hence the political-economic impasse between 
the two. 
Methodology 
The investigation of the above set of issues poses a 
variety of problems from a methodological point of view. 
The approach followed in this paper is a compromise among a 
set of requirements for strict verifiability. 
In order to investigate the first of our research 
concerns, we propose to examine the specific conditions of 
33 
the IMF's formation and its rules of behaviour. From this 
we may be able to suggest an approach that describes its 
modes of action in dealing with peculiar circumstances that 
Jamaica faces. The specific circumstances of having to deal 
with LDC debt problems and financial restructuring will then 
be highlighted. 
The second question will be analyzed on the 
assumption that the political philosophy of a particular 
government, if strongly held, will to a large extent 
determine how flexibly that country will behave in the 
context of the negotiations with external bodies. A 
selective review of Jamaica’s modern political development 
sets the stage then for a study of the PNP's political 
philosophy. Such a study will highlight the aspects of such 
a philosophy which are regarded as non-negotiable (as 
opposed to those which are), and will allow inferences about 
the likely outcomes of serious negotiations which have the 
possibility of seeming to undermine those non-negotiable 
elements of political philosophy. 
This thesis can be regarded as a case study of 
responses to IMF conditionality, and as such, reflects the 
strength of the case study approach. It, however, 
necessarily has the limitation of limited generalizability 
outside the time-space context of Jamaica's socio-economic 
developmental history. Data generated by the IMF, Bank of 
Jamaica, the Department of Statistics (Jamaica), the World 
Bank, and the Jamaican National Planning Agency will provide 
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the quantitative dimensions of the evidence used. In 
addition, the paper will utilize qualitative assessments 
generated by a wide group of interested parties in the 
debate concerning Jamaica's relationship with the IMF. 
Also, survey data will be used to examine the internal 
conflict between the Manley government and the ruling middle 
classes . 
Review of the Literature 
Drawing from her experience as a staffer of the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Teresa Hayter has 
documented the purpose of aid to the developing countries. 
In Aid As Imperialism she illustrates how the international 
organizations, specifically the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
United States Agency for International Development, have 
colluded by acting only in their interests, under the guise 
of aid for developing countries. It is an open secret that 
aid served the purpose of the developed countries: 
Aid is, in general available to countries whose internal 
political arrangements, foreign policy alignments, 
treatment of foreign private investment debt servicing 
record, export policies, and so on, are considered 
desirable, potentially desirable, or at least 
acceptable, by the countries or institutions providing 
aid, and which do not appear to threaten their 
interests.37 
On the surface this would appear to be the necessary 
condition to solicit another's help, but one has to consider 
the history of exploitation and the terms of trade that 
37Teresa Hayter, Aid As Imperialism (Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguin Books, Ltd. , 197 2), p. 15. 
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developed countries have had over developing ones. 
The author further elaborated on her observation by 
examining the operations of these agencies in four Latin 
American countries: Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and Peru. 
Although the circumstances were not quite similar, the 
underlying results were. Whenever those four countries have 
had populist governments intent on making mild reforms, such 
as expansion and redistribution of the national income, and 
in one case the redistribution of land, the IMF has called 
for devaluation of the currency and has broken off relations 
with them. The IBRD and AID have tried to influence the 
political process, but because their aid was on a long-term 
basis, it was not as easy to sever relationships. The 
question that needs to be asked is, Who benefits from aid 
given by those international agencies?: 
The crucial issue is whether the present systems of 
economic and social organization in Latin America, based 
on private enterprise, a respect for property, however 
unequally distributed, and economic and political 
dependence on the United States, are capable of 
providing real improvements in the conditions of life of 
the masses of the people. The policies of the 
international agencies imply that they are, or that such 
improvement is unnecessary or secondary to other 
considerations o^ simply that the United States, 
supported by the major financial agencies, is determined 
to preserve the existing situation for as long as 
possible . . .3° 
Cheryl Payer sets the basic foundation of the IMF 
operations in her book, The Debt Trap. It is necessary to 
have an organization like the IMF because of growing 
38ibid., p. 63 • 
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interdependence and trading among nations. When nations 
trade they have different balances because of the division 
of labour and capital around the world. The developed 
countries trade among themselves predominantly in finished 
goods and trade with the LDCs for raw materials. 
Historically, the developed countries have had the advantage 
in trading, because raw materials are controlled, and 
dependent on the whim and fancy of the developed countries. 
As importantly, the developed countries have control of the 
markets, and often use the market forces to depress or 
accelerate the usage of developing countries' raw materials. 
Over time the developed countries have had the 
advantage over the developing nations in trade resulting in 
unequal exchange rates. The fluctuation in demand for raw 
materials and the pricing of them by the developed countries 
have exacerbated the unequal exchange problem. The IMF, as 
an international organization, should be addressing the 
problem of equity in trading and unequal exchange rates, but 
its record is one of failure to address these issues, while 
it blames the victim, the LDCs', for inefficiency. Their 
efforts were inadequate and led to the LDCs demand for a 
NIEO. 
IMF approval, Payer records, serves as a prerequisite 
to all major sources of credit in the developed capitalist 
world, whether governments or multilateral institutions such 
as the World Bank. If not approved by the IMF, the 
particular country is blacklisted and refused any type of 
aid. She concludes: 
37 
The IMF is not the real villain of the plot, though it 
is the agent of the villains. They are the multinational 
corporations and capitalist governments which are the 
natural enemies of Third World independence and can 
usually mobilize the resources to crush it.39 
This adds weight to Hayter's notions that aid was a secondary 
source of influence: 
I believe, now, that the existence of aid can be explained 
only in terms of an attempt to preserve the capitalist 
system in the Third World. Aid is not a particularly 
effective instrument for achievement; hence, its current 
decline. But, insofar as it is effective, its contribution 
to the well-being of the peoples of the Third World is 
negative, since it is not in their interest that 
exploitation should continue.^0 
Development is a somewhat difficult term when one 
considers the European countries and Japan; their development 
went through the stages postulated by Rostow's stages of 
growth. But, applied to developing countries, these stages 
cannot stand up to critical analysis. The LDCs at this point 
and time have more external interference than those countries 
had. A more meaningful and realistic definition is given by 
Dudley Seers. Although not inclusive, it sheds more light 
on the problem: 
The questions to ask about a country's development are 
therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has 
been happening to unemployment? What has been happening 
to inequality? If all three of these have declined from 
high levels, then beyond doubt, this has been a period 
of development for the country concerned. If one or two 
of these central problems have been growing worse, 
especially if all three have, it would be strange to 
39cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1971), p. 10. 
^°Hayter, p. 9. 
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call the result development even if per capita income 
doubled . ^** 
The other side of the coin is underdevelopment, which 
is the bane of the developing countries, and which Dennis 
Goulet tries to describe: 
Underdevelopment is shocking: the squalor, disease, 
unnecessary deaths, and hopelessness of it all: No man 
understands if underdevelopment remains for him a mere 
statistic reflecting low income, poor housing, premature 
mortality or underdevelopment. The most empathetic 
observer can speak objectively about underdevelopment 
only after undergoing, personally or vicariously, the 
shock of underdevelopment. This unique culture shock 
comes to one as he is initiated to the emotions which 
prevail in the culture of poverty. The reverse shock is 
felt by those living in destitution when a new self¬ 
understanding reveals to them that their life is neither 
human or inevitable . . . The prevalent emotion of 
underdevelopment is a sense of personal and societal 
impotence in the face of disease and death, of confusion 
and ignorance as one gropes to understand change, of 
severity toward men whose decisions govern the course of 
events, of hopelessness before hunger and natural 
catastrophe. Chronic poverty is a cruel kind of hell; 
and one cannot understand how cruel that hell is merely 
by gazing upon poverty as an object. ^2 
The Report on the North-South dialogue is the result 
of a Commission of representatives of the North-South 
leaders, academicians and specialists, under the 
chairmanship of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. 
Their task was to analyze and recommend changes in North- 
South relationships. This independent group was concerned 
about the history of open confrontations between the North- 
^Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," Inter- 
national Development Review, XI (December 1969), p. 5. 
^2pennis Goulet, Economic Development in the Third 
World (New York: Longmans, Inc., 1981), p. 61. 
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South and the hardened positions taken by them at the more 
conventional international meetings where old cleavages 
remained and no meaningful solutions were forthcoming. The 
Commission said the situation warrants urgent reasoning and 
common understanding to solve a problem that includes all of 
mankind. Although not wanting to sound alarmist, they had 
this to say: 
This Report deals with great risks, but it does not 
accept any kind of fatalism. It sets out to demonstrate 
that the moral dangers threatening our children and 
grandchildren can be averted; and that we have a chance, 
whether we are living in the North or South, East or 
West, if we are determined to do so, to shape the 
world's future in peace and welfare, in solidarity and 
dignity.^3 
The report gives a general description of the grave 
problems facing the world at present: the plight of the 
poorest countries: hunger and food, population growth and 
movement, and the environment; disarmament and development; 
commodity trade and development; energy; industrialization 
and world trade; transnational corporations; investment and 
the sharing of technology; the world monetary system; 
development finance; unmet needs; a new approach to 
development finance; international organizations and 
negotiations and a program of priorities. 
The major theme of the work is that we are our 
brother's keeper and in a world becoming more 
interdependent, concessions and compromises have to be 
^independent Commission on International Development 
Issues, North-South: A Program of Survival (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1980) , p. 23* 
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shared for mutual benefits and the common good. The North 
is developed and has technological know-how, the South has 
raw materials and is underdeveloped. The East is between 
these position, but it needs to play a more meaningful role 
in world problem-solving. The heart of the matter is that 
the terms of trade between the North and South are 
inequitable. The Commission, like Spero, Lett, and other 
authors, dwelled on the fact that the percentage of trade 
between the North-South is rather low compared to that among 
the western developed countries. This is not as significant 
a fact as the figures would imply, as U1 Haq has pointed 
out, the 20 percent of trade between LDCs and DCs is 
misleading because of the type of goods traded. When the 
North buys raw materials from the South at a low price, it’s 
value or price/cost values rises when the revenues from 
shipping, manufacturing, advertising and the resale of the 
finished goods are added. This has the added effect of 
creating employment in the North, and the gaining of profits 
by several sectors in the North to the exclusion of the 
South. 
One draws this illustration to set the stage for a 
more realistic bargaining position between North and South. 
In the long run it is hoped that a more equitable trading 
relationship between North-South would be attained and that 
mere statistics should not be used to cloud a situation that 
is predicated on inequities. On the other hand, the South 
should not make unrealistic demands. 
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In many instances, a great influx of capital will only 
exacerbate southern problems of massive public spending when 
there are few trained locals available to administer or 
execute the influx of funds (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Nigeria). 
More importantly, benefits derived from these agreements 
should be used for the upliftment of the general population 
and not for a privileged few. 
In a study by John Williamson, a group of economists, 
and IMF officials, which by their own definition "was . . . 
mildly more centrist than initially planned but reasonably 
diverse nonetheless," met to discuss The Lending Policies of 
the IMF. The group assessed the negative image of the IMF. 
The Fund has been accused of adopting a doctrinaire 
monetarist approach and being insensitive to the 
individual situations of borrowing countries; imposing 
unreasonably one-sided conditions; being ideologically 
biased against socialism and in favor of free markets, 
and even perpetuating dependency.^ 
By and large, they found that although the Fund is not 
perfect these charges were unwarranted if not unfounded. 
The role of the Fund was conceived as a monetary 
institution charged with solving problems of payment 
deficits of member countries and preventing their adopting 
measures destructive to national and international 
prosperity.^5 They found that at its inception the Fund was 
characterized by limited borrowing from member countries, 
^John Williamson, The Lending Policies of the 
International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.: Institute 
for International Economics, 1982), p. 63. 
45ibid., p. 11. 
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and that there were substantial bilateral agreements between 
the United States and the devastated industrial countries 
under the Marshall Plan. 
Loans of the period were generally "Low 
Conditionality" where a country with a balance of payment 
need (deficit) declares its problem to the Fund, and is 
loaned the amount requested, on assurance that it will 
eliminate its deficit.^6 "High Conditionality," which 
started in the 1960s and especially with the newly 
developing states, involves a specific set of measures 
needed to eliminate a deficit, and the country has to 
undergo specific requirements set up by the Fund and the 
commitment of the member country to comply. 
The Commission goes on to state that the IMF is 
essentially a bank, and it cannot be frivolous in its 
lending policy, and that there must be a certain amount of 
conditionality for members to borrow.^7 What they found was 
an unfavorable situation; countries were coming to the IMF 
as a last resort, making it difficult to assess whether it 
is the banks' conditionalilty or the already precarious 
position of the country that causes the bad press and 
impression of the IMF "overkill." Of late, the IMF has 
tried to change that image by lending India a substantial 
^6lbid. , pp . 1 1-12. 
4?The Commission was part of a conference at Airlie 
House, Virginia chaired by C. Fred Bergsten and the results 
published by John Williamson. 
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sum of $5 billion as a lender of first resort. The 
performance figures on this transaction are still being 
analyzed. 
What the developing countries are most concerned 
about is the design of the IMF adjustment programs. Should 
the IMF interfere with the mix of policies of the particular 
country? The view is that it might be well to devise 
policies for balance of payment improvement, but "the 
challenge is to find a set of policies that will do so 
without sacrificing growth, employment, and an equitable 
distribution of income. . ." 48 The Commission posed the 
problem that states are sovereign and as such would be 
difficult for the Fund to please every one of their 
particular demands and serve the interest of all. The Fund 
functions better, they believe, if its technocrats lay down 
broad and general guidelines. 
As a whole, the Commission found that Fund policy was 
not excessive. However, they characterized Fund policy on 
certain countries as follows: 
The Fund can be accused of a lack of political realism 
in both Jamaica and Peru for having started by demanding 
drastic changes in policy, involving a fundamental 
scaling down of those countries’ ambitions to accord 
with unpleasant realities, in return for a minimal level 
of Fund financial support but that is not the same as 
having demanded overkill.49 
On the whole, they found the Fund was not monetarist. 
According to Williamson, its theoretical position is 
48i bid . , p. 25. 
49 Ibi d. , p . 54. 
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"eclectic" rather than "monetarist." Also the Fund was not 
necessarily anti-socialist. At the time of the conference 
some 11.5 percent of Fund loans went to six Communist 
countries and at one time Jamaica was the heaviest per 
capita borrower from the Fund. 
They did recommend some improvements: 1) The IMF 
could not be a lender of last resort; it should become more 
involved in structural deficits. 2) It should respond more 
closely to cyclical vagaries of the international system and 
lend weaker members in desperate situations more. 3) The 
extended facility should be more flexible so as to help 
continue to adjust to structural deficit, and a more closely 
coordinated cooperation with the World Bank. 4) In 
addition, the Fund should take into consideration output, 
growth inflation, and income distribution as well as balance 
of payments. 5) Credit ceilings should be contingent rather 
than fixed requirements. 6) Quotas should be large enough 
that the Fund can play the role it was designed fo^, and low 
conditionality loans should be given to countries whose 
deficits are caused by forces outside of a country’s 
control.50 
Joan Spero contends that modern western academe and 
liberals have clouded the concept of political economy. 
Their insistence that politics and economics are separate 
has brought about an artificial separation. On the one 
50ibid., pp. 57-59. 
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hand, they see the economic system based on production, 
distribution and consumption of goods and services. These, 
they insist, obey natural laws, while the political consists 
of power, influence, and public decision-making.51 They 
conclude that their only hope for peace and harmony is for 
politics to be isolated from economics, for the natural and 
harmonious processes of free trade to operate among nations 
bringing not only prosperity, but peace to all. 
Her alternative suggests that economics and politics 
are interconnecting, and that there are three ways in which 
political factors shape economic outcomes: (a) the political 
system shapes the economic system, (b) political concerns 
often shape economic policy, (c) international economic 
relations, in and of themselves, are political relations.52 
She then shows how political considerations played an 
important role in the management of economic relations since 
World War II and how the Bretton Woods system emerged, and 
the subsequent United States control of the system. It 
worked well until the late 1960s after which United States 
dominance could not control the system any more. The new 
vagaries of the international political and economic 
relations have created a complex system requiring genuine 
international cooperation. 
51 Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International 
Economic Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 
pp. 1-2. 
52ibid., p. 4. 
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Spero is of the opinion that the difference between 
competing political systems is one of the major reasons for 
continued conflicts. It is characterized by the Western 
countries and their interdependency, the North-South system 
and its dependence, and the East-West system of 
independence. The former has a crisis of management because 
of rapid economic expansion and the bankruptcy of effective 
management. The North-South system of dependence, which the 
South is convinced is caused by the North, provides 
development in the North and underdevelopment in the South. 
The Eastern bloc countries are not integrated into the 
western system and tend to develop by themselves. For the 
international system to operate and especially the monetary 
system, all the political systems have to be integrated and 
play meaningful and responsible roles. It will take more 
than idealism to get the parties together. One hopes 
however that mutual self-interests in living on the same 
planet will somehow have the different systems working 
together in the future. 
Professor Bourne is of the opinion that the Manley 
government, although well intentioned, was a financial 
disaster to Jamaica.53 But one should point out that 
Jamaica needed to break the cycle of unemployment and 
poverty. He points out that the Special Employment Program 
53Compton Bourne, "Jamaica and the International 
Monetary Fund: Economies of the 1978 Stabilization Program " 
Economics and Sociology Occassional Paper #729. (Columbus, 
Ohio: The Ohio State Univeristy, 1980), p. 18. 
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of 1972 began as a means to relieve the unemployment 
problem, but actually resulted in a major policy of work 
creation during the administration’s tenure. Another 
example he cited was the Free Secondary Education Program. 
It might be a good long run investment, but it depressed the 
government's treasury at an inopportune time. 
He faults the government expenditure over private 
enterprise and says, 
The central conclusion to be drawn so far is that the 
Jamaican balance of payments crisis is largely 
attributable to the poor export and production 
performances of the economy, domestic credit expansion, 
inflation, and excessive growth of governmental 
servi ces.54 
The IMF therefore was acting in Jamaica's best 
interest in imposing stricter fiscal management of the 
economy. He agrees that the IMF devaluation would serve to 
lessen import demand that was already depressed by the bad 
economy. The stabilization programs, he insists, would have 
the effect of lowering public and private consumption. The 
government revenue would then increase and the deficit would 
be lessened from 13.4 percent to 4.5 percent in 1978. As 
importantly, government savings would change from the 
disastrous 1.3 percent of G.D.P. to 7.9 percent.55 
For all of this, the IMF was to provide $240 million 
in loans over three years. Also, it was projected that 






economy, but these credits should not exceed a total of $100 
million dollars because she would run into the problem of 
debt servicing, which has been the bane of other developing 
countries, namely, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. 
Professor Bourne says that the IMF program had not 
been followed to the letter because the government reneged 
on its public sector wage increases, and failure to meet the 
IMF performances could be attributed to this.56 This caused 
the major problem between the IMF and Jamaica because they 
were opposed to an expanded public sector. 
It would appear that Professor Bourne’s recommendations 
are those that the Manley government was totally opposed to 
and the typical form of dependency that the Latin American 
economists in the dependency schools are bitterly opposed 
to. 57 
56lbid., p. 26. 
57Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 56. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
It is commonly mistaken that the modern impulse for 
an international monetary order in the form of a Clearing 
Union came from John Maynard Keynes. It has been documented 
that Dr. Walter Funk, Minister for Economic Affairs and 
President of the Reichsbank under Nazi Germany, thought of 
the idea for a United Europe under Hitler's rule. The 
German success over Poland and France led them to believe 
that they could finally unify Europe and Asia. They then 
thought about a system to manage world trade: 
The clearing system would make gold superfluous for 
currency and payment purposes within the clearing . . . 
Trade with other continents would be regulated by barter 
agreements . . .1 
The British got wind of the idea of a clearing union 
and of a system that would reject the backing of national 
currency by gold, and the concept of international trade on 
a need basis facilitated by a barter system. Maynard Keynes 
was the man appointed to combat this German financial 
propaganda. The logic of the reasoning convinced him of its 
viability, and instead of rejecting it, he accepted the 
notion, and in addition co-opted it as a British original. 
^Helen Alfred, (ed.) The Bretton Woods Agreement and 
Why It Is Necessary (New York: Citizens Conference on 
International Union, 1944), p. 6. 
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Keynes realized the futility of returning to the old laissez- 
faire arrangements whereby a country could be bankrupt, "not 
because it lacked exportable goods, but merely because it 
lacked gold.”2 He then set out to convince the English 
financial powers of the desirability of such an international 
system and having done so, to convince the United States. 
Fortunately for him, Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury 
was anticipating some form of international monetary system.3 
It took some convincing of the American politicians; 
the United States had entered a new level of world power and 
its consequent responsibilities. There were two major forces 
at work: the internationalists and the isolationsists. 
There were those who recognized that the United States had 
become the major power in the world and concomitant with 
military power is economic power. 
The United States, of course, was the dominant element. 
For better or worse only the U.S. had the resources to 
make these institutions work. Moreover . . . and people 
often forget this in recalling the Bretton Woods 
Conference . . . the war was still on. The Normandy 
landings took place only a month before the conference 
opened. The allies had not yet broken out of the Normandy 
beachhead; nobody knew when the war would end or how it 
would be won. There was almost complete dependence on 
the United States militarily, politically and economically 
No wonder then that the U.S. role at Bretton Woods was 
decisive. It is unlikely that there will ever be another 
world conference in which American power is so 
preponderant 
2Ibid., p. 7. 
3Alis Acheson, J. F. Chant and M. F. J. Prachony, 
Bretton Woods Revisited (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972), p. 2Y. 
^Ibid. p. 24. 
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Like Britain before her, the United States was east in the 
role of world leadership and the governing of a stable 
international monetary system. The internationalists, led 
by Secretary of State Hull, influenced by Dean Acheson, were 
convinced that liberalized trading would solve the problems 
of the world and eliminate war. 
In the United States, however, all were not ready to 
take on the new world leadership role. 
The most important objective of international 
cooperation is undoubtedly a large volume of trade. In 
the past we have been eager to sell but not by buy. We 
must do both. If there were a free flow of trade 
between all commercial nations there would be no reason 
for major wars. The interchange of goods and ideas, not 
only eliminates to a very considerable extent the 
underlying causes of war, but would help materially to 
increase world-wide production and minimize 
unemployment. 5 
The isolationists were concerned with domestic production 
and the protection of their local markets from the expected 
revival of the European economies. Therefore, the internal 
politics of the United States was not settled and there were 
divisions on the executive level as well as within the 
Congress and the population as a whole. Secretary Cordell 
Hull was inclined to solve the balance of payments 
difficulties by lifting trade restrictions and import 
charges. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau was inclined 
towards financial aid and exchange controls. Morgenthau had 
the President's ear so the IMF concept won over the 
International Trade Organization that would have been more 
5lbid., p. 17. 
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reflective of Hull's position. At the same time the 
American people and Congress had to be wooed. The U.S. had, 
at that time, never been part of an international 
organization; it had declined membership in the ill-fated 
League of Nations and there was a lingering isolationalist 
tradition in the country.6 
The Bankers favored the State Department's plan for a 
free market. But, it was doomed to failure because of the 
mood of the American public, especially the mid-western 
farmers. They were against any international free trade. 
The memories of the depression were still vivid in their 
minds, and they wanted to protect their domestic market. 
What the farmers were afraid of was the practice of the 
international community in the 1920s and 1930s, the beggar- 
my-neighbor policies of the industrial countries. What they 
did was to export their unemployment by dumping goods on 
each other. They would sell exports cheaper than prices in 
their domestic markets so as to keep their factories 
running, farms cultivated and their people employed. By so 
doing, they were able to keep employment at home and export 
unemployment to their trading partners. The farmers' 
protectionist stance weakened Secretary Hull's position of 
free trading and enhanced the Treasury's plan of financial 
aid and exchange control to eventually win out over an 
International Trading Organization (not that the farmers 
^Winthrop Aldrich, Some Aspects of American Foreign 
Economic Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1944), p. 142. 
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were pro-Treasury, but it suited their limited world view).7 
The White Plan 
The American Plan for the IMF was developed by Harry 
Dexter White. He worked on his draft from 1941 to 1943- He 
was influenced by John Maynard Keynes, the British counterpart 
in developing the plan. The White Plan essentially advocated: 
The Bank was to have a capital stock of $10 billion, 
half paid in immediately by members in the form of gold 
and local currency. It was designed chiefly to supply 
the huge volume of capital to the United States and 
Associated Nations that will be needed for reconstruction 
for relief, and for economic recovery. It was designed 
to eliminate world-wide fluctuations of a financial origin 
and reduce the likelihood, intensity, and duration of 
world-wide depressions; to stabilize the pi-ices of 
essential raw materials; and more generally to raise the 
productivity and living standards of its members. It 
was specifically empowered to buy and sell gold and 
securities of participating governments, to discount and 
rediscount bills and acceptances, to issue notes and to 
make long term loans at very low rates of interests.° 
What White envisaged was a lending bank with capital stock 
of about $10 billion, and credit-creating power to issue 
multiple loans to the tune of $60 billion. This was 
horrifying to the international bankers because of the amount 
of international liquidity that would be created. The IMF 
would become an institution that would literally usurp the 
international bankers’ power by putting all their functions 
into an international agency. The international 
?Fred L. Block, The Origin of International Disorder 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), p. 53- 
^Richard N. Garner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 74-75. 
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bankers saw an opportunity to lend money on the world mark 
(then limited to Europe and some Latin American countries), 
but a supranational lending agency would compete against 
them by lending money to developing countries. The IMF 
long-term goal should have been full employment policies 
based on the economic principle of comparative advantages, 
rather than protectionist policies and short-term fix-it 
remedies. To accomplish this expansionary policy the plan 
called for little or no change in the exchange rate; and 
balance of payment problems would be handled by mild 
disinflationary policies in deficit countries and 
expansionary policies in surplus countries. The While Plan 
envisioned a wider trading area and the involvement of more 
countries in a broader and wider world community.9 One 
cannot go overboard with the White Plan's expansionary role. 
It was limited, then, in how the world was perceived because 
the Asian and African countries were not independent. But 
to give him the benefit of the doubt, the plan could include 
all countries and their later independence would enable them 
to enter into the community of nations. 
White conceded that the plan would impinge on certain 
aspects of sovereignty because the IMF would be able to 
block changes in exchange rates -- a function that 
historically was done by states themselves, although in 
other ways the IMF would work to enhance the power of 
9Block, op. cit., p. 44. 
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political changes to improve their economies have been 
frustrated by the individual investor moving his money to 
other countries. 
France, in particular, suffered from massive capital 
flight during the period of the Popular Front with the 
result that the government was forced to abandon some of 
its economic and social reforms.”^ 
For his plan to work there would have to be cooperation 
between national governments, and in the case of France, the 
Popular Front's policies would be adhered to because of 
certain conditions in the White Plan: 
(a) Not to accept or permit deposits or investments 
from any member country except with the permission 
of the government of that country, and 
(b) To make available to the governments of any member 
country at its request all property in form of 
deposits, investments, securities of the nationals 
of that member country.”'"' 
White was willing to sacrifice the disgruntlement of 
the five to ten percent of wealthy persons in these 
countries that had enough wealth to invest abroad. (No 
wonder White was scrutinized under the McCarthy communist 
scare. ) 
^Colin Wolfe, The French Franc Between the Wars 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp~. 147-170. 
"^Keith J. Horsefield, The International Monetary 
Fund: 1945-1965 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, 1969) , P* 44. This would mean that nationals of a 
country undergoing structural changes under’ the auspices of 
the IMF, would not be able to transfer funds to other 
countries, thereby thwarting the efforts of reconstruction. 
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The Keynes Plan 
The Keynes Plan, on the other hand, called for a 
Clearing Union: 
It was essentially an overdraft facility that would 
grant credit to deficit countries automatically when 
they ran payments deficits. Payments deficits or 
surpluses would appear as debits or credits in the books 
of the clearing union. The clearing union would be able 
to provide a total of $26 billion in credit, but each 
country would have a maximum credit quota determined on 
the basis of its share of international trade. The 
large quantity of available credit meant there was 
little pressure for adjustment on deficit countries. 
The fact that surplus countries would simply accumulate 
credit balances rather than real assets, and that they 
would be required to pay interest on credit balances 
above a certain size, meant that there would be strong 
pressure for surplus countries to return to balance-of- 
payments equilibrium. In short, surplus countries would 
have to adjust by inflating their economies and by 
increasing their imports, while import countries would 
largely be free to pursue their own policies. The plan 
would give Britain freedom for domestic experimentation 
while assuring access to significant quantities of 
international credit. It would mean that even if the 
U.S. economy slipped into depression or ran a major 
export surplus, it would have little negative effect on 
the rest of the world economy.12 
On the face of it, surplus countries would be at a 
disadvantage, because they would be penalized for a trading 
advantage and for oversaving. What has happened in the past 
is that in surplus countries there is the tendency towards 
inflation, with too much money chasing too little goods. 
Also in the past, countries tended to impose tariffs on 
trading partners to equalize trading. The most overriding 
fact, however, would be there should be equilibrium between 
national governments. In the past, countries that 
12Block, p. 48. 
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made trading partners to have as equitable a world system as 
possible. Hence, both deficit and surplus countries should 
sacrifice in preserving such a system. 
The Keynes Plan was biased to the extent that he 
favored Britain’s interests of protection for deficit 
countries. Notwithstanding this, his plan had merit, 
because his Clearing Union would be acting as an overdraft 
facility. 
It was unfortunate that neither the White nor Keynes 
plan was finally adopted, although it is widely acknowledged 
that White’s plan laid the foundation for the IMF. The 
American Congress, led by Senator Taft, was opposed to the 
United States government investing large sums of money in an 
international organization. Furthermore, Roosevelt died in 
1945 and Morgenthau and White were not retained by the 
Truman Administration. The IMF was therefore influenced by 
policy makers with limited international scope. 
The United States was on its own, and bilateral 
arrangements took precedence over international ones. 
Simultaneously with the Bretton Woods agreement, the United 
States loaned Great Britain $3*75 billion outside of the IMF 
which had only $8.8 billion.13 Also, she began the recovery 
of the broken down economies of Europe and Japan by 
bilateral agreements: 
"13Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International 
Economic Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 
pp. 35-36. 
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The leading industrial economies have found that it is 
beneficial to coordinate balance-of-payments policies 
under a system that frowns upon parity changes. The IMF 
has provided a forum of discussions of policy problems, 
but the most effective cooperation has been forged at 
meetings outside the IMF umbrella between officials of 
the financially important countri es . 1 
As a matter of fact, by 1 950 the IMF had only used $.8 
billion in international adjustments. The United States 
dollar had become the key currency.15 
The Role of the United States 
The United States, as a young world power, decided on 
political rather than economical solutions to the IMF's 
problem. Keynes advocated that the U.S. should contribute 
more than the $2.64 billion to the Fund. (See Table 2.1). 
The amount of funds in the IMF was adequate to meet the 
world's liquidity demands. As a consequence, the U.S. only 
delayed the international problem by its many bilateral 
arrangements in the loans it gave to other developed 
countries. 
1 ^Development Dialogue "Background Notes on the 
International Monetary Fund," p. 102. 
15ibid., p. 110. 
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Table 2. 1 
The quotas in the 1943 version of the Keynes Plan were as 
follows in millions of dollars: 
Great Britain 4, ,978 
United States 4, , 040 
France 1 , ,931 
Germany 3, ,129 
USSR 411 
The rest of the world would contribute about another $10 
billion giving it a grand total of about $26 billion 
dollars.16 
What the United States had not been willing to undertake 
within the framework of a broadly conceived 
international institution like the Keynesian Clearing 
Union, she did through her direct efforts to help other 
nations return to currency convertibility.^® 
She sought to dictate world stability through the IMF and 
herself. The consequences were grave: 
The outcome of the Bretton Woods system needed (1) far 
greater liquidity reserves than the Fund could provide, 
and was forced into shanghaing the U.S. dollar as 
international money; and (2) that the system had to 
weather repeated international monetary crises connected 
with the relatively rare but substantial parvalue 
changes.17 
What Keynes had feared came to pass, similar to the 
pound in the 1930s, the U.S. dollar became overvalued. It 
became an international currency. In acquiring functions of 
"I^George Halm, A Guide to International Monetary 
(Lexington: Lexington Press, 1975) , p. 25. 
17Gerald Meir, op. cit., p. 143. 
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an international currency, the dollar reaped certain 
benefits, but also some burdens. Although the country had 
surpluses in the commodity trade, there was a continuing 
payment deficit owing to her role as key-currency country.18 
The United States failed to take her cue from history by 
responding similarly as Britain did when the other European 
countries became industrialized: 
This country was no longer the sole practical supplier. 
Again, all that was happening was that the world was 
growing up around the U.K. Other countries, having 
industrialized themselves, were contributing their quota 
to the ever expanding total of world trade. '9 
Paradoxically, the countries that the United States 
had helped in rebuilding their economies began to have 
excessive amounts of dollars. The United States decided 
that it would not exchange the dollars for gold. The United 
States’ expenditures, especially her military spending and 
competition against the Soviets in the giving of aid, 
resulted in an abundance of U.S. dollars in the other 
developed countries.20 The U.S. production was high and 
there was confidence in the American dollar and few 
countries demanded gold for dollars. 
Naturally, over time the surplus countries became 
worried because their surpluses were used by the United 
States to finance her deficits. She had not cut down on her 
military spending; instead she just printed more money. 
I8ibid., p. 144. 
19Gerald Munser, p. 24. 
20Joan Spero, p. 149. 
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However favorable it appeared to the United States, she had 
to depend on the continued faith of the other developed 
countries placed in the United States dollar. Further, the 
principle and spirit of Bretton Woods was breached by the 
predominance of one currency. 
The developing countries, on becoming independent, 
realized that they were not on parity with the developed 
countries in the international organizations. The United 
States, under the Marshall Plan, had given aid from 1948 to 
1952 to Western Europe to the tune of $17 billion while in 
the same period the IMF disbursement was $.85 billion.21 
This amount went largely to peripheral Northern countries. 
The newly independent countries, it was thought by the 
United States in particular, would be able to grow from the 
export of their primary products and by their own efforts. 
The era of the Cold War saw a change in U.S. policy. The 
Soviets were financing revolutionary movements around the 
world and the U.S thought it fit to oppose Moscow's designs 
wherever possible.22 
21lsmail-Sabri Abdalla, The Inadequacy and Loss of 
the Legitimacy of the International Monetary Fund 
(Development Dialogue: 1980), 2, p. !P4 (The IMF activities 
were limited until the mid 1960s; see Appendix F). 
22jennifer Whitaker, Africa and the United States: 
Vital Interests (New York: New York University Press, 
1974), pp. 12-14. 
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The Third World Response 
The IMF was not the vehicle used to disburse the aid 
and in most cases the aid was tied to the donor countries, 
resulting in more benefits to the donor than to the 
recipient.23 The LDCs responded by trying to isolate 
themselves from the international trading system. 
Throughout the decade of the 50s, they tried import 
substitution. There was some industrialization, but by the 
early sixties, their strategy was clearly a failure. The 
crude policies of protection under import subsititution 
worked for the early stages of economic growth, but the lack 
of competition at the later stages, produced barriers to 
subsequent growth.24 
In fact, import substitition produced high-priced 
goods, capital intensive machinery and had little or no 
impact on employment. Even more damaging, it stifled 
agricultural output by placing most of the foreign exchange 
on parts and equipment. There was little investment in 
agriculture, the industries were concentrated in the cities, 
and a dual economy appeared. Characterized by income 
inequalities, the industries in the city were paying high 
wages while there was low agricultural income in the 
23Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered 
(Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1966), p. 16. Also Teresa Hayter, Aid as 
Imperialism. 
24john H. Power, "Import Substitution as an 
Industrialization Strategy," The Phillippine Economic 
Journal, 5 (1966), pp 169-174. 
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country.25 This resulted in the social problem of people 
flocking to the cities hoping for employment in these new 
industries. These new cities could not cope with the urban 
sprawl caused by the new mass migration. 
There had to be a new strategy for the ’60s. The 
Southern strategy began in earnest in 1961 at the Belgrade 
Conference of non-aligned governments under the tutelage of 
President Tito of Yugoslavia. The South formed a united 
front to voice their concern about trade management in the 
international trading system. The United Nations was the 
arena they decided was best suited to air their demands. 
The growing unity and majority of the South in the General 
Assembly forced the North, through the operations of United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1962, to 
make plans to form the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, which convened in Geneva in 1964.26 
Since 1964, the developing countries have become more 
vociferous in their demands. They began to question the 
International Monetary System which was controlled by the 
United States. The U.S. dollar had become the main currency 
and continued American deficits caused inflationary 
consequences among her major trading partners. The problem 
termed the Triffin Dilemma resulted from the fact that there 
25joan Spero, p. 186. 
26charles L. Robertson, "The Creation of UNCTAD" in 
Robert W. Cox, (ed.) International Organization; World 
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1969) , pp. 258-274. 
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were too many U.S. dollars around the world.27 The 
contradiction was that if the U.S. took action to stem the 
dollar outflow there would be a critical shortage of 
international liquidity which would have worldwide 
repercussions. Many of the major countries started to 
switch to gold and the prospects of a depleted Fort Knox 
became real. The U.S. reserves fell from $24.4 billion in 
1948 to $15.4 billion in 1964. Belatedly, the U.S. found 
out that the organization formed to oversee such an 
emergency was of little help because its reserves were too 
inadequate to meet the great demand. From 1959 to 1970 IMF 
quotas were increased by 50 percent.2^ 
The IMF could not handle the precarious situation. 
During Kennedy's presidency, with a more outward looking 
international posture, some changes were initiated. He 
began focusing on the more powerful European Common Market 
and its inward looking trading pattern. This threatened to 
decrease U.S. trade even further. The United States wanted 
Britain to join the Common Market because she had 
historically favored liberal trading relations. But the 
French, especially, and the Germans were opposed to 
Britain's entry because they realized more liberal trading 
would weaken their advantage. The competition of the 
developed European countries was having a telling effect on 
27Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 12. 
28see Appendix F. 
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U.S. trade and her goods were becoming less competitive in 
the world market. In implementing his policy, Kennedy had a 
two-pronged attack: First, the United States belief in 
trading relations rather than a truly International Monetary 
Fund got new life in the Kennedy Rounds General Agreement of 
Trade and Tariff.29 in 1961-62 the Dillon Round was 
negotiated, but it had adverse limitations because of 
existing U.S. legislation; tariff barriers could not be 
lowered more than twenty percent. What resulted was a 
complicated, slow process of item-by-item reduction. The 
Kennedy administration was not satisfied with this slow 
process, so legislation was enacted to rectify the 
situation. In order for President Kennedy to show good 
faith to the EEC, he had to lower the tariff barriers the 
Congress had imposed on their main trading partners. The 
result was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 under which the 
U.S. could cut tariffs up to fifty percent. Kennedy, in so 
doing, wanted to invite the EEC to adopt more liberal 
trading arrangements, and also to help Britain join the 
EEC.30 
The other attack by the Kennedy administration was 
the effort of Under Secretary of State Robert Roosa. By 
1961, the U.S. insistence that the gold price remain at $35 
per ounce came under increasing pressure. Bilateral 
29Fred Block, p. 175. 
30Bela Belessa, Trade Liberalization Among Industrial 
Countries (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 30-31. 
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arrangements were made with Britain, Switzerland, and the 
European Common Market to furnish half of the gold needed to 
keep the price at $35 per ounce. However, private 
speculators began buying gold, thus pushing up the demand. 
The United States, to counter that trend, had to sell gold 
on the private market which further depleted the U.S. 
reserves of gold at Fort Knox. At the same time, Roosa 
realized that if the dollar was to remain the international 
currency, it had to get relief. The United States had, in 
fact, become a deficit country like Britain, which had 
consistently called for more international liquidity since 
the days of Bretton Woods.31 The United States also became 
convinced that there was a need for more international 
liquidity. They proposed, not an expansion of quotas, but 
additional borrowing facilities from member countries.32 
But it was not enough to stop the U.S. deficit, at 
the same time the British pound came under pressure. From 
1964 to 1967 the United States did as much as she could to 
support the pound, knowing that if it were devalued, the 
dollar would be next. The United States, therefore, had to 
fight for relief of the dollar, and the most effective way 
was to expand the IMF. The U.S. sought to take pressure off 
the U.S. dollar in an expanded IMF that would give some 
relief to the inadequate international liquidity problem. 
3lBlock, p. 178. 
32Keith J. Horsefield, p. 485. 
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These changes in exchange rates and gold market 
arrangements mean that the rules of the International 
Monetary Fund are obsolete. The Fund remains moderately 
active (international institutions never die, even 
though their original justifications do), but the Fund's 
articles and rules are now largely irrelevant. Foreign 
centered banks hold a large’" volume of dollar assets 
than they prefer. The usefulness of gold holdings of 
foreign central banks in monetary settlements is 
questionable. Perhaps more importantly, the consensus 
among Atlantic nations on how the international system 
should operate has been shattered.33 
It became painfully clear to the United States and 
the Atlantic powers that the IMF, with its dollar-gold 
standard, was incapable of making the arrangements for 
integrating separate monetary systems. But they were not 
sufficiently far-sighted to adopt the Keynesian Plan and 
Keynes' bancor idea. Instead, a limited Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) was created. 
The shortage of international liquidity meant that 
there had to be seme accomodation to relieve the world 
monetary system. The SDRs were thought to be the solution 
to the problem but still had the old notion that a currency 
should be backed by some standardized measure of worth. In 
the old days (British system) it was gold; under the Bretton 
Woods System it was the combination of gold and the U.S. 
dollar. At present it is the combination (basket) of 
sixteen currencies from the leading industrial countries 
along with those from OPEC countries. It should be an 
international central bank run by a representative body of 
administrators from developed, developing and oil countries 
33Robert Aliber, pp. 9-10. 
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where funds are disbursed according to needs and not 
necessarily the ability to repay. 
The DCs would have to set aside special funds within 
the IMF to alleviate the plight of the poorest countries. 
The goals of the newly industrialized countries can be 
generalized to full employment, an educational system that 
impacts on every person within the society, and the 
lessening of inequality. However some poor countries have 
basic, primary concerns such as food to stop mass 
starvation, water for its many vital functions, roads to 
mobilize the society and other basic infrastructure to bring 
them into the twentieth century. 
In this sense we continue to make common cause with the 
Arusha Initative as an appeal in favour of a U.N. 
conference for solving the questions of international 
finance and monetary affairs. We believe that a new 
international finance order must serve two basic 
objectives. First, it must be capable of achieving 
monetary stability, restoring acceptable levels of 
- employment and sustainable growth, and checking the 
present strong inflationary and stagflationary 
tendencies and policies in the world economy. Secondly, 
it must be supportive of a process of global development 
especially for the countries of the Third World which 
contain the majority of the world's poor.34 
More specifically the most desperate of the LDCs 
should be helped by all the major world organizations 
including the IMF to upgrade these poorest of the poor, 
about ten percent of the world population, by starting them 
34samuel Lichtensztejn, "The IMF - Developing 
Countries: Conditionalilty and Strategy” in John 
Williamson, op. cit., p. 222. 
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off on the basics. Loans could become aid if the ability to 
pay does not materalize as quickly as anticipated. 
The impulse of the United Nations to alleviate the 
problem through the International Development Association 
(IDA) and United Nations Industiral Development Organization 
(UNIDO) is far from adequate. These organizations should 
not be eliminated, but work in conjunction with the IMF in 
ways to best solve the problems of the poorest and 
eventually help create an equitable world system. 
Efforts to Change IMF Structure 
Adjustment 1: The SDR 
In the field of international liquidity, the Special 
Drawing Account constitutes a major historical 
development, as it provides for a deliberate managing of 
the level of world reserves and the use of their new 
component: SDRs. Its establishment has rightly been 
called the most important event in monetary affairs 
since Bretton Woods.35 
The inadequacy of the system showed from the early 
1950s, and in 1961 the Group of Ten had to lend additional 
amounts of their currencies to enable the IMF to cope when 
supplementary sources were needed.36 This stop-gap measure 
did not last and in 1968 the following applied: 
The plan to create SDRs was the result of a lengthy 
discussion. The problem was how international liquidity 
reserves could be consciously created and could, to that 
extent, become independent of the haphazardness which 
characterized additions to monetary gold reserves and 
foreign-held dollar balances. Besides, many members of 
the Fund were dissatisfied with the strictly conditional 
nature of the traditional drawing rights in the credit 
35Qeorge Halm, p. 35. 
36IMF Review, 1945-1970, p. 42. 
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branches, otherwise, the whole problem of additions to 
liquidity reserves might have been solved simply by 
speeding up the process of quota increases and making 
it independent of additional gold contributions.37 
What the international monetary system wanted was a truly 
central bank with a responsible manager similar to that 
which exists in most major financially viable countries. 
The liquidation of the fiction of the central debtor of 
money in circulation is a genuine breakthrough in 
monetary thinking. In the nation, no recipient, holder, 
or spender of money ever thinks of the existence of a 
legal debtor who issued the money and continues to ’owe' 
something to the holder. The only thing in the mind of 
the recipient and holder of money does not expect to 
’collect’ from the issuing agency, but only to pass on 
the money to those who have something to sell. The 
holder of special rights, likewise, will not collect 
from or draw on the Fund or its Special Drawing Account. 
Instead, the participating country will pass its SDRs on 
to other participants in payment for convertible 
currencies. In other words, the SDRs are international 
money accepted by the participating monetary authorities 
in payment for various convertible national currencies. 
Since only the acceptability of SDRs has to be secured, 
and is in fact secured by the obiligations undertaken by 
the participants, there is no need for any obligation or 
liability to be assumed by the agency that issues or 
allocates them.38 
The SDRs, as a move to alleviate the precarious monetary 
system, were limited because they were still tied to the old 
system of dollar-gold standard and its shortcomings, namely 
the deflationary bias of gold and the inflationary bias of 
the dollar. Under the old Keynesian concept, bancor would 
act as a medium of exchange from the central bank to its 
component national bank members.39 
37ibid., p. 22. 
38Fritz Machlup, Remaking the International Monetary 
System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 34. 
39wilbur Monroe, International Monetary 
Reconstruction (New York: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 73. 
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The situation with the SDRs did not change 
international trade drastically and the dollar continued to 
be the key currency. As the amount of dollars in the 
reserves of other countries continued to increase, the price 
of gold on the world market began to climb putting added 
pressure on the dollar. 
Reform of the system was proposed during 1967-68, but 
there was no action taken. There were various proposals for 
changing the system. The Triffin Plan, resembling the 
Keynesian Plan, suggested that there be an international 
central bank empowered to create credit for use by the 
national central banks. The Bernstein Plan proposed that 
all countries place their reserve assests, gold, foreign 
exchange and SDRs in a deposit account at the Fund, called 
the Reserve Settlement Account, which would work basically 
like a Clearing Union. The Despres Plan proposed a dollar 
standard, which would make dollars rather than the gold- 
dollar the standard for world reserves, making the U.S. the 
world banker.^0 These plans, whatever their merits and 
demerits, were not implemented because the U.S. was 
resistant to change. The nagging problem of inadequate 
international reserves remained: 
There may be a sufficiency or even an oversupply of 
reserve currencies, but there is a shortage of 
internationally created and managed reserve assets. The 
SDR, which is supposed to be the centerpiece of the 
reformed international monetary system, nowdays has 
quite a sorry record for a centerpiece. The 
^Wilbur Monroe, p. 73- 
72 
deficiencies in this situation are quite obvious. 
Reserve currencies are national currencies, and national 
currencies are used quite legitimately for national 
purposes. But these do not necessarily coincide with 
international needs, so that there is a shortage of the 
right kind of international 1iquidity.41 
The result is that countries that have had a surplus 
over the years have no shortage of national reserves, but 
the very fact that they have accumulated these vast reserves 
indicates that there is a shortage in the system as a whole. 
Not only were the LDCs faced with the problem, but so were 
some industrial countries like Britain and Italy. The lack 
of adequate international reserves has tended to limit the 
amount of funds available for general development the world 
over. 
The position of the United States worsened. She had 
used her political might to limit the exchange of foreign 
American dollars for gold because the reserves in Fort Knox 
were decreasing alarmingly. The United States had reserves 
of $26 billion in 1940; by 1971 they had dropped to $13-2 
billion (See Table 2.2). A political decision had to be 
made in light of the trading deficit, especially in the 
cases of Japan and West Germany: "Thus the Bretton Woods 
system has ceased to function. It will take many years for 
the Special Drawing Rights to become a sufficient 
substitute."*^ jt only addresses a small fraction of the 
4lNorman Miller, International Reserves, Exchange 
Rates, and Developing Country Finance (New York: Lexington 
Books, 19Ô2), p. 12. 
42ibid., p. 114. 
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world’s need and its convertibility is too limited. 
The inevitable happened; President Nixon had to take 
action forced by "the pressure of events rather than 
collective judgement -- not the collective judgement of 
another Bretton Woods Conference." The U.S. withdrew her 
commitment of gold convertibility and ceased the selling of 
gold at $35 an ounce.^3 In effect she had ushered in the era 
of floating exchange rates in contravention to the Bretton 
Woods agreement. 
^3ibid., p. 115. 
TABLE 2.2 
SIZE, SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD MONETARY RESERVES, 
1913-1978 (in billions of U.S. dollars of SDRs) 
End of 1913 1937 1949 1959 1969 1972 1975 1978 
Sources 
World gold in billions of 
SDRs at 35 SDRs per ounce 
throughout 4.1 25.3 34.4 39.9 40.8 41.2 41.1 40.1 
Credit in billions of SDRs 0.7 2.4 11.1 17.0 37.9 105.3 152.7 239.3 
Foreign exchange 0.7 2.4 11.0 16. 1 32.0 95.9 136.9 220.8 
SDR allocations and IMF credits 0.2 0.9 5.9 9.4 15.8 18.5 
SDR allocations n/a n/a n/a 9.3 9.3 9.3 
IMF credits n/a n/a 0.2 0.9 5.9 0.1 6.5 9.2 
Impact of gold-dollar fluctuations -0.3 0.1 0.2 44.2 149.6 291.5 
On gold valuation -0.3 0.1 0.2 35.2 123.6 219.0 
Gold and SDR rate -0.3 0.1 0.2 29.2 99.6 158.8 
SDR-dollar rate n/a n/ a n/a 6.0 24.0 60.2 
On credit valuation 
(SDR-dollar rate only) n/a n/ a n/a 9.0 26.0 72.5 
Total reserves, in billions 
of dollars 4.8 27.7 45.2 57.0 78.9 190.7 343.4 576.9 
Distribution 
Total reserves in billions 
of SDRs 4.8 27.7 45.2 57.0 78.7 146.6 193.8 279.4 
TABLE 2.2 (continued) 
End of 1913 1937 1949 1959 1969 1972 1975 1978 
Sources 
Uni ted States 1.3 12.8 26.0 21.0 17.0 12.1 13.6 15.0 





























n/a = not applicate 
SOURCE: Robert Triffin, "The Future of the International Monetary System," paper delivered 
on October 31» 1979 at a conference of the Global Interdependence Center, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
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The IMF had at that time the opportunity to implement an 
international currency by utilizing a Clearing Union; 
instead it continued to put its faith in the limited SDRs 
that it had created. The IMF responded by converting its 
accounts into SDRs.2*1* 
In December of 1971 the Group of Ten made an 
agreement without consultation of the developing countries. 
They decided on a general realignment of parities, which in 
effect meant a devaluation of the American Dollar from seven 
and one-half percent with regards to the weakest Group of 
Ten currency, the Italian lira, to 16.9 percent to the 
stongest, the Japanese yen.^5 Detached from any standard, 
the dollar was again devalued just over a year later 
(February 1973). But this was a mere stop-gap measure and 
this system broke down in March 1973* The floating rates 
became the order of the day, effectively killing any vestige 
of the old Bretton Woods system.^6 The devaluation of the 
dollar meant that American goods were more competitive in 
the international market. 
It is interesting to note that these setbacks to the 
Bretton Woods Agreement and the International Monetary 
System came before the OPEC oil price increase. It has 
become the custom of developed countries’ analysts to blame 
^Ismai 1-Sabri Abdalla, op, cit., p. 46. 
45IMF Annual Report, 1974, p. 111. 
^Abdalla, p. 46. 
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the world monetary system and the Third World indebtness on 
the OPEC oil price increase. But the system began decaying 
in the 60fs and came to a crisis in 1971. By then the U.S. 
realized that Adjustment 1 was not sufficient and there was 
a need for another adjustment because the abandonment of par 
values in terms of gold and the sale of IMF gold stocks 
could not be accomodated without amending IMF articles of 
agreement which forbid their sale.^7 
Adjustment 2 
It appears that there was a consensus on the need for 
real international cooperation. "In June 1974 the IMF 
Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System, 
the •so-called' Committee of Twenty, published an Outline of 
Reform" (Appendix II). ^8 The ideas held in the provisions 
of the second amendment permeate the articles of agreement 
entirely and were not an addition or treaty by themselves, 
similar to the first amendment's creation of SDRs. They 
insisted, however, "on stable but adjustable par values" 
similar to the old Bretton Woods accord — "old concepts die 
hard." It was hoped that a Keynes type Plan might yet 
emerge with improved modifications for the future. The 
inclusion of the developing countries in the Committee of 
Twenty shows more awareness of them in the world.^9 
^71 bid., p. 47 
^8IMF Report, 1974, p. 67. The second amendment 
basically approves the floating exchange rates as compared 
to the fixed rates of the old system. 
49 Mahbub U1 Haq, p. 190. 
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If the nation-states of the world are going to improve 
and develop, they need to have a just economic order, similar 
to that proposed in the ongoing North/South dialogue which 
seeks to improve trading agreements between the developed 
and developing countries. The IMF would be one such 
international organization to move these nations closer to 
that goal. 
The LDCs are eager to establish a reformed international 
monetary system that will 'promote an increasing net 
flow of real resources to developing countries.' For 
this reason, the possibility of establishing a link be¬ 
tween development assistance and SDR allocation in the 
context of the reform has closely been examined. 50 
The developed states recognized that there had to be 
some change and the Group of Ten proposed an increase in 
quotas under a floating exchange rate. But in order to do 
so they had to amend the Articles of Agreement. Under the 
old agreement such an article required 85 percent of the 
vote. France, Britain and West Germany combined had 16.7 
percent. The United States had 20 percent. The 
significance of the eighty-five percent requirement gave the 
U.S. veto power. The eight European monetary participants 
backed the United States' proposal for amendments which also 
gave them veto powers of 18.7 percent.51 Therefore France, 
Britain and West Germany, combined also had veto power. The 
U.S. by now had completely changed its stand and advocated 
increased international liquidity to help the failing dollar. 
50Ibid., p. 192. 
51"Background Notes on the International Monetary 
Fund," Development Dialogue 1980: 2, p. 100. 
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The U.S. sought Third World support by offering them 
a carrot. It was proposed that the IMF sell some of its 
gold reserves; half to member countries at $35 an ounce, 
and half at a profit on the world market. Thirty percent or 
so of the proceeds would be divided up and given to the 
Third World countries. The balance was to be paid into a 
Trust Fund managed by the IMF, providing medium-term loans 
at very low rates of interest to low income countries to 
help in their balance-of-payments crisis.52 
The U.S. strategy succeeded. The Third World 
countries adopted the recommendations of the Committe of 
Twenty to amend the Articles of Agreement introducing 
exchange rates. The Third World got $.8 billion dollars of 
gold profits shared among them for voting with the developed 
countries. By mid-1979, an additional $1.7 billion was lent 
to them. The U.S. had used its carrot of the gold sales, 
but attached to it was the stick of continued high 
conditionality. This time the LCDs were advocating a change 
in loan policy to permit lending money for longer periods. 
This meant that the LDCs, in the final analysis, had 
to link up to a key-currency. Political sovereignty was 
encroached as the LDCs’ trading patterns became more 
dependent on the particular key-currency. Although this 
might well be a better system, the thought of any type of 
over-dependency on the metropolitan powers is an alarming 
prospect for LDCs. Yet, some sort of international faith 
52Abdalla, p. 47. 
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and good will is necessary for any system to work.53 
The LDCs have to be aware that it is not mere coinci¬ 
dence that since OPEC has had increased political and eco¬ 
nomical power, that they are more respected in international 
forums. The Committee of Twenty formed to review the IMF is 
one such new force. Yet, with all of this new power changes 
are few and tedious. The North/South Dialogue has come to a 
virtual halt. Nevertheless, the small gains are 
appreciated. In 1978, "the second amendment had brought 
into the effect the provisions of a new Article IV which 
stressed the objective of a continuing development of the 
orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for 
financial stability."54 Also it made more explicit the 
responsibliti es of member countries as to their exchange 
arrangements. More importantly, SDRs are no longer 
expressed in gold, since 1978 and the method of valuation of 
the SDR is determined by an eighty-five percent majority. 
They are now expressed by the currencies of the sixteen 
member countries with the largest export of goods and 
services for the period 1973-76 (See Table 2.3). 
Ever so slowly the IMF is moving toward becoming a 
clearing union and therefore, an effective international 
organization. The LDCs cannot wait, however, because there 
are pressing problems now and they continue to appeal to the 
developed countries to help immediately before the 
Malthusian day of doom arrives. 
53wilbur Monroe, pp. 130-131. 
54JMF Report, 1978, p. 55. 
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TABLE 2.3 
IMF SDR VALUES 
Currency SDR Value Weight 
U.S. Dollar 0.40 33 (33) 
Deutsche Mark 0.32 12.5 (12.5) 
Japanese Yen 21.00 7.5 (7. 5) 
French Franc 0.42 7.5 (7.5) 
Pound Sterling 0.05 7.5 (7.5) 
Italian Lira 52.00 5 (6) 
Netherland Guilder 0. 14 5 (4.5) 
Canadian Dollar 0.07 5 (6) 
Belgian Franc 1.60 4 (3.5) 
Saudi Arabian Riyal 0.13 3 
Swedish Krona 0.11 2 (2.5) 
Iranian Rial 1.7 2 
Australian Dollar 0.017 1.5 (1.5) 
Spanish Peseta 1.50 1.5 (1.5) 
Norwegian Krone 0. 10 1.5 (1.5) 
Austrian Schilling 0.28 1.5 (1) 
Source: IMF Report, 1978. 
Adjustment 3 
These amounts (see Table 2.3) were determined on June 
30, 1978 on the basis of the average exchange rates for the 
three-month period ending on June 30, 1978. The share of 
each of these currencies is the value of the SDR 
corresponded on June 30, 1978 to the weights specified for 
each of them by the relative importance of the issuing 
country’s share in world exports of goods and services, 
except that the U.S. dollar was given a weight of 33% of the 
total to reflect both its commercial and financial 
importance.55 
I bid., pp. 56-57. 
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The Third World’s Appeal 
Even if SDRs were not exactly what the LDCs wanted, 
it was a step in the right direction. The other systems, 
gold or gold-dollar system, depended too much on unilateral 
arrangements, while SDRs are created by the International 
Monetary System. What the LDCs advocate is a commodity 
based system that would eliminate the present deficiencies 
in SDRs in that: 
1. It should not continue to be a ’cocktail' of 
currenci es . 
2. It should have solid backing, redeemability and more 
automatic forms of issue limitation. 
3- It should be equitably distributed and be an 
attractive enough asset to be held by countries in 
preference to other assets. 
4 It should be issued by the world central bank whose 
establishment has been proposed.56 
What they proposed instead was a commodity standard which, 
in the light of present day thinking, is not as 
revolutionary as first proposed. The LDCs, especially the 
Latin American countries, met in Venezuela to decide to 
default on their debts, because of growing inability to pay 
under the stringent IMF terms. These countries, having 
tried import substitution, have found that their finished 
goods come under tariff barriers and a general worsening of 
terras of trade between developed and developing countries. 
They are also looking into the possibility of setting up 
56justinian F. Rweyemamu, ’’Restructuring the 
International Monetary System," Development Dialogue 
(Sweden: Dag Hammarskjold Centre"! 1980) , p"! 5(T! 
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their own international central bank.57 it is therefore in 
the best interests of all the parties concerned to arrive at 
a reasonable compromise. 
The commodity standard does not seem so farfetched 
now because it involves a revamping of the system. In 
competing with the basket of currencies, the basket of 
commodities would involve more Third World participation 
rather than the developed countries' continued dominance. 
A "commodity unit" - a basket of commodities which are 
basic, storable and in common use - would be established 
by international treaty. This could be done in the 
framework of a strengthened and greatly expanded Common 
Fund, which would have to be brought under the control 
of the world central bank. 
The relative amounts of the commodities included in the 
unit would be determined by their relative importance in 
international trade. The size of their unit would be 
such as to make it convenient for deposit and 
redemption. 
The value of the new SDR would be defined in terras of 
the commodity unit, in the same way as the value of the 
present SDR and national currencies used to be defined 
in terms of gold. The only difference is that the new 
SDR would be based on a bundle of commodities rather 
than on just one. 
The world central bank would issue legal tender SDRs 
against the deposits of the warehouse receipts, such as 
are currently dealt in on commodity exchanges, for 
commodities constituting one or more commodity units. 
Conversely, the bank would surrender warehouse receipts 
in exchange for an equivalent amount of SDRs. 
In effect, the new SDR would be a warehouse certificate 
having all the desirable characteristics of gold 
certificate and gold-secured money-solid backing 
redeemability limitation of issue. These are important 
qualities lacking in the gold exchange system.58 
57Harry Anderson, "Is the IMF Going Broke?" Newsweek, 
October 18, 1983, p. 73. 
58justinian F. Rweyeraamu, op. cit., pp. 80-81. 
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According to Luigi Spavanta the new proposals had several 
problems. The setting up of a world bank is idealistic at 
this point. The concept of symmetry is also very difficult, 
and the working out of what commodities to be used in the 
commodity-backed SDR will be difficult to negotiate.59 
The IMF and its members are concerned about the 
several problems of the international system. In the early 
1950's the United States was the dominant force, but by the 
early 1960s the revived economies of Europe and Japan 
returned to convertibility. At the same time the 
proliferation of Third World countries occurred. 
The IMF should have been utilized to realize these 
new demands, the need for more international liquidity, and 
the setting up of precedents for stability of exchange 
rates. The U.S. response can be characterized by three 
phases: 1958 to 1963» Atlanticism, where the U.S. tried to 
work out agreements with the European countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance, to no avail because differing self- 
interest opposed consensus. According to Block, the period 
from 1964 to 1968, can be known as "Semisophisticated Delay" 
where there were changes in the IMF: increased liquidity, 
the issuing of Special Drawing Rights, and limited 
cooperation with other developed countries not to demand 
gold for dollars. In some cases joint gold purchases were 
made with other DCS. The chronic crisis was from 1968 to 
59Luigi Spaventa, "Comments on the Long-term 
Proposals for Reconstructing the International Monetary 
System" Development Dialogue, 1980, pp. 92-94. 
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1975 when the United States abandoned the international 
"rules of the game" for national self-interest. As the 
problem of excessive dollars abroad increased, the treasury 
of gold in Fort Knox could be literally wiped out. The U.S 
unilaterally rejected the dollar being backed by gold at 
thirty-five dollars an ounce. In addition, a floating 
exchange rate became the order of the day and the unheard of 
Republican decision of domestic wage and price controls was 
introduced to prove American seriousness in solving domestic 
inflation.60 
At the same time the LDCs' problems had become 
endemic and the rising tide of expectations made monetary 
austere measures at home unpopular. They sought relief from 
the international arena, and demanded more for their exports 
and increased industrialization. Matters came to a head 
with the formation of OPEC in the early 1970s, underlining 
the interdependence of the World and the dependence on oil. 
The flood gate of demands was opened. 
During all of this the IMF tried to reform, but these 
were piecemeal measures, and the LDCs proposed a commodity 
standard alternative. The disparity between DCs and LDCs 
continued. 
OPEC1 s Response 
The IMF has certain changes that they have been 
trying to adopt over the years, but they are insufficient 
60Fred Block, op. cit., p. 91 
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and do not address the needs for a long term or mid-term 
loan arrangement that the LDCs require. Many LDCs wait too 
long to adjust their monetary problems because the IMF is 
perceived to be unsuitable to their needs. 
The IMF had been attacked for its overemphasis on demand 
management, blunt monetary-policy instruments and shock 
treatment to reduce or eliminate inflation and balance 
of payments disequilbria; its relative neglect of supply 
side policies longer-term development, and income 
distribution, and its traditional aversion to controls, 
selective policy instruments and gradualist 
approaches. 61 
The IMF has not been totally oblivious to these 
problems. There are certain guidelines that the IMF has 
been studying to relieve or solve the problem. 
The Executive Board adopted a set of guidelines 
providing, among other things, for the Fund to pay due 
regard to the domestic social and political objectives, 
the economic priorities and the circumstances of members 
including the cause of payments problem . . .62 
These guidelines are slow to be realized, and in the 
meantime the problems of the LDCs are getting worse. 
The great opportunity was lost however in the 
formative years of the oil increases to solve the increasing 
debt problem. There were six proposals to solve the 
probl em: 
1. The United States "safety net" of "financial 
solidarity" put forth by Secretary of State Kissinger 
and Treasury Secretary William Simon in November, 
1974. 
61G. K. Helleiner, "The IMF and Africa in the 1980's" 
(Princeton University Series, New Jersey No. 152 July 1981), 
p. 1. 
62sidney Dell, "On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution 
of IMF Conditionality" (Princeton University Series No. 144 
October 1981), p. 26. 
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2. The U.S. Trust Fund Plan proposed during the same 
year . 
3* An International Monetary Fund Oil Facility, 
presented in January 1974 by Johannes Wittereen then 
Managing Director of the IMF. 
4. A plan proposed initially by Emile Van Lennep, the 
Secretary General of OECD, in November 1974. 
5- The Kleinman Plan, a privately initiated proposal 
originally presented in February 1974 by David T. 
Kleinman, professor of Finance at Fordham University, 
to the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
6. Another privately initiated recycling proposal 
published in Foreign Affairs January 1975. co¬ 
authored by Khodadad Farmanf armai an of Iran, Armin 
Gutowski of West Germany, Saburo Okita of Japan, and 
Robert V. Roosa and Carroll L. Wilson of the United 
States.83 
Plans 1, 2, and 4 represent continued dominance of 
the Western States and how to stop or accomodate OPEC 
increases. Plan 3 is a compromise of LDCs and DCs and Plans 
5 and 6 were for OPEC assistance outside of the IMF and 
IBRD. We will examine Plan 3? the only one that was 
implemented, and which combined IMF and OPEC efforts to 
resolve the mounting debt problem (see Table 2.5). 
The Oil Facility Bill in SDRs was proposed in 1974 to 
give relief to the LDCs. 
63Nazli Choucri and Vincent Ferraro, International 
Politics of Energy Interdependence (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1976), ppT 66-74. 
88 
TABLE 2.4 




Austrian National Bank 50,000,000 1.74 
National Bank of Belgium 100,000,000 3-49 
Deutsche Bundes Bank 300,000,000 10.48 
Kingdom of the Netherlands 200,000,000 6.99 
Bank of Norway 50,000,000 1.74 
Swiss National Bank 150,000,000 5.24 
Total Non OPEC 850,000,000 29.72 
OPEC 
Central Bank of Iran 400,000,000 1.43 
Central Bank of Kuwait 200,000,000 6.99 
Government of Nigeria 200,000,000 6.99 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 1,000,000,000 34.96 
Central Bank of Venezuela 200,000,000 6.99 
Total OPEC 2,000,000,000 70.27 
Total 
International Monetary Fund, IMF Survey, No. 42, 
(June 23, 1975), p. 177. 
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All countries that were adversely affected by the oil 
price increases could apply. But the funds were not enough 
and they were under the same onerous IMF conditions that 
they had before. 
OPEC not only made these funds available; additional 
loans were made available bilaterally. 
The IMF reports $2.54 billion in official Development 
Assistance, but also reports total disbursements of the 
oi1-exporting countries in 1974 as totaling $5.6 
billion. These totals were not enough and the IMF 
should have insisted that the DCs contribute more in a 
crisis situation. 
Therefore OPEC realized that they had an obligation to try 
and relieve the debt problem of the LDCs, but the IMF. a 
more able organization to oversee the problem, did less. 
Clearly the DCs were affected by the oil prices, but 
the LDCs were more dependent on food and fertilizer, an oil 
derivative further affected by inflation in the DCs. which 
made a bad situation even worse. 
One can deduce that if the IMF were geared for Third 
World development, it would have addressed the problem then, 
because the situation could only worsen in the future. That 
worsened future has indeed come to pass, reflected in the 
mammoth debt of LDCs. 
There are many LDCs that were not satisfied with the 
OPEC response to their problems. But OPEC was beset with 
its own problems. Not all the countries of OPEC produced 
vast quantities of oil and only a few had small populations. 
64ibid., p. 68. 
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This caused tensions within OPEC itself and were it not for 
the dominance and leadership of Saudi Arabia OPEC would have 
floundered because of internal conflicts. Furthermore OPEC 
is still not its own master. 
Clearly control over the final price of oil - the amount 
paid by individual consumers - is not exclusively in the 
hands of the oil producing countries. Instead it is 
shared among OPEC, the oil companies and the governments 
of consuming nations.65 
Leaders like Manley and Nyerere were aware of these problems 
and pledged allegiance in the hope that in the future LDCs 
alliance could be worked out. It was also important that 
the LDCs show resistance towards the present world economic 
system, although this was done at great sacrifice to many 
countries. 
65nendrik A. Houghakker, The Price of World Oil, 
(Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute of 
Public Policy, 1975), p. 33. 
CHAPTER III 
A BRIEF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
JAMAICA AND THE MANLEY YEARS 1972-80 
The history of Jamaica is one of human suffering and 
revolt. From the early 1500s to 1834 the country was 
primarily a British colonial possession based on slave labor 
and sugar production. The majority of these slaves were 
black and at Emancipation in 1838, the Jamaican society had 
two distinct types of people. 
Jamaica, as a society, was not only molded by the 
plantation economy, it was created by it . . . Although 
Jamaican society of the early nineteenth century was 
unified with peculiar single-mindedness in the business 
of producing sugar and coffee, the unity hardly 
penetrated beyond the common economic endeavor. 
Jamaicans were divided legally into the three casts: 
free whites, colored people with limited privileges, and 
Negro slaves. Of the three divisions, the white and 
colored people had something in common as the heirs of 
European culture as it existed in Jamaica. The Negroes 
stood apart as a separate group, not only because they 
were slaves, but because their cultural heritage was 
still largely African.1 
The British were the colonial masters and had things 
very much their own way. But the island was not without 
United States influence. As early as the United States' War 
for Independence, the disruption of food supplies (flour, 
rice and especially salted cod) resulted in mass starvation 
1Phillip D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas: The Role of Ideas 
in a Tropical Economy, 1830-1865 (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1955), pp. 22-23. 
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of seme 15,000 people in Jamaica.2 
After emancipation, lands were apportioned according 
to colour and class. Many absentee land owners sold out 
their lands to local and pioneering whites. The larger 
tracts of land were given to these whites, smaller tracts to 
poor whites, and the hilly infertile lands to the blacks.3 
By 1865 a series of continued drought and no relief 
from Britain exacerbated by the emancipation of blacks in 
the United States saw the outbreak of violence in the Morant 
Bay Rebellion. Encouraged by a mulatto newspaper man, 
William Gordon, in Kingston, who wrote about the deplorable 
conditions of blacks in the local press and led by Paul 
Bogle, a lay Baptist preacher, a group of blacks marched on 
the Morant Bay courthouse demanding better conditions.1* 
After repeated pleas to the governor to alleviate the 
dismal conditions, a fight broke out and several militia men 
were killed. The governor sent the colonial troops to quash 
the rebellion. Bogle was caught and along with Gordon 
hanged for treason.5 
In addition the Jamaican people were punished further 
^Eric Williams, p. 128 
3Trevor Munroe and Don Robothman, Stuggles of the 
Jamaican People. (Kingston, Jamaica: Workers Liberation 
League, 1977), p. 36. 
**F. R. Augier and S. C. Gordon, Sources of West 
Indian History (Kingston: Longmans Caribbean Limited. 1962), 
p. 178. 
5lbid., p. 179. 
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by downgrading the island from a self-governing colony to a 
limited crown colony. In the former, local persons were 
elected to the legislature and decisions were made in 
concert with the governor, both having the power of veto; in 
the latter, all power rested in the governor.6 The 
succeeding governor, Peter Grant, consolidated the British 
reign of terror, by the brutal suppression of the Morant Bay 
Rebellion and creating a new police force (paramilitary) to 
quell any further disturbances . 7 
The 1870s saw a decline in sugar prices and a 
decrease in the island's economy. The start of construction 
of the Panama Canal saw the first mass migration of 
Jamaicans. When the canal project was stopped, some of the 
Jamaicans returned to poverty.^ 
A grave situation became even more desperate when 
Cuba, aided by the United States, became a major sugar 
producer. This resulted in larger scale production whose 
magnitude dwarfed the other West Indian production.9 
The War of 1914 — 18 gave many West Indians the chance 
to travel to the métropole and many came back to implement 
changes. Trade union movements sprang up all over the 
region. At about this time Marcus Garvey was preaching race 
^Samuel Hurwitz and Edith Hurwitz, Jamaica; A 
Historical Portrait (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 148. 
7Munroe and Robotham, p. 60. 
^Eric Williams, p. 246. 
9lbid., p. 248. 
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pride in the United States. The accumulation of these 
factors laid the foundation for unrest in the 1930s.TO 
The unrest caused by trade union agitation started in 
Trinidad and Barbados (1 937) and was brought to a head in 
Jamaica in 1938. The wages were low on the sugar estates 
which were owned by large British companies. The massive 
strike of 1 938 forced Britain to reconsider her neglect of 
the West Indian island. The Moyne Commission was sent to 
appraise the situation and gain first hand information.11 
What resulted from the massive strike? The acting 
governor promised $650,000 to assist in the purchasing of 
land for settlement by peasant farmers. More importantly, 
some political leaders emerged: A.G.S. Coombs in the sugar 
lands in the west; Norman Manley, a Kingston lawyer; and 
Alexander Bustamante of Kingston, a labor leader.12 The 
latter two subsequently formed the present two leading 
political parties and their concomitant unions: The People's 
National Party and the National Worker's Union and the 
Jamaican Labor Party and The Bustamante Trade Union. 
After the Moyne Commission report was published in 
10 Phi lip Sherlock, West Indian Nations (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1973)» p. 71. 
11 West India Royal Commission Report 6607 (London: 
Great Britain H.M.S.O., 1945). p. 400. (The Moyne 
C omm i s s i on ) 
1  2KWJ Post, "The Politics of Protest in Jamaica, 
1938: Some Problems of Analysis Conceptualism" in Robin 
Cohen, Peter Gutkind and Phyllis Brazier, (eds.) Peas ants 
and Proletarians: The Struggles of Third World Worker, (New 
York: Monthly Press Review, 1979), p. 200. 
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1944 and Jamaica got universal suffrage, Bustamante's party, 
the JLP, won the first election with a programme similar to 
Manley's party except for the self-government issue. But by 
1949 the JLP also favored self-government. ”13 
The PNP had no other alternative but to address its 
Fabian preference of socialism. 
Manley, however, saw a continuing difference in the 
worldview of both parties. He stated a natural 
preference for his party's socialist commitment since it 
related individual freedom to collective responsibility 
and obligation whereas the free enterprise predilections 
of the JLP were seen by Manley as the continuance of 
unstructured and irrational development and political 
"bossism." The differences grew less significant with 
the frequency of elections transferring the JLP into a 
more structured political party, with its leadership 
drawn from the same sources of its counterpart in the 
PNP.14 
The PNP realized that for them to succeed at the 
polls they would have to counter the JLP's trade union. 
Bustamante's activities made him beholden to the working man 
in Jamaica. For although the PNP had the popular vote in 
the 1949 elections, it was still the opposition because its 
votes were in the more populous urban area which had a 
limited number of seats. This they did by forming the Trade 
Union Congress in 1952, a conglomerate of several unions. 
This set the stage for political infighting in the PNP. Ken 
Hill, the union's chief organizer, and other union leaders, 
Richard Hart, Arthur Henry and Frank Hill (the 4Hs and 
13Rex Nettleford, Manley and the New Jamaica (New 
York: Africana Publishing Company, 1971), p. xxii. 
14ibid., p. xxxiv. 
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avowed leftists), were opposed by union moderates, N. N. 
Nethersole and Florizel Glassopole (Governor-General, 1974- 
85). All of them, however, were within the party 
executive.15 It has been a recurring issue in the party 
that there is a leftist force, which had been purged over 
time. By 1952 the problems between the leftists and 
moderates in the party broke out into open warfare, and the 
4Hs were expelled from the party.16 The PNP always had to 
define its brand of socialism: 
Offically socialism meant to the PNP: (a) state control 
of the means and extent of production; (b) equality of 
opportunity; (c) the duty of the state to provide the 
necessities of life.17 
The leftists of the party demanded or wanted more control of 
the means of production. Norman Manley responded by 
declaring that the PNP was not communist and the result was: 
The PNP statements of policy between 1 940 and 1955 moved 
from the rhetoric of public ownership through the notion 
of socialism as a Christian way of life in favon of 
private ownership to the inclusion of ’socialism’ merely 
as a label. 1 ° 
The PNP never explained to the masses a coherent land policy 
and the JLP has always played upon the image of the PNP 
taking away their lands and animals and dividing it up among 
the rest of the populace. 
15George Beckford and Michael Witter, Small Garden, 
Bitter Weed (Morant Bay: Maroon Publishing House , 19 8 2 ), 
p. 43. 
1 ^Nettl ef ord , p. xlv. 
1?Ibid.» P• lviii. 
18pian for Today, 1940; Plan for Security, 1943; Plan 
for Prosperity, 1944. 
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The PNP had always claimed a greater social 
consciousness over its JLP counterpart on the matter of 
land, but the JLP had always made capital of the PNP's 
vulnerability on its socialist views on land ownership 
and land utilization."^ 
The JLP lost no time in equating socialism with communism 
and the 1949 elections were greatly influenced by the JLP 
equating socialism to tyranny and slavery. In the 1955 
elections after the 4Hs were expelled, the issue was not as 
potent and the PNP won.20 
Bustamante always alluded to the PNP as the "brown 
man's" party. In unraveling this accusation, one has to 
critically examine the racial tensions in Jamaica. Although 
the national motto, "Out of Many One" has some validity, 
there are certain undercurrents that cause tension, one of 
which is the "brown man's" mentality of the privileged 
mixture characterizing the Jamaican upper class. The 
society emanating out of a plantation economy has certain 
inherent divisions: the absentee landowners, the rich 
Europeans who controlled the slave economy, and a small 
number of white settlers who owned medium-sized plantations. 
But the Whites had to have managers for their estates. For 
1 9Nettleford, op. cit., p. lx. 
20Nettleford is of the opinion that the international 
climate had an impact on the PNP's posture. The Cold War 
had begun in earnest. The United States, the archenemy of 
communism, was one of the major trading partners of Jamaica. 
Jamaica, therefore, had to relax her socialist posture. The 
political directorate had to adopt policy unopposed to the 
U.S. The PNP realized that the JLP had been using the 
Communist bogey to win the former elections. The PNP had 
changed its strategy and downplayed socialism. Also, the 
British government was against nationalization. 
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the most part these were indentured servants from Europe or 
the offspring of miscegenation, the " brown" men. Some 
inherited property from their fathers while others acquired 
savings made off managing absentee landowners' property and 
so bought properties themselves. Over the years this class 
has intermixed forming a distinct group -- the "brown 
m an . " 21 
Although Bustamante and Manley were classified as 
"brown men" they utilized it to different ends. Bustamante, 
through his union activities, was the poor man’s friend who 
merely happened to be brown. Manley was a brown man of high 
intellectual integrity called upon to lead his people. He 
was an urbane lawyer given to support of the arts and 
cultural affairs. Bustamante was able, with some 
justification, to label the PNP the "brown man's" party. 
Many of the leaders of the PNP were actually brown, and if 
they were not, they aspired to the "brown man’s" high 
intellectual capabilities (in many instances pseudo 
intellectualism). So a curious thing happened: there was a 
party of brown and intellectual men leading individuals 
preaching a doctrine of socialism that they did not live.22 
Until 1972, the PNP was a party that the middle class 
supported because of either "brown man" mentality or the 
2TMunroe and Robotham, p. 107- 
22it was the writer's experience in 1976 that a brown 
member of the PNP hierarchy could not be entertained in a 
country constituency because there was no place deemed 
adequate enough for him to wine and dine. 
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striving for higher intellectual achievement. Over the 
years the great majority of the poor and illiterate people 
were alienated by what they perceived the PNP to be and 
Bustamante used this perception effectively against them. 
Political Development in Jamaica 
The Jamaican relationship with the developed 
countries has been one of dependency. Briefly, it was a 
former colony of Spain, but for the major part of its 
history, it remained a British colony. The majority of its 
inhabitants, blacks from Africa, were enslaved from the 
early sixteenth century and were emancipated in 1838. 
Jamaica, as the largest English West Indian colony, tends to 
be the model used for political relationships in the 
Caribbean. 
The elections of 1954 saw a change of government with 
little gains in self-government. The movement was 
compromised by the independence movement for all the West 
Indian states. By 1958 there was internal cabinet 
government giving more power to local elected officials. 
Also, there was the possibility of a West Indian Federation 
leading to independence. However, by 1960 the Federation 
became too tedious and a referendum determining the Jamaican 
stance on the issue resulted in a narrow defeat for the PNP 
ruling party. The PNP had advocated a Federation of the 
West Indian islands; the JLP opposed. The PNP had won 
reelection in 1959 under that banner, but the possibility of 
gaining independence became more real in 1960. The JLP 
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wanted to go it alone and the PNP called the referendum. 
The JLP victory occurred at a crossroad point for 
Jamaica. The migration outlet to England in the 1950’s had 
been closed. But the western expansion of increased bauxite 
production and urban development caused the dual economy. 
Many of the peasants were drawn off the land seeking 
employment in the urban areas, while the rural areas became 
unproductive, resulting in increased food importation. The 
influx of these rural persons aggravated the unemployment 
figures (See Table 3-1). 
By the elections of 1967 the middle class was 
prospering and became heavily influenced by western 
conspicuous consumption. The JLP had changed. It had come 
to power in 1962 on a broad alliance of classes, by 1967 it 
had a vested interest in the new middle class. The PNP 
campaigned on the rising inequalities among the population 
and the need to control the natural resources. 
The new PNP (1968), under the leadership of Michael 
Manley (Norman's son), had promised a more democratic 
government and increased control over the island’s natural 
resources, a strategy to combat dependency and the start of 
self-reliance and regional cooperation. 
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TABLE 3-1 
SIZE OF LABOR FORCE, NUMBER UNEMPLOYED, PERCENT UNEMPLOYED, 
PERCENT UNEMPLOYMENT, AND PERCENT CHANGE IN 











1943 509,092 79.000 16.0 
1955 575,500 114,000 20.2 — 
1956 601,200 116,400 19-0 + 2.0 
1957 645,000 120,000 19.0 + 3.0 
1958 656.300 117,500 18.0 - 2.0 
1959 630.100 102,300 16.0 - 13-0 
1960 607,000 84,900 14.0 - 17.0 
1961 609,800 89,250 15.0 + 5.0 
1962 675,900 91,000 13.0 + 2.0 
1963 690,250 95,300 14.0 + 5.0 
1964 696,705 98,900 14.0 + 4.0 
1965 701,450 106,000 15.0 + 7.0 
1966 722,000 120,000 17.0 + 13-0 
1967 730,000 412,000 56.0 +243.0 
1968 750,000 215,000 29.0 - 31.0 
1969 771 ,873 225,000 29. 1 + 5.0 
1970 798,400 218,300 27.0 - 3.0 
1971 805,600 207,500 26.0 - 5.0 
1972 822,000 203,000 25.0 - 2.0 
1973 850,200 208,600 25. 1 + 3.0 
1974 890,755 212,850 24.0 + 2.0 
1975 925,400 221,300 24.0 + 4.0 
1976 957,000 246,400 26.0 + 11.0 
1977 989,800 271,700 27.0 + 11.0 
MEAN 
% CHANGE + 11.8 
Sources : Labour Force Statistics (1958 -1978); Jefferson 
(1972); Francis (1963); Five Year Development Plan 
1962-1963; Five Year Development Plan 1972- 1977. 
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The period 1972 to 1980, saw another change of 
government. Manley’s election coincided with the economic 
change in the world international system. In August of 1971 
President Nixon broke away from the agreements of Bretton 
Woods and the United States dollar no longer was backed by 
gold at $35 per ounce. Also, Nixon had entered a period of 
detente with the Soviets and the Chinese. 23 A genuine 
sense of interdependence between the world's people was 
felt. Many countries that were unde10 the western umbrella 
felt that they could have more meaningful relationships with 
the eastern block countries and Cuba. The remaining African 
countries under the colonial yoke sought their independence 
from the Portuguese, South Africans, and the British. The 
Manley government then started to initiate some changes at 
home and in its foreign policy. The latter was more in 
sympathy with the tenets of the non-aligned nations rather 
than that of the old relationships of dependency and 
alignment. The new posture stemmed from the unfavorable 
positon of the developing countries. They wanted more 
equitable trading agreements and they demanded this by the 
call for a new order. This demand was formalized by the 
Group of 77 at the U.N. meeting in 1974.24 
In 1973 after the Arab-Israeli October war, the Arab 
countries boycotted oil supplies to the United States and 
23Nettl ef ord , p. lxxi. 
2^W. A. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labor " The Manchester School (May 1954), pp. 
141-142. 
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the Netherlands and formed OPEC at the same time. The 
United States retaliated by increasing the price of her 
grains.25 
OPEC had two major impacts on the developing 
countries: (a) the balance of trade worsened especially of 
those that had depended on oil as their major energy 
resource: (b) it was the first time that the developing 
countries could dictate favorable trading terms with the 
industrialized countries, hence the LDCs formed a coalition 
with OPEC which gave them power in demanding a NIEO. 
The LDCs' position was best explained by Michael 
Manley. Although the oil increases were crippling the 
Jamaican economy, he was willing to sacrifice for Third 
World solidarity. Never again would there be such a golden 
opportunity to show the developed countries that their 
monopoly on Third World raw materials was inequitable and 
detrimental to Third World developuent. Although the LDCs 
were adversely affected by the oil price increases, they 
realized that they had to do something about inequalities in 
the international trading arena. There was some concern 
among developing countries that they should receive 
preferential treatment from OPEC because the oil increases 
were having adverse effects on their economies. This 
dissension was muffled by the euphoria that they were 
dictating some terms of trade to the DCs and hopefully in 
the future a more equitable system of trade would be reached 
25Beckford and Witter, p. 43. 
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to the benefit of all. This area however remains fertile 
grounds for discontent among LDCs and OPEC, but these 
problems will not be resolved until OPEC itself is on firmer 
grounds in negotiations with the DCs. The Manley government 
was active in pursuing better cooperation among LDCs. It 
worked out a plan with Venezuela for differential payment of 
oil based on anticipated increased oil prices. At the same 
time it tried to form a consortium with Trinidad, Guyana and 
Venezuela for a bauxite smelter. Late in his administration 
he negotiated with Algeria to barter bauxite for aluminum 
and a loan for $100 million was in the making with Libya 
when he left office.27 
In 1974 Manley led a group of four Caribbean 
commonwealth governments in officially recognizing Cuba and 
readmitting her into the Organization of American States. 
In addition, he declared Jamaica a democratic socialist 
country, passed a levy on the bauxite companies and formed a 
bauxite cartel. These political actions had grevious 
consequences for the government as the United States began a 
program of destabilization (see Chapter IV). To make 
matters worse, oil and wheat price increases whittled the 
Jamaican reserves. "... Jamaica's oil bill in 1980 was 
eleven times higher than it was in 1973 even though it cut 
consumption by twenty percent."28 But the Manley government 
27ABC Report, December 30, 1980. 
28ibid., p. 114. 
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maintained that Third World solidarity, however harsh the 
consequences, was necessary to break the stranglehold the 
developed economies had on the developing states. In spite 
of this situation, the government at the time was: 
. . . undertaking an unprecedented land reform 
program; national control over public utilities; the 
creation of sugar workers’ cooperatives; the 
institution of a Minimum Wage and Labor Relations 
Act; an end to discrimination against illegitimate 
children; compulsory recognition of trade unions; 
equal rights for women including equal pay for equal 
work and appointment of women to senior positions; 
free education at the university level; nutrition 
subsidies for 70,000 children; rent roll back in 
depressed areas; national day care programs; an 
increase in public assistance; the establishment of 
community farms; special loans to farmers; an attack 
on adult illiteracy; the restoration of civil 
liberties and an end to harassment of individuals for 
political reasons.29 
These changes meant that the middle class formed by 
the PNP in the '50s and the JLP in the '60s had to bear the 
brunt of taxes to pay for these services. They took the 
position that the government had come under the direct 
control of Castro's Cuba --propaganda born in the United 
States.30 As a result, they resisted the programs, fled the 
country in hoards and took millions of dollars with them 
which started a foreign exchange problem. 
The PNP was not deterred and continued on the road to 
self-reliance by diversifying its trade and seeking higher 
prices for Jamaica's raw materials. But the proximity to 
the U.S. and historical reliance on American technology 
29ibid., p. 
3°Girvan, p. 128. 
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made it a difficult proposition and slowly, the battle of 
attrition waged by the United States government retarded its 
progress. The exaggerated press reports of crime in Jamaica 
caused the rapid decline in tourism plus the drying up of 
loans. 
Manley declared: 
The formation of the International Bauxite Association 
must be seen, not as an act of reprisal, not as an 
attempt to wrest undue power for ourselves, nor as an 
act calculated to threaten those who need our raw 
materials for their society's well-being, but rather as 
our effort to achieve an equitable return for the raw 
material which is our patrimony.31 
21 . 
3'lAsian Wall Street Journal, February 28, 1980, p. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MANLEY YEARS 1972-80 AND THE IMF POLITICS 
The PNP's electoral victory in 1972 was opposed by 
forces inside and outside of Jamaica. Violent crime and 
political thuggery were part of Jamaica’s political culture, 
but it escalated in the late 1960's. The PNP had won the 
1972 elections on the slogan "The PNP will destroy the guns". 
The PNP did not effectively stop the guns; gun crimes actually 
went up. The PNP responded by forming the Gun Courts, anyone 
found possessing illegal firearms was jailed indefinitely. 
Later the courts found this to be unconstitutional and 
mandatory life sentences were imposed. However, these measures 
did little to deter the violence.1 2 
Matters became worse in February 1976. A series of 
shootings occurred, including two guards at the American 
consulate and two policemen. Roving gangs invaded several 
communities and set them on fire, accompanied by the shootings 
at firemen who tried to douse the fires. These incidents 
embarrassed the Manley government because they coincided 
with the meeting of the IMF Foreign Ministers conference 
held in Jamaica. The accompanying international reporters 
1Race Today, Vo., 8, No. 5, p. 115 
2Jamaica: Caribbean Challenge, EPICA Task Force, ISBN 
0-918346-03-0, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 74 
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relayed the news home. 
In May, a PNP stronghold was surrounded and the 
houses set on fire. All escape routes were blocked off by 
gunmen, resulting in two adults and eight children being 
killed. In June 1976, gunmen attacked a PNP youth club 
dance and killed six people and wounded fifty.3 In the same 
month, a group of well-to-do right-wing middle class women 
staged a demonstration protesting shortages of food. The 
demonstration was almost a carbon copy of the famous CIA- 
inspired ’’March of the Empty Pots" by middle class Chilean 
women opposed to the socialist Allende government. 
The internal resistance was strengthen by bad 
publicity abroad. The U.S. press got into the act and 
unfavorable articles appeared in dailies and weeklies.1* Some 
writers asserted that Cuba had a cadre of Jamaican leftists 
bent on a communist take-over. They focused on widespread 
violence and anti-Americanism and said lack of government 
control in the island made it dangerous for American 
visitors. The result was that many hotels closed and 
tourism slowed to a trickle. The bauxite companies 
3lbid., p. 74. 
4james J. Phillips, S.J. "Jamaica: A Repeat of the 
Chile Pattern?’*, Christian Century, September 1976, p. 2. 
This had the effect of disrupting the PNP’s plan for more 
self-reliance on Jamaica's produced foods. "The New 
Jamaica," Newsweek, January 12, 1976 pp. 44-45; "Bauxite 
Producers Opt", Business Week, November 1, 1976, pp. 27-28; 
Stephen Davis "Fear in Pardise", New York Times, July 25, 
1976, magazine section pp. 30-32; David Binder "Cuban 
Influence in Caribbean Rises, Worrying U.S. Officials", New 
York Times, March 21, 1976, p. 1. 
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responded to Manley initatives by reducing production by 30 
percent and doubling their imports from the African 
countries. The U.S. assistance of $13*2 million in 1974 
dropped to $2.2 million in 1976.5 The international 
investment, which was a major source of Jamaica’s capital, 
declined. According to one writer: 
there was a tendency for potential investors and lenders 
to stay on the side lines waiting developments. Private 
foreign investment has all but ended and the Government 
of Jamaica faces increasing difficulty in finding 
lenders to finance debt burden.° 
The Manley government protested that it was being 
destabilized. Manley declared: 
that Jamaica was the target of "international action" to 
stop social change. . . . unexplained violence at 
sophisticated levels, upsurge in industrial unrest, 
organized letters in the press, internationally 
orchestrated articles published in newspapers, the 
slowing down and entangling of aid.7 
In September former CIA agent Phillip Agee was 
invited to Jamaica by the Jamaican Council for Human Rights. 
He publicly identified seven CIA officers and four other 
U.S. Embassy personnel he felt certain were working with the 
CIA. Within days of Agee's disclosure, three of the 
5office of Program and Information Analysis Services, 
U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas 
Loans and Grants Assistance from International 
Organizations: Obligations and Loans Authorization, July 1, 
1945-September 30, 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 54. 
6u.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of 
State, Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for 
the United States: Jamaica, NCK 77-065, May 1977, p~! 7~. 
7Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, May-July 1976, p. 14. 
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United States diplomatic team suddenly left the island.8 In 
a small country like Jamaica the presence of eleven reputed 
CIA agents seemed excessive. 
On the economic front tentative contacts with the IMF 
in 1976 indicated that their general prescription for help 
would be to the private sector. The curtailment of public 
spending and the freezing of wages would be conditions for 
their aid. 
The wage increases from 1974 to 1975 averaged between 
50% and 60% and began to exceed substantially cost of living 
increases. In the election year of 1976 the government 
proposed a catching up with cost of living increases since 
the June 1973 oil (OPEC) prices. These were election 
promises the government guaranteed. On the other hand, they 
froze wages in excess of $16,000 per annum.9 They did this 
so that income inequalities would be reduced. 
In addition, the government introduced a tax package 
of $80 million to an economy whose production was leveling 
off and tried to curtail government expenditure in an 
election year. These measures fell far short of their mark. 
By November a critical situation had become worse. The 
Jamaican government needed foreign exchange desperately so 
it applied to the IMF for $13-5 million in Compensatory 
Financing Facility which were funds the IMF made available 
^Ellen Ray. "CIA and Local Gunmen Plan Jamaican 
Coup," Counterspy, Vol, 3, No. 2, December 1976, pp. 39-40. 
^Norman Girvan, Development Dialogue, p. 121. 
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to countries that were adversely affected by the increased 
oil prices. It was the newest IMF initiative to alleviate 
export shortfalls.10 The request was granted grudgingly. 
. . . the major industrial countries’ representatives 
vied with one another in scolding President Michael 
Manley's government for slapping on unauthorized import 
licensing restrictions and otherwise breaking their 
promises to the Fund .... Third World representatives 
at the meeting sympathized with the Jamaican government 
dilemma. The social and political conditions were such 
that they could not be ignored, maintained Festus G. 
Mogae, representing 16 African nations. This plea for 
understanding left Director Cross unmoved. The Jamaican 
authorities had departed substantially from the 
financial programme that had been presented to the Fund, 
he said reprovingly. (The programme would have required 
cuts in wages and government aid for the poor.) The 
concept of conditionality for the use of the Fund's 
compensatory financing facility and its other facilities 
must not be weakened, he insisted.^ 
At this point the IMF and Jamaica had no major problems, but 
they were insisting that on a general rule public 
expenditure be cut in favor of private. 
The rumor was that the PNP and the IMF had worked out 
a standby arrangement in December of 1976. But the election 
results precluded the harsh measures requested by the IMF. 
These measures were a major devaluation, a wage freeze, and 
a programme to achieve a balanced budget. The left wing of 
the PNP was in ascendency and General Secretary D. K. 
Duncan, who was credited with organizing the massive PNP 
10Ibid., p. 121. (The Fund had reservations in 
granting this loan because it might be used to support 
policies counter to IMF dictates. They were concerned about 
the wage increases and the printing of money by the Bank of 
Jamaica to offset the lack of foreign investment.) See 
Chapter II. 
11Ibid., p. 122. 
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victory, and others of the left were not prepared to give in 
to IMF conditions that did not benefit the masses of the 
people they had just aroused. 12 
In January 1977 the Prime Minister made a defiant 
speech to the nation that the IMF conditions were 
unacceptable and called upon all Jamaicans and members of 
the left to prepare a production plan. Although austere, he 
hoped it would relieve the situation. At this time the 
foreign exchange market of Jamaica had closed down because 
there were no foreign reserves after the general election. 
It was decided that the market would reopen on a day-to-day 
basis, and that the new plan would eventually ease the acute 
shortage of foreign exchange. The plan called for (a) no 
devaluation; (b) a steep new gasoline sales tax aimed at 
raising $50 million; (c) a six-month pay raise moratorium; 
(d) strict import licensing and the rationing of foreign 
exchange to essential payments only; (e) additional 
government takeovers in commercial banking and cement; and 
(f) preparation of an Emergency Production Plan to mobilize 
domestic production in agriculture, industry, bauxite, and 
tourism.^ The plan was still on the drawing boards when 
the internal problem forced Manley to reconsider his 
position on the entire issue at hand. 
Manley's problems were two-fold. First, right and 
center groups of the party favored an agreement with the 
I^The Jamaica Daily Gleaner, December 18. 1976. 
13Girvan, p. 122. 
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IMF. They controlled the key governmental financial insti¬ 
tutions, the Bank of Jamaica, and the important ministries 
such as finance and trade. The other problem was the 
private sector, which was opposed to any initiatives of 
trade and loan from the Eastern bloc countries. 
The wealthy and businessmen complained that the 
present state of affairs gave them no incentives to invest 
their monies and energies into production. They began to 
lay off more workers, and made litle effort to find local 
raw materials to replace unavailable imports.^ 
The Jamaican and IMF relationship is shown in Table 
4.1. The economic squeeze was causing internal unrest and 
the threat of a shutdown by the private sector forced the 
government to negotiate with the IMF. The private sector 
was aware that if agreement were reached with the IMF, there 
would be stronger likelihood of increased international 
commercial loans.15 On the other hand, the government was 
able to arrange many unconventional loans, albeit they came 
from conventional sources. Through Manley's personal friend¬ 
ship with Prime Minister Trudeau the government got a loan of 
$100 million. Prime Minister Callaghan of Great Britain made 
some funds available. He, too, was critical of the IMF 
conditions because, were it not for North Sea oil revenue, 
Britain would have been adversely affected by its IMF terms. 16 
I^EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 101. 
1^Girvan, p. 123. 
16 Girvan, p. 124. 
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The government had felt the effects of the world reces¬ 
sion in the early 1970's, but the bauxite levy of 1974 was 
more than enough to offset the reduction in loans and invest¬ 
ment capital (see Table 1.4). The IMF, however, was concerned 
about Jamaica's high currency (one dollar Jamaican was equi¬ 
valent to $1.10 U.S.) and the fact that the government had 
increased wages, and was spending the levy funds on public 
sector projects. They predicted that a financial crisis would 
occur if more production was not forthcoming. Production for 
the IMF meant private sector-created jobs and increased 
exports. The Manley government wanted a more equitable 
society. He favored public sector jobs and more employment. 
These differences were not mutually exclusive but were enough 
to prolong the ongoing conflict with the IMF (see Table 4.1). 
Jamaica's problems with the IMF became critical in the 
election year of 1976 and in 1977 because of the government's 
emphasis on social reform and the IMF requirement for stricter 
fiscal management. The general problems are listed in Table 
4. 1. 
The initial agreement between the IMF and Jamaica was a 
compromise; it was a two year stand-by agreement. 
In April 1977, it was announced that a fresh approach 
would be made to the Fund as part of the Emergency Pro¬ 
duction Plan. Simultaneously, a dual exchange rate was 
adopted: a 37.5 per cent devalued "Special Rate" to 
facilitate exports and to apply to essential imports; 
and the old rate, "Basic Rate," for governmental trans¬ 
actions, bauxite exports and essential imports of basic 
foods and medicine .... Wage increases after the 
expiration of the moratorium would be limited to $10 per 
week about 22 percent on the average weekly rate. 
17 Ibid, p. 125. 
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The devaluation and austere IMF measures exacerbated the 
problem of migration of skilled persons and their illegal 
financial transactions. The drain of foreign exchange 
returned to pre- 1976 elections volume amounting to over $300 
million.1® 
The agreement created open warfare within the PNP 
party. The left, which had made gains in the party since 
the election of 1976, was disciplined at the party 
conference in September 1977 because of its continued 
opposition to the IMF terras and was voted out of its 
position of prominence. D. K. Duncan, General Secretary and 
the Minister of Mobilization, whose job it would have been 
to oversee the Emergency Plan and the "Non-IMF way" resigned 
with his staff after the party conference. 
The IMF and its Conflict with Jamaica 
In a worsening economic climate caused by IMF 
austerity and irresponsible private sector greed for 
profits, the initial agreement from February 1977-December 
1977 had to be changed. The truce between the IMF and 
Jamaica did not last for long because of the internal 
problems. The wage guidelines set by the IMF were breached 
by the trade unions demanding more. Manley, coming from a 
trade union background, went along with the unions. But the 
IMF held the trump card. The Bank of Jamaica failed to 
achieve the required J$355 million by the ridiculously small 
"•^EPICA Task Force, p. 103* 
118 
amount of J$9 million, representing 2.6 percent. 19 
The IMF after nine months called for a new agreement. 
The two-tier system was disbanded and the exchange rate was 
unified, plus an additional 15% currency devaluation was 
effected. This meant 47% devaluation of the old basic rate 
( 1976 prices). There was also to be an additional 1.5% monthly 
devaluation starting from May 1978 to May 1979. Varying 
additional taxes were placed on different consumer goods.20 
Incentive was given to the private sector by the lifting of 
price controls. The objective was to secure more private sector 
investment and expansion. 
There were other political ramifications to these 
conditions. "Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Ken McNeil 
quit in January 1978; Finance Minister David Coore, in March; 
and long-time member of Parliament Vivan Blake, in May."21 in 
1978 Finance Minister David Coore resigned because he was blamed 
by the people and party for failure to abide by strict IMF 
conditions. 
IMF shocker! 15% devaluation, $180.3 million in new 
taxes, gas $3 per gallon. The announcements were part 
of a three-year economic programme announced by Finance 
Minister Eric Bell resulting from negotiations between 
the government and the International Monetary Fund for a 
U.S. $240 million loan assistance package .... He 
conceded that the final decisions would be a "shock to 
the society" over which the Cabinet had agonized in an 
attempt to ease the burden on the poorest in the society.^2 
19»Jamaican Dollar", International Currency Review, No. 
2, May 1979, pp. 153-157. 
20EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 99. 
2'll bid., p. 155. 
22Weekly Gleaner (North America), May 22, 1978, p. 1. 
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Eric Bell, the new minister, was more diligent to the tasks, 
but after complying with the IMF conditions he expressed 
concern about the hardships on the people. 
The rapid adjustment had the effect of shocking the 
productive sector as well as the man in the street. Few 
countries, authoritarian or democratic, could have 
survived the period without violence. Jamaica did, and 
when by the end of 1978 the community recovered from the 
initial shock of the adjustment, it became clea>" that 
there was insufficient foreign exchange to provide 
capital goods and raw materials required for recovery 
and expansion.23 
The Gross National Product began to decline. From 
1978 to 1979 the Jamaican political machinery went along 
with the IMF, and in certain quarters, actually was regarded 
as an IMF success story. But there was dissatisfaction in 
the PNP ranks because of the slowdown of benefits to the 
masses of the people and the increased militancy of the 
private sector in demanding more. The government had not 
given up hope in finding an alternative to the IMF, but the 
world was in recession and financial loans were difficult to 
obtain and interests rates were exorbitant. 
The Jamaican government tried to make the new 
agreement work as best as it could, and it followed IMF 
dictates both in letter and spirit. She devalued the 
currency, relaxed price controls, increased taxes and held 
down wages. As a matter of fact, the 25 percent reduction 
asked for was closer to an estimated 35 percent by the 
National Planning Agency.24 
23IMF Report, 1979, p. 190. 
2^The Jamaica Daily Gleaner, November 14, 1979. 
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In 1978 the Jamaica government was the highest 
recipient of IMF loans because she had adhered to the IMF 
dictates so closely. At the same time the international 
commercial banks were not granting Jamaica any loans because 
they perceived the government to be socialist.25 THe IMF 
felt duty-bound to assist Jamaica in her dilemma caused by 
their arrangements. But she was not totally honest about 
it, because of the funds committed, only a fraction was 
actually disbursed (See Table 4.2). 
TABLE 4.2. 
IMF RESOURCES APPROVED AND USED UNDER THE STAND-BY 
AGREEMENT AND EXTENDED FUND FACILITY 
(U.S. $ millions) 
Agreement Approved Disbursed 
US $ M % Quota US $ M % Quota 
Stand-by agreement 
July - December 1977 
75 120 22 35 
Extended Fund 
Facility 
May 1978 - January 1980 
429 445 172 179 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, 1980. 
25jennifer Sharpley, op. cit., p. 261. 
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For a time the IMF was pleased at the government’s 
performance. In the light of its difficulty in acquiring 
new loans from the commercial banks, the IMF interceded and 
actually helped in implementing her own recommendations 
because the government was using the money borrowed for IMF 
performances test rather than frivolous spending on private 
sector exports.26 
However, Jamaica could hardly be punished for adopting a 
programme of the Fund's own making, and the IMF helped 
the government technically to pass the arrears tests and 
adopted an understanding and sympathetic attitude 
towards the shortfalls in fiscal performance 
(performance tests were not actually breached).27 
The IMF insisted that along with the package they were 
suggesting that the government abide by certain guidelines. 
1. Wage increases would be kept to 10 percent and price 
increases also kept to 10 percent through the social 
contract. 
2 Government would work to promote an atmosphere of 
harmony and mutual trust and confidence with the 
private sector. 
3. Trade unions would undertake to minimize industrial 
disputes especially those arising out of inter-union 
ri valry. 
4. The private sector would undertake to reinvest 
profits and so promote growth and create jobs. 
5. Government was to reduce the real size of the budget 
(the nominal increase was kept to 4 percent) in order 
to release more credit for the private sector. 
6. The Fund committed more resources for the second and 
third year of the programme, principally from the 
26RiChard Fletcher, formerly of the Ministry of 
Finance, in an interview, (August 1983) recalls how the U.S. 
commercial banks became hesitant to give loans because they 
were being monitored more strictly. 
27G irvan, p. 124. 
122 
supplementary financing facility. The total would 
amount to U.S $419 million compared to U.S. $240 
million originally committed in 1978 making Jamaica 
the highest recipient of IMF assistance in per capita 
terms .28 
The IMF and Its Conflict with Jamaican Politics 
There were factors other than economics that 
precipitated the Jamaican crisis with the IMF. They were 
essentially political, and they were local as well as 
international. The IMF tends to separate politics from 
economics and insists that they are neutral and are the 
ablest technocrats in the economic field. 
Manley’s actions as a political leader affected 
Jamaica economically. The stage was set in the early 1970s 
by the United States overtures to the Soviet Union and China 
and the beginning of detente. It would seem reasonable that 
Manley could have friendly relations with Castro, an island 
ninety miles away, and one that has had significant 
historical ties with Jamaica. But this was only one of 
Manley's political moves.29 
A more serious stance toward the United States and 
the developed world was Manley's association with the 
nonaligned nations and their awakened demand for a New 
International Economic Order. The developed countries were 
2®Ibid., p. 128. 
29Nettlef ord, in A New Jamaica, is of the opinion 
that detente by the U.S. gave Jamaica certain signals to 
have more friendly relations with the socialist states, op. 
cit., p. xil. 
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going through a boom in the late '60s and early '70s. The 
Southern countries came to realize the developing countries’ 
dependency on their raw materials (see Table 4.3). The OPEC 
price hike served to accentuate the growing power of the 
South. Manley was one of the Southern leaders who was in 
the forefront of that movement. 
Table 4.3 
DEPENDENCE ON SELECTED MINERAL IMPORTS 
FROM UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1973 
(as a percentage of consumption) 
United States Japan Western 
Europe 
Bauxite and aluminum 67.0? 47.0? 22.0? 
C hr om e 31-0% 38.0? 38.0? 
Copper 51.0% 49.0? 57.0? 
Iron Ore 34.0$ 44.0? 30.0? 










Nickel 7.0? 88.0? 2.0? 
Phosphates - 39.0? 67.0? 
Tin 94.0? 90.0? 85.0? 
Tungsten 61.0? 96.0? 58.0? 
Zinc 11.0? 32.0? 16.0? 
Source: Council on International Economic Policy, 
International Economic Report of the President 
(Washington, D.C., March 1975). pp. 161-162. 
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He realized that if the OPEC movement was broken by 
southern countries quarreling among themselves about the 
increases, as they affected them, that there might never be 
another opportunity for the South to demand equity from the 
North. In 1974 he raised taxes and royalties on bauxite 
production; the new taxes were based not on the bauxite 
extracted, but on the price of aluminum ingots on the North 
American markets. He was even more aggressive in 
anticipating that the companies would decrease production 
and shift their operations. He required them to maintain 
production levels established by the Jamaican government or 
to pay taxes on that level whether o^ not it was actually 
maintained.30 
In exacerbating the problem, he was instrumental in 
forming the International Bauxite Association that had a 
membership of eleven (Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
Yugoslavia, Australia, and Indonesia). The cartel worked at 
first, but the combination of transnational bauxite 
companies and Third World lack of solidarity saw Australia 
and Guinea selling bauxite at a lower price. Also Australia 
improved its production at the expense of the Caribbean 
partners of Jamaica, Surinam, and Guyana.31 Theinternational 
companies retaliated by slowing down 
30carmine Nappi, Commodity Market Controls 
(Lexington, Mass,: D.C. Heath, 1979), p. 123. 
3'lSpero, op. cit., p. 277. 
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production in the Caribbean. 
The United States was gravely concerned about 
Jamaica’s action and Ambassador de Roulet voiced his dismay 
by saying he had had Manley's reassurance that there would 
be no increases. Manley, in retaliation, made him "personna 
non grata." The U.S. administration did not take kindly to 
such a show of national authority, and relations between 
Jamaica and the United States were at a very low point. 
This deteriorated to the point that the embassy was regarded 
as a danger post. The actions of Jamaica were more than an 
irritant to the United States. As the leader of the 
developed market economies, it had a vested interest in free 
trade. The demands of the South and unilateral actions like 
Jamaica's were frowned on. Interestingly enough, Tony Smith 
is of the opinion that if the South did not call for a NIEO, 
the North would probably have done so. Although his 
analysis is not Marxist he agrees with Lenin that capitalism 
over time runs into the problem of the need for expansion of 
its markets. Smith cites the new invesment of multinational 
corporations and their global expansion. If the LDCs remain 
depressed, they will have neither the appetite nor the 
resources to consume products made in th métropole.32 The 
demands for a new NIEO reflects Jamaica's sentiments: 
The present international economic order is in direct 
conflict with current development in international, 
political and economic relations .... The developing 
32iony Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power in 
North-South Relations Since 19*15" International 
Organization XXXI (1977), pp. 1-27. 
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world has become a powerful factor that makes its 
influence felt in all fields of international activity. 
Their irreversible changes in the relationship of forces 
in the world necessitates the active full and equal 
participation of the developing countries in the 
formulation and application of all decisions that 
concern the international community.33 
The developing countries recommended that a: 
North commitment to the transfer of 0.7 percent of GNP 
as set by the second United Nations Development Decade, 
a greater flow of emergency funds designed to deal with 
the food, energy, and recession-inflation crises, a 
renegotiation of the less developed countries' debt, and 
the implementation of the link in monetary reform. 
Foreign investment recommendations called for the right 
to expropriation, greater Southern control of 
multinational corporation, more effective application of 
technology by foreign investors, and improvement in ways 
” ‘ ” ing technology to less developed 
resisted any concession to the LDCs. The reaction was 
hostile, and Patrick Moynihan and John Scali, representing 
the United States at the U.N., reacted demonstratively 
against such a proposal, calling it "tyranny of the 
majority" because by this time, (1974) the Southern states 
were a majority in the General Assembly. 
But the Northern states were divided and France, with 
a relatively planned economy, realizing what a detrimental 
effect a Southern boycott would have on her economy, began 
to reason with the South. At the sixth special session of 
33ûuy F. Erb and Valerianna Kallab, Beyond 
Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out (Washington, 
D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1975), p. 186. 
34Anthony Edwards, "The Potential for New Commodity 
Cartels: Copying OPEC or Improved International Agreements?" 
QER Special No. 27. (London: The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, September, 1975), p. 4.1. 
The United States, fearing a flood gate, effectively 
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the United Nations General Assembly, France pressed for 
organization and international management of raw material 
mar kets.35 
In May of the following year at the meeting of 
Commonwealth Heads of Government in Jamaica, Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom outlined a new British 
policy that included a general international commodity 
agreement, specific commodity agreement, stabilization of 
export earnings, and consideration of indexing prices of raw 
materials and manufactured products. 36 The Europeans and 
Japanese were steadily moving towards compromise with the 
South, but the United States remained adamant. They would 
only agree to discuss oil and energy issues, but were 
opposed to any broad consumer-producer negotiations. At a 
meeting of oil producers called by the South in April of 
1975, the United States refused to agree to attend and the 
meeting collapsed.37 
But there was a change in international relations. 
The South was able to combine many of its demands with the 
powerful OPEC countries. Also, the United States realized 
that the other developed countries were more oil dependent, 
35Foreign Minister Michael Joubert at the sixth 
special session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
April 10, 1974. Service de Presse et d'information. 
36prime Minister Harold Wilson, May 1, 1975 (British 
Information Service Policy and Reference Division 33/75.) 
37charles Robinson, Undersecretary for Economie 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, The Bulletin, 72, (May 
26, 1975), pp. 688-689. 
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and to a lesser extent raw material dependent, and they 
could not play the indifferent role that the U.S. had 
adopted. The U.S. feared that the other developed countries 
(Western Europe and Japan) would make separate arrangements 
with the developing countries and she would be left in the 
lurch and would not be able to play a leading role in the 
new negotiations. An about face was made in May 1975 when 
Under-Secretary of State Charles Robinson said, "We expect 
the OPEC-LDC bloc under OPEC leadership to be a strong and 
vocal force in future international forums."38 This was 
followed by Secretary of State Kissinger’s announcement in 
Kansas City that same May, that the United States was now 
willing "to discuss new arrangements in individual 
commodities on a case-by-case basis."39 Although the United 
States showed its willingness in September 1975 for 
achieving a new international economic order, it merely 
signaled a shift, but not a fundamental change in American 
policy. There were forces in the U.S. government that 
resisted any commodity agreements, and with the advent of 
recession and inflation in the 1970s, there was increasing 
protection of U.S. markets from Southern exports. 
The Manley government was involved in other political 
ventures. A Jamaican team of negotiators was instrumentalin 
keeping alive the Law of the Sea Conference by proposing 
38ibid., p. 190. 
39secretary of State Henry Kissinger, U.S. Department 
of State, The Bulletin, 72 (June 2, 1975), p. 717. 
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a compromise between the North and South. Gaining the 
backing of many of the nonaligned countries, Jamaica was 
proposed as the headquarters for the Conference.^0 There 
was resistance by the developed countries on the general 
concept "that the oceans should be exploited for the benefit 
of all mankind." The heart of the controversy was that the 
developed countries wanted at least sixty percent of the 
undertaking because they were the ones supplying the capital 
and the technology. Also they wanted free access for 
exploration and were opposed to the 200-mile limit zone of 
economic control and favored the 12-mile limit. The 
developing countries countered by insisting that their 
economic zone extented beyond the 12-mile limit and many 
were claiming 200-mile economic zones, which meant the major 
portions of the ocean, and that landlocked countries should 
also benefit. 
After initial reluctance by United States Presidents 
Nixon and Ford, President Carter favored an agreement, but 
the Reagan administration opposed the treaty. 
Jamaica was also active in the reform of the IMF and 
was a member of the Committee of Twenty that met in January 
of 1976 to negotiate a list of reforms prepared by the 
Executive Board of the IMF in 1972. They were concerned 
with the adjustment process, the convertibility system, the 
management of global liquidity, and the transfer of real 
4°The Jamaica Daily Gleaner, February 3, 1976. 
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resources to developing countries.1^ The Committee of 
Twenty in 1976 decided that: 
the Jamaican agreement virtually accepts the fait 
accompli that had followed the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system. Thus members are permitted to adopt the 
exchange arrangements of their choice; the IMF is given 
the role of exercising firm surveillance over the 
exchange rate policies of members and adopting specific 
principles for the guidance of all members with respect 
to those policies.1*2 
Effectively they had adopted the United States decision of 
floating exchange rates but from 1974 the Jamaican 
government was aware of the problems the IMF had in its 
exchange rates because of lack of liquidity, and was 
unwilling to go to the IMF for assistance. 
Jamaica, by this time, had become a vocal leader in 
nonaligned and Third World forums for a just economic order. 
Michael Manley, as a vice-president of Socialist 
International, became a global figure and like Nkrumah 
before him, was convinced that imperialism was the single 
most important factor causing underdevelopment. He became a 
firm believer in the dependency theory; he, therefore, 
sought to diversify the Jamaican trading partners and to 
seek more aid from the Socialist bloc. 
Although the Carter administration was not 
antagonistic, certain other anti-socialist forces in his 
government were most upset with the Jamaican show of 
independence and the turn towards socialism as they 
**''North/South Dialogue, p. 175. 
42Ibid., p. 176. 
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perceived it.^3 They got ample support from Edward Seaga, 
the leader of the opposition, who on a visit to United 
States told a session of Congress of the Jamaican 
government's rapid movement towards socialism and of the 
planned restrictions of the private sector. On his return 
to Jamaica there was a motion in the Jamaican House to 
censure his behavior and it was passed.^ 
Jamaica and the IMF Conflict 
By 1979 the Manley government's political utterances 
and the IMF foothold on the economy had come to a head. He 
had sought to improve Jamaica's export potential by forming 
a consortium between Mexico, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Jamaica to produce aluminum from bauxite. When that 
venture fell through because of a lack of consensus among 
the group, he approached the Hungarians and plans were afoot 
for them to build a smelter in Jamaica. He approached 
Algeria for a joint venture and in the final days when IMF 
relations were cut off, he approached Libya.^5 The Seaga 
government became the recipient of the Libyan loan.^6 
^Girvan, p. 122. 
44The_ Jamaica Daily Gleaner, March 10, 1977. 
^Michael Manley on ABC News Documentary: ABC News 
Closeup: A Matter of Survival with Tom Jarrel. December 30, 
1980. 
^The Manley government made arrangements for a loan 
of $100 million but it came through 3 months after it left 
office. The deliberations with the Algerians were still in 
the initial stages when the government was removed. 
132 
Manley defended these moves by telling an ABC documentary 
team, 
We go to Algeria and say, Comrades in socialism, you are 
Third World, we are Third World, you have gas power, we 
have bauxite raw materials. Make we do a thing, make we 
marry Third World resource with Third World power, and I 
say, Glory to the process.^7 
The IMf refused to give the PNP a reprieve on their loan 
repayment. This slowed imports of raw materials for 
manufacturing. The government in March broke away from the 
IMF and Manley called an early election to get approval from 
the populace. The events that led to this breakaway were 
the government belief that: 
Well, what was happening was that the IMF was trying to 
insist upon, in a country already suffering, the grave 
social consequences of heavy unemployment, was really 
saying in effect, either lay off tens of thousands of 
people or virtually wipe out the social programs not a 
matter of free education ... we can’t guarantee that 
and therefore the battle would rage. You know, about 
what to, should be the proper extent of the .... We 
know and that of course things have to tight, but not 
that tight.(SIC) 
The Manley government appeared confused on its acceptance of 
IMF dictates. They had eroded the mandate they got from 
the populace for a non IMF path of development. The party 
was returned in 1976, and the Jamaican people appeared to be 
willing to make the necessary sacrifice for foregoing an IMF 
loan. But having accepted the IMF loan, though he had 
avowed not to take it, Manley got little sympathy from his 
^Michael Manley ABC News, December 30, 1980. 
^^ibid., p. 142. (an improptu speech by Manley 
recorded by ABC news team.) 
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strongest supporters when the IMF conditions became unbearable. 
The IMF conditions caused unemployment and an increase 
in food prices. The Manley government tried to reassure its 
supporters that it was for the long term good. But there 
was increased discontent and continued pressure from the 
left wing of the party. In a national meeting in February 
the party decided to break relations with the IMF. 
The JLP won the election in October 1980 on an IMF 
pro-capitalist, pro-United States platform. It also used 
the Communist bogey, started in 1944, only with more ammunition 
this time resulting from the increased friendship between 
Manley and Castro. Seaga responded to Manley's protest of 
undue influence by the socialists. 
They don't like when I call them Communists. They don't 
have to. Their foreign policy is the same as Cuban 
Communists. They send over young boys to be trained in 
Marxism, Leninism, which is another name for Communism. 
They get Cuban agents to come here to train hand picked 
members of the security forces in political espionage. 
They walk with Communists, they talk with Communists, 
they march with Communists, hold meetings together with 
Communits; they do everything that they can possibly do 
with Communists. I say that if you look like a duck and 
if you walk like a duck, if you swim like a duck, and 
you quack like a duck, you cannot be anything else but a 
duck.49 
Michael Manley insisted that Jamaica was merely taking a 
nonalign-posture. 
We have known our philosophy a long time, Democratic 
Socialism . . . and we trade honorably with the United 
States, we trade honorably with Canada, we want our friend¬ 
ship with America, we want our friendship with Canada, 
we want our friendship with the Soviet Union. We have 
worked with them. 50 
49Edward Seaga on ABC, December 30, 1980. 
BO 
Michael Manley on ABC, December 30, 1980. 
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The JLP’s victory was a convincing 51 to 9; again the 
Jamaican people had chosen the immediate gains over the 
long-term self-reliance and development. The coalition of 
middle class workers and lumpen proletariat that gave the 
PNP victory in 1976, were not prepared to undergo the 
hardships that they foresaw with the break with the IMF. 
The Manley government in 1980 was in essence asking them to 
make the sacrifice in 1980 that they had already given him 
in 1976. Furthermore, although the PNP won many seats in 
1976, the historical two-party system with both parties 
having a core of roughly forty percent each, with a twenty 
percent swing vote meant the JLP was not dead. Both U.S. 
presidential candidates expressed their approval.51 
To demonstrate his approval, President Reagan invited 
Prime Minister Seaga to be the first Head of State to visit 
him. Three weeks after the elections, the commercial 
bankers in the U.S. worked out an agreement with the 
Jamaican government to pay interest on the $450 million in 
outstanding loans. Pending the results of IMF consultations 
in December 1980, they agreed to work out a package of aid 
to the Jamaican government. This turned out to be favorable 
and the government got back into the good graces of the IMF 
and U.S. commercial banks. Three weeks after the elections, 
the government and the U.S. announced a reduction in crime 
and a boom in the tourist industry, an industry that had 
5^The New York Times, November 15, 1980. 
52ibid. 
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been hurt commercially by bad publicity in the United 
States. 
Early in 1981 the formation of a joint U.S. and 
Jamaican committee to oversee Jamaica’s recovery was 
announced. In was headed by David Rockefeller, Chairman of 
Chase Manhattan Bank. 
The members of the American committee, described by a 
White House news release as an ’initial steering group’ 
are: Mr. Frank Borman, Chairman, Eastern Airlines; Mr. 
Charles Bludhorn, Chairman, Gulf and Western Industries; 
Mr. John C. Duncan, Chairman, St. Joe Minerals; Mr. W. 
H. Frome George, Chairman, Alcoa; Mr. Howard C. Kaufman, 
President, Exxon Corporation; Mr. Cornell C. Maier, 
Chairman, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation; Mr. 
Seymour Milstein, Chairman, United Brands; Mrs. David P. 
Reynolds, Chairman, Reynolds Metals Co.; Mr. Curt R. 
Strand, President, Hilton International.53 
They were all representative of multinationals with vested 
interests in Jamaica from bauxite, oil. tourism and food 
importation. It seems Manley’s cry that above all, "We are 
not for sale," was lost in the wind. Manley had sought 
diversification of loans and trading partners so that he 
would not be totally dependent on the U.S. capitalist class. 
The possibility of aid from Eastern bloc countries was also 
explored, but Manley felt there was not enough time to 
develop the diplomatic and trade relations on which such aid 
would be based. There were limits on the amount of aid 
available, and the amount of time it would take to receive 
"it". The U.S. government gained more influence over 
theJamaican economy as to how it should be developed. Mr. 
Arthur Preeg was designated by Secretary of State Alexander 
53The Jamaica Daily Gleaner, April 19, 1981. 
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Haig and was attached to the Office of the Undersecretary of 
Economic Affairs at the State Department to coordinate the 
U.S. style recovery of Jamaica.54 
Another important point is that the crime situation 
in Jamaica had not changed dramatically. Yet, the reports 
in the U.S media are all favorable. It was rumored before 
the elections that Cuban intelligence forces were dispatched 
to influence the elections. But instead the security forces 
have recovered "one hundred and ninety-two firearms 
including 53 M16 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 22,857 
rounds of ammunition. . . "55 it would appear that the 
reverse would be expected - Cuban or Russian arras. Rather, 
it is clear that the U.S. had responded to Mr. Seaga's 
plea, ". . .if ever there was time for an umbrella policy 
to be framed, that time is now."56 
The IMF reopened negotiations with Jamaica and this 
was the signal for the multinationals and commercial banks 
to invest in Jamaica. The IMF loan of U.S $640 million 
dollars gave Seaga confidence that he could manage the 
Jamaican economy. 
Prime Minister Seaga has assured the country that the 
impending IMF agreement will have positive implications 
and ensure adequate funding for basic commodities, raw 
materials, fuel supplies, and debt servicing. Mr. Seaga 
has told Parliament that the agreement will not involve 
devaluation, any specific requirement for lay-offs, in 
54ihe Jamaica Daily Gleaner, April 18, 1980. 
55ihe Jamaica Daily Gleaner, October, 14, 1980. 
56The New York Times, January 24, 1981 . 
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the public sector, or for a cut-back in the expenditure. 
It may be that the crisis of financial confidence having 
passed with the Manley government, the JLP 
administration anticipates greater flexibility in the 
IMF’s conditionality.57 
Despite Mr. Seaga's positive outlook, there were certain 
restrictions to the loan. 
1. observance of the limit on net bank credit to the 
public sector from the domestic banking system; 
2. observance of the limit on the net domestic assets of 
the Bank of Jamaica aimed at keeping inflationary 
credit creation under control; 
3. achievement of targets for the net international 
reserves of the BOJ; 
4. observance of the limit on new external borrowing, 
both direct and guaranteed, by the government; and 
5. observance of the obligation not to introduce 
multiple currency practices or to introduce new 
restrictions on payments and transfers for current 
international transactions.5° 
Mr. Seaga was well aware of IMF conditions and he expected 
the conditions that were laid down because he was in 
agreement with the IMF ideology. He stated: 
New agreements with the IMF will only suffer the fate of 
the old agreements - failure succeeded by failure, until 
the Government accepts that the basic problem is not 
economic but political and ideological.59 
This is the point Michael Manley has always insisted on. 
The difference is that Manley wanted to be free from 
dependency, while Seaga depends on the U.S. good will. 
57The Jamaica Daily Gleaner, March 8, 1981. 
58ihe_ Jamaica Daily Gleaner, April 10, 1981. (The 
IMF concern is that there should be adequate amount of 
reserves in the BOJ for private sector). 
59EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 104. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED 
TO THE JAMAICAN ELITE 
The IMF is a household name in Jamaica, but not many 
understand it or know why the IMF plays such an important 
role in their lives. To a great many people its political 
connotation is known as "Is Manley’s Fault and the 
Impossible Monetary Fund." There are those who are anti-IMF 
and others who are pro-IMF; Milton Friedman advocates its 
abolishment and refers to it as a bunch of incompentent 
bureaucrats.1 Yet for others it is the savior of the world 
and President Reagan supported expansion of the Fund. 
This questionnaire addresses the internal dynamics of 
the Jamaican society, its government and its external 
relationship with the IMF. The 13 persons selected are part 
of the ruling elite. They include industrialists and 
entrepreneurs of the left and right, members of the news 
media, the clergy, government officials who participated in 
the IMF negotiations, and labor leaders. The group is small 
for several reasons. Although the IMF’s policy affects 
every Jamaican, only a few are aware of its implementation, 
also there are few persons directly involved with the IMF. 
^Newsweek, October 23, 1983, p. 42. 
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To this end the questions are general rather than 
specific in order to cover the broad macro aspects that were 
under continuous discussion during the Manley government's 
tenure. The individuals interviewed represent broad areas 
of Jamaica business and culture. It is important to assess 
their knowledge of the IMF and its operation because they 
are the ones who were responsible for implementing its 
condition or advising others as to its import. 
The IMF deals with difficult monetary matters and 
exchange controls which are not readily understood by all. 
The questionnaire allows us to appreciate the dynamics of 
the Jamaican and IMF relationship among principal actors. 
Was there cooperation from this group or opposition? A 
government is more effective and insistent on its conditions 
if it has the undivided support of its people. The 
different actors in the Jamaican society were not of one 
mind, hence the difficulty in Jamaica and IMF relations. 
The Manley governments' position was that IMF continues 
dependency and there are few cases of IMF successes. There 
are many in Jamaica who do not agree. 
Question 1a. How would you define development? 
All responded that is was a combination of social and 
economic factors. Nine respondents were emphatic that 
unemployment is the major problem and one respondent went so 
far as to say "it has been the major problem for Jamaica in 
the last 150 years". The members of the business sector and 
the labor leaders were the most concerned with unemployment. 
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Question 1b. 
Dudley Seers defines development as: 
The questions to ask about a country's development are 
therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What 
has been happening to unemployment? What has been 
happening to inequality? If all three of these have 
declined from high levels, then beyond doubt, this has 
been a period of development for the country concerned. 
If one or two of these central problems have been 
growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be 
strange to call the result development even if per 
capita doubled. 
In what ways do you agree or disagree with this? 
All agreed basically with this definition; many of 
the respondents in answering 1b. gave definitions of 
development somewhat similar to Dudley Seers. Yet four of 
the respondents did not favour the methods used by Michael 
Manley to effect these changes. One respondent said 
emphatically "that a market economy was more cyclical, that 
employment will fluctate according to economic trends. 
Poverty and inequality have always existed and there are no 
short term, fix it methods that will change them 
dramaticall y." 
Question 1c. Would you use this definition as a working 
framework for Jamaica? 
There were 12 respondents who said they would use the 
general definition for development. One participant felt 
that the most pressing problem was the short run inability 
to earn foreign exchange and to put demand and supply in 
e qu i 1 i br i urn . 
There was concern about how the rising tide of 
economic expectation would be fitted into a developing 
country that had to make choices between addressing the 
basic needs of the masses of the society and at the same 
time satisfying the lifestyle of conspicuous consumption of 
the middle class. 
Question 1d. Has the Manley Government effectively changed 
any of the above? 
All agreed that there was some attempt at change. 
Eight respondents were emphatic about the real gains by the 
PNP especially in addressing inequalities, the passing of 
minimum wage, equal pay for equal work, 
Employment/Termination Act, land lease and food farms. 
Three respondents thought the plans fell short of their 
obj ectives. 
The overall responses reflected the various interests 
of the participants. The only surprise was the business 
sector’s concern for more employment as compared to more 
profits. 
Question 2. What were the major factors causing a deviation 
or failure to achieve these plans? 
Seven blamed the problem on external factors such as 
world inflation, world recession and internal problems of 
inablity to achieve loan assistance to meet the 
deteriorating balance of payment situation, U.S. covert 
action in the Western banking situation, lack of private 
sector confidence and investment, and local sabotage of the 
private enterprise. 
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Four responded that there were some rather good 
sounding programs and ideas for change, but gross 
mismanagement made shambles of the entire project. 
Two said a combination of local and foreign factors 
caused "our" problems. 
There were the eight respondents who believed that 
the United States had interfered with the Jamaican economy. 
Not all were agreed that this was inherently bad because it 
was brought about by the excesses of the PNP. They felt 
that the United States and the IMF were destabilizing the 
country and ought not to have done so. Three respondents 
were of the opinion that the U.S. had not interfered. 
Question 3. What should be the Government's role in 
devel opment? 
All agreed that a government should play a vital role 
in a country's development. But there were variations as to 
what that role should be. In trying to quantify the 
government's role, some had it 80 percent government and 20 
percent private sector and vice versa. The extremes were 
"The government should encourage, promote, facilitate and 
spearhead high risks or those link aspects not being 
accomplished by the private sector." The opposing view was: 
"The government should have total control over the 
allocation of funds and should encourage the expansion of 
industries and give funds to the private sector, then the 
economic and social benefits would result." 
This response expressed the general view that the 
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public sector was doing more than was necessary or that they 
could manage, while the advocates of a more equitable 
society believed the public sector needed to be expanded 
even further. 
Question 4. Do you advocate a free market system, a planned 
system or seme combination of the two? 
Eight respondents believed in a mixed system, while 3 
were for a free market system. Two favored a planned 
system. The free marketers were concerned with the free 
flow of supply and demand and believed that government 
interference by both the PNP and JLP had caused havoc to the 
economy. Those who favored a mixed economy pointed to the 
fact that even the U.S. government had regulatory bodies. 
If it were otherwise, the law of the jungle would be 
applicable. The two advocates of a planned system said the 
only way the country can be turned around is that the 
priorities set out by the government should be implemented. 
Question 5. In what areas was Jamaica weakest under Manley? 
There was no consensus on this question, but reasons 
varied as to why Manley's government fell:" (al the 
supplies of goods needed for industrialization of the 
country were inadequate, also the markets for finished goods 
should be expanded; (b) the quality of the civil service has 
deteriorated. It is bad government to use the civil service 
to solve unemployment. The salaries offered by the 
government are too low; as a result, the elite of the 
professionals are attracted to private enterprise. The 
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government tried to solve its financial problem by printing 
more money. It also forced the Jamaican businesses to 
become corrupt by the stringent policies on the private 
sector. They tried to control the market by introducing 
price controls. The bauxite levy was squandered away under 
poor planning. In both the free market and the planned 
systems, Jamaica is weak. Coming out of a mercantile 
background, Jamaican enterpreneurs still feel like traders 
rather than producers, and have traditionally abused the 
consuming public. We have been poor planners as evidenced 
by the growth of unimportant manufacturing like buttons and 
shoe laces, while we ignore meat processing and other food 
handling ventures.” 
There were indications that certain plans were not 
implemented properly and the flight of skilled persons left 
many gaps in the personnel to manage certain new plans of 
the government. 
Question 6. What were its areas of strength? 
The answers varied. ”The government did a good job 
in promoting self-sufficiency. For the first time the need 
to earn foreign exchange through our own means was 
emphasized. It was successful in motivating production in 
the non-traditional sector. This was not a function of the 
government alone. Jamaica's economic strength lies in its 
comparatively competent administrative approaches (1955-72) 
and the general population's ability to be creative and 
industrious. The government made great strides in 
1H5 
addressing social injustice. The idea of collective farms 
was great, but its implementation leaves much to be desired. 
The government did not have a plan and the little planning 
they did was incomplete. No government should polarize its 
populace. The PNP antagonized the private sector and the 
middle class and caused conflict between them and the 
masses ." 
The overall impression was that there was great 
activity within the government towards change; some were 
successful, but others were not because too much was 
attempted in too short a period. A minority believed that 
enough was not done and the changes were too slow. 
Question 7. To what extent has the country's development 
corresponded with its development plan? 
All agreed that there had been flaws in the 
government plans. There was a range of responses. In the 
’50s and '60s import substitution and industrialization by 
invitation did not have the expected results. In the '60s a 
continuation of that policy and little planning led to 
widening income disparities. In the ’70s, structural 
readjustment met with confrontation and sabotage. In the 
'80s, further adjustment is being interpreted and 
manipulated by the quick buck mentality. The government has 
been bedeviled with problems in agriculture. The formation 
of agricultural cooperative was very important by cutting 
out the middle man, but the cooperative struck against 
themselves because things were not explained adequately. 
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Four said the major funding the IMF is from DCs and 
they are operating within the market system. The LDCs have 
to develop good money management and savings of their own 
economies. Most LDCs think that they can achieve the same 
level of development as the DC's, but DCs' economies are the 
result of several hundred years compared to the unrealistic 
20 years that LDCs have tried to develop their economies. 
Three thought the bank needed drastic changes and 
called for a complete new organization based on more equity. 
The responses to this question were mixed. There 
were those who have problems with the IMF's bias towards DCs 
and high conditionality. They believe that the extent of 
the problem can be alleviated by IMF adjustment in respect 
towards LDCs. There were others who think that the IMF is 
an efficient banking enterprise, and the loans having been 
disbursed along sound banking guidelines. A minority would 
have the total structure revamped because the IMF is 
imperialistic . 
Question 16. Is the issuance of Special Drawing Rights a 
step in the right direction to solve the world's liquidity 
reserves problems? Comment on its likely impact.* 
Eight did not know enough about the Special Drawing 
Rights to comment. 
Three responded that an ongoing problem of the IMF is 
its limited funding. The SDRs are a move in the right 
*This question was intended for the specialized Jamaican 
technicians that had negotiations with the IMF, hence it was 
not surprising that others failed to answer. 
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Question 9. State briefly your impressions of the IMF as a 
viable arm for development. 
Six considered the IMF a bank of last resort or just 
a bank and as such, he who comes to borrow money should do 
so by the guideines of the bank. Their responses were the 
LDCs were putting blame on the IMF to cover up their money 
mismanagement. The IMF had done a creditable job in 
averting international money disaster. Its true role is to 
help desperate countries -- a kind of lifeboat role. 
The IMF for many is a kind of international 
commercial bank, and as such has not met with success in 
LDCs, but the LDCs have no alternative but to remain with 
the IMF. 
Five thought the bank has a monetaristic approach to 
development and is inappropriate for the Third World in the 
second half of the 20th century. 
Two said that it can help and were it not for 
institutions like the IMF the world would have more 
f i nan ci al pro bl ems . 
Question 10. How effective is the IMF in helping developing 
countries? 
Ten believed that the IMF is not effective in helping 
developing countries. This is so not because the 
organization is inherently bad. The reasons given were 
varied. The IMF is a macro economic system and it cannot 
deal with the micro problems of its numerous members; 
neither does it have the personnel, capital and technology 
to do so. It is a bank of last resort and is geared to bail 
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out operations. The IMF in certain cases might have delayed 
disaster, but it has never given genuine assistance to any 
developing country. It uses financial control to subvert 
sovereignty. 
Three are convinced that the IMF can help and will 
help. Its major task is to oversee a macro world economic 
system. It has been instrumental in working out the right 
price for a country's money, and in so doing it facilitates 
exports and restricts imports. It should be asked to form 
an economic plan, not to implement one. 
The latter responses came from those who believed in 
a monetaristic solution to Jamaica's problems, and they were 
opposed to what they thought an incompetent government was 
doing in an effort to become more self-reliant. 
Question 11. From what you know, has the IMF structure made 
for a more effective management of the world's economy? If 
not, suggest a more preferable structure. 
Eight thought it was not effective. It does not have 
sufficient funds to carry out its programs. The bank 
officials are too distant from the everyday operations of 
member countries. 
Five said it can be improved, but in the absence of 
anything else, it has been effective in the controlling of 
foreign exchange funds. It serves as the guru for 
monetarist policies (the theory that loans from banks are 
constrictive or expansionary). The world would be far more 
unstable without the IMF to oversee certain monetary 
problems. The improvement they would like to see is more 
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involvement of the private sector in IMF consultations and 
more trade of finished goods to the developed countries. 
Question 12. Do you think the IMF is politically neutral? 
Eight believe it is not neutral for different 
reasons. "In its present state, it does not address Third 
World problems adequately; development is being guided by 
northern attitude of monetaristic thinkers. The IMF is 
greatly influenced by its major contributors which happen to 
be the developed countries. The IMF personnel by training 
are pro-private enterprise. The Third World countries guard 
their newly found independence jealously and will not allow 
any organization to infringe on their political rights. IMF 
should not be called upon for development. That is the role 
of the private sector and governments of the individual 
countries; rather, it should be used to upgrade basket 
cases 
There were those that responded adversely to the IMF 
operations and would advocate its disbanding and a new, more 
equitable organization formed because it is too capitalistic 
and serves only the interests of the U.S. 
Three felt it is politically neutral, its major 
concern is not development or imperialism because it serves 
countries both of the East and West and they are given 
fairly equal treatment in the working out of a stable 
monetary system. "We who are newly independent still have a 
parent/child relationship between the DCs and the LDCs, and 
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the developed countries have certain responsibilities to 
some of their former colonies.” 
The consensus is that the IMF technicians are capable 
and do a fairly good job, but because they are trained in 
the West, they are biased towards that system. 
Question 14. Are there any changes you would make in the 
IMF? 
All agreed that there are changes needed. The IMF 
has to change its image so that the man in the street is not 
as frightened of its operations as the harbinger of bad 
news. The IMF should expand to include the private sector 
and the unions. If one is planning for economic development 
these sectors are vital. The research that the IMF does 
should be made public so that everyone can work towards the 
goals that are set. 
Question 15. Is there a need for the IMF to become more 
representative? 
Six would want it to be more representative; also, 
borrowing countries should have a say at the policy-making 
level. Although there are many who view the IMF as a 
commercial bank, it has a far more important role than a 
mere commercial bank. Its purpose is to oversee a world 
system and strict monetary policies are its goals. 
Commerical banks are geared for profits, but the IMF 
controls world monetary stability. We know what the results 
are when commercial banks try to play that role in the 
bankrupt economies of Brazil, Argentina, Poland and others. 
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Four said the major funding the IMF is from DCs and 
they are operating within the market system. The LDCs have 
to develop good money management and savings of their own 
economies. Most LDCs think that they can achieve the same 
level of development as the DC’s, but DCs' economies are the 
result of several hundred years compared to the unrealistic 
20 years that LDCs have tried to develop their economies. 
Three thought the bank needed drastic changes and 
called for a complete new organization based on more equity. 
The responses to this question were mixed. There 
were those who have problems with the IMF’s bias towards DCs 
and high conditionality. They believe that the extent of 
the problem can be alleviated by IMF adjustment in respect 
towards LDCs. There were others who think that the IMF is 
an efficient banking enterprise, and the loans having been 
disbursed along sound banking guidelines. A minority would 
have the total structure revamped because the IMF is 
imperi alistic. 
Question 16. Is the issuance of Special Drawing Rights a 
step in the right direction to solve the world's liquidity 
reserves problems? Comment on its likely impact.* 
Eight did not know enough about the Special Drawing 
Rights to comment. 
Three responded that an ongoing problem of the IMF is 
its limited funding. The SDRs are a move in the right 
•This question was intended for the specialized Jamaican 
technicians that had negotiations with the IMF, hence it was 
not surprising that others failed to answer. 
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direction, but it is still too heavily influenced by the 
major currency. An expanded IMF can give more liberal loans 
to the LDCs and they should be able to follow IMF 
gui del i nes . 
Two within this response said the amounts given by 
the IMF are too small and restricted to particular sectors; 
they should be given for all areas of development. 
Question 17. Do you believe OPEC has adopted the proper 
strategy in demanding a more realistic pricing for their 
oil? 
All agreed that something had to be done about the 
price of products from the developing countries. The OPEC 
countries did not use their windfall profits correctly. The 
other LDCs formed a common bond in helping OPEC realize its 
goal, but it in turn did not do them justice. The Manley 
government made gains on its bauxite levy, but it squandered 
the money on fancy projects that did not get off the ground 
(the sugar cooperatives, the education program from birth to 
university and the state trade cooperative). 
Question 18. Would you characterize the 1980 elections as 
IMF influenced.? 
Six were of the opinion that the IMF influence was 
neglible, if any, on the elections. "The people were tired 
of an inept government and wanted a change. It might have 
started out as IMF influenced, but the political violence 
that came later changed the picture completely. Never in 
the history of Jamaica had there been so much violence. 
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There must have been some forces unseen that caused so much 
violence (outside influence). The problem started in 1979 
when the PNP lost political credibility and the government 
was operating in a counter clockwise movement from the 
people. The problem of unemployment has never been solved 
by western governments and the promise for improvement has 
always swayed the electorate. The IMF was made a domestic 
issue by the PNP to cover up its mismanagement." 
Five responded that the IMF had a definite hand in 
influencing the elections. The government did not receive 
half of the money pledged to it by the IMF at the critical 
stage, when the funds were needed. Most of it was withheld. 
(See Table 4.5.) 
Two felt there was direct evidence that the United 
States and the IMF acted together in destabilizing the 
government (but they did not provide any specific evidence). 
The fact is that the IMF dictates constricted the economy 
and the gains of the masses declined. This had the effect 
of breaking the new coalition of the Manley government. The 
working class which had been attracted to the party because 
of government spending began to defect. Therefore the IMF 
policies had adverse effects on the government. 
Question 19. Did the IMF act fairly in not granting waivers 
toward Jamaica in the light of natural disasters (1979)? 
Ten felt they did not. The government was making a 
gallant effort to deal with its problems, but the flood 
rains of the western parishes had serious effects on 
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agriculture. In addition, there were extensive funds spent 
on reconstruction of the area. 
Three felt that natural diasters are part and parcel 
of a given country. Although they are unfortunate and other 
agencies can help, the duty of the IMF is to advise on 
monetary policy and not on every misfortune of a particular 
government. 
Question 20. Are the new IMF arrangements to the benefit of 
Jamaica? 
Nine said they are not, if one judges the performance 
of the government and the economy unde^ the new 
arrangements. "The arrangements are not so good as they 
seem, and the Seaga government will soon run into problems 
because his fiscal management is too loose. There is a 
great need to tighten the free spending in the economy. 
What they seem to be doing is putting up foreign currency to 
liquidate foreign debt and to stabilize that aspect, while 
development, inflation, unemployment, poverty go 
unattended ." 
Four felt the Jamaican economy was lucky it had an 
international organization like the IMF to bail it out of 
the economic woes it found itself in. "The IMF imposes 
economic targets that a country should live within the 
resources it has. We really did not have a choice in 
accepting IMF arrangements. The IMF has given Jamaica a 
good start, although some of the programs need more 
flexi bility." 
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An Overview of the Questionnaire 
The Manley government was most successful in 
attacking the structure of the IMF. Most of the respondents 
thought it needed change. Three respondents thought that 
the IMF, in the absence of an alternative, was making the 
best of a bad situation. If it were not around, the world's 
monetary crisis would be even graver. 
On the performance of the Manley government, the 
overall response was favorable. There was need for change, 
and the Manley government made attempts to do so. The 
entrenched business sector response was that the change was 
too traumatic at times and did not allow for proper 
adjustments, hence irritation and conflict. A labor leader 
and new left businessman thought the changes were not enough 
and did not address the structure that was the cause of the 
problem. One respondent thought that the changes caused the 
situation to become worse. 
The response to the role government should play and 
what system was best indicated that a mixed system is the 
overall choice. The opinion is that government of any 
extreme would not be tolerated by the Jamaican populace. 
Sentiments were expressed for a free market system, supply 
and demand and access to the international market place. 
The only hope for an economy like Jamaica is to exploit its 
proximity to the United States and take advantage of the 
market potential of the United States. 
Although a majority thought the IMF was partial, this 
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response did not necessarily help the Manley government's 
position. A partial IMF has loaned money to its friends of 
western capitalism. One of the responses was the 
unpredictability of LDCs and the IMF has to take certain 
positions to bring them into line. A prime example was the 
Manley government and its many experiments. Manley's 
position was vigorously supported by three respondents who 
would have nothing to do with the IMF. The Jamaican 
officials who negotiated the IMF agreement felt that 
conditionality was too harsh and the adjustments needed 
improvements . 
The Manley government favoured an IMF that 
represented the interests of LDCs more rather than the DCs. 
The view that this could not easily be changed and that some 
conditionality was necessary was shared by a broad cross 
section. It would be asking too much to borrow money 
without accountability. The undertones suggest that the 
Manley government accountability left much to be desired. 
The Manley government came under some harsh criticism 
for its vacillation between the socialist and capitalists 
paths. The response from the right was that his indecision 
about stating clearly his position on which system he 
favoured created uncertainity and confusion. Investors from 
abroad were not encouraged, production at home lagged, and 
the several government interferences such as taking over the 
hotel industry, nationalizing the banks and the state 
trading corporations were detrimental to the Jamaican 
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economy. A small group on the left thought the private 
sector was greedy and government planning was necessary to 
give the masses some gains. 
On the tax structure issue, everyone agreed that it 
was in shambles. The business secto^ (except for the 
independent businessmen, lawyers, doctors and the urban 
petty traders) thought they were over taxed because their 
funds are easier to account for, similar to the employees. 
The informal sector (the urban petty traders) were not taxed 
enough, also the professional class, which still reflects 
the privileges associated with colonialism favouring the 
expatriate colonials. 
The IMF got an overall favorable vote by the margin 
of seven to six, but for conflicting reasons and varying 
positions. The entrenched money class figures there is need 
for an institution to make funds available, and it is better 
to get money from the West than the East. We do not know 
enough about their system, their terms hardly involve hard 
cash. There is the view that some agency should be 
overseeing the government’s reckless spending and that LDCs 
need the IMF style of management. The minority opposed to 
the IMF sees its macro aspects and its broader policy 
guidelines. The government officials who had represented 
the government's position during the IMF negotiations felt 
there were structural changes needed at the IMF rather than 
the piecemeal changes. 
There was general agreement that OPEC did the right 
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thing and that the Manley government did well in forming a 
bauxite cartel and putting the levy on bauxite. Two 
respondents thought it unwise that the government should 
have challenged the United States because the U.S. need for 
bauxite is not as important as Jamaica's need to remain 
friendly to the U.S. 
The responses to the effect of the IMF on the Manley 
government indicate the division in the populace the 
government faced. Six responses said the IMF influence was 
negligible and that the government had backed itself into an 
unfavorable position by its policies. Five persons thought 
that the government was adversely affected by the IMF and 
two persons alleged direct interference by the U.S. and IMF. 
Concerning the natural disaster of 1979 (the flood of 
1979), ten persons thought it should have been mitigating 
circumstances for IMF assistance, and that the government 
got a bad deal on that score. One person thought the 
government should have been able to adjust to national 
disasters. 
The consensus was that increasing IMF involvement in 
Jamaica was not beneficial, but four persons thought the 
country could not function properly without the IMF. The 
above analysis shows the problems faced by the Manley 
government. Its hands were tied throughout the IMF -Jamaica 
relationship. There were those that felt the government's 
failure to meet the various IMF tests was proof of its 
ineptness (the three month's tests in 1977). (See Chapter 
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4.) Others believed continued IMF involvement meant doom. 
Manley was torn between the differing forces, and his 
compromise to this group at one time and that group at 
another gave the impression that his leadership was 
indecisive. It did not help also in his talks with the IMF 
because the Fund’s officials realized he was not bargaining 
from absolute strength and was therefore vulnerable. 
The dictates of the IMF and the plan set out by the 
Manley government were diametrically opposed. The Manley 
government's objectives were to address the historical 
problems of landlessness, unemployment and inequality. The 
IMF concerns itself with exchange rates and accessibility of 
the private sector to become more industralized. The 
influence of the United States and general capitalist 
philosophy of the IMF led to eventual conflict between the 
two. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The International Monetary Fund is one of the most 
maligned international organizations. At present, both the 
developed and developing countries are expressing concern 
about its operations. But in fairness to the organization, 
it was never given the wherewithal to function at its 
highest level of efficiency. 
It is hoped that this research has pointed out the 
dilemma that the IMF has always operated under. The Fund's 
capital, from its inception, was not large enough to satisfy 
the needs of the broken down economies of Europe and Japan; 
it was even more inadequate for the global economy of today. 
This fact is easily substantiated. The United States, under 
the Marshall Plan, loaned western Europe $17 billion dollars 
for reconstruction, yet the IMF's starting capital was $8.8 
billion dollars.”' The aggregate debt of the developing 
countries alone amounted to $700 billion dollars and the IMF 
operating budget 1983 stood at $50 billion dollars.2 
The limited liquidity of IMF funds places added 
pressure on the U.S. dollar. The debtor countries like 
"'Fred Block, op. cit., p. 43- 
^Washington Post, October 19, 1983. 
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Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, for thei^ part, suffered 
because they were blocked from competing in the capitalist 
markets. We experienced the most unlikely scenario of a 
Republican President requesting an additional $8.8 billion 
dollar increase in U.S. contributions for an IMF operation 
fund of $90 billion dollars.3 in order to convince the 
Congress the President had to overcome hostile criticism for 
his perceived IMF bail out. At work was the curious 
spectacle of conservative Jack Kemp and liberal consumer 
protectionist advocate, Ralph Nader, agreeing that the 
United States should not increase IMF funding.^ Their 
reasons were different. The former objected because the IMF 
is perceived as an international organization that lends 
money to countries hostile to American interests and are 
irresponsible in the use of this money. The latter saw this 
as a bail out of the international commercial banks 
(especially the U.S. banks) that loaned huge amounts of 
funds to some advanced developing counties and socialist 
countries. 
Whatever the reasoning was, it has been the plight of 
the IMF over the years to operate in support of United 
States foreign policy because it is its major donor. The 
organi zati on, therefore, has always been handicapped in 
achieving its fullest potential. Loans were generally given 
3Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, "Latin American Debt: Act 
Two" Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983» pp. 19-38. 
^Newsweek, October 23, 1983, p. 3^» 
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to countries within the U.S. sphere of influence, and others 
rejected like Poland and Tanzania when they were perceived 
to be attacking U.S. foreign policy. 
Although the IMF has not accomplished monetary 
stability, it has fostered international cooperation. There 
are many who predicted the collapse of the world monetary 
system, especially in 1971 when the United States decided to 
break away from adjustable fixed exchange rates and the 
backing of the dollar by gold at thirty-five dollars an 
ounce. It was thought that the major countries would adopt 
beggar-my-neighbor policies by resorting solely to national 
interests rather than the common good; but thanks to the IMF 
in part, there was an element of international cooperation 
that staved off a world monetary collapse.5 
The IMF was conceived to function in close 
cooperation with the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development. Although their functions complimented each 
other, the IMF had the onerous task of dealing more directly 
with the political problems of the nation states. It 
purported to be politically neutral, but the two major 
socialist countries (Soviet Union and China) were never 
effectively members of the IMF and IBRD -- a limitation 
somewhat similar to the United States not having been part 
of the League of Nations. The difference was that the 
5Thomas D. Willett, Floating Exchange Rates and 
International Monetary Reform (Washington: American 
Enterprise Institutite for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 
126. 
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western world led by the United States controlled 80 percent 
of world trade, hence the socialists countries' 
participation was more of a political factor than an 
economic one.6 
The division of the two meant that the IMF was 
influenced by Western economic and political concerns. 
Furthermore, the United States, its major donor, was 
committed to the resistance of communism, which is included 
in its foreign policy and reflects certain dictates to the 
IMF. In the past loans have not been forthcoming to 
communist regimes unless their political conditions are 
favorable to western interests, for example, Poland in the 
1970s. The IMF at one time was willing to help Poland, but 
changed when the U.S. disagreed with the regime. 
However, at times the United States suffered from bad 
publicity in developing countries because it had to play the 
role of the defender of capitalist values, when in fact LDCs 
were affected by the totality of Western capitalist 
exploitation. Because if the other developed countries were 
concerned about the plight of the LDCs they had enough 
weight and voting power within the IMF to make it more 
responsive to LDCs' needs and participation in policy 
decisions. So the lack of initative for a more responsive 
6l. Wallerstein, ''The Three Stages of African 
Involvement in the World Economy" in Gutkind and 
Wallerstein, eds, The Political Economy, Sage Publications, 
1976, pp. 169-197. Although these states were not denied 
membership, the terras and articles of the IMF agreement 
would interfere with a socialist planned economy. Hence 
China has joined since its policies have changed. 
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IMF involved the other western countries as well as the 
Uni ted States. 
Joan Spero has pointed out that political, as well as 
economic factors shape the international climate, and what 
we see in the international arena today is a debt ridden 
Third World (see Table 1.2), increasing unemployment and 
mass starvation. Also, the most powerful capitalist 
country, the United States, is in an unstable position: 
. . . for example, the federal deficit. By official 
reckoning government spending exceeded income by a 
disturbing $195.4 billion in the fiscal year ended last 
September 1983. But that's just the beginning. First 
there's the $12.4 billion lost by 'off-budget' agencies 
like the U.S. Railway Association. Then there's the 
$53*3 billion borrowed by government-supported entities 
such as the Federal National Mortage Association or the 
Student Loan Marketing Association. And finally, the 
government should be setting aside at least $186.1 
billion to fund future pension and social security 
obligations. Altogether Grace concludes, the real 
federal deficit last year amounted to an appalling 
$447.4 billion.7 
When the national debt of $1.49 trillion dollars and its $85 
billion annual debt service is brought into the equation, 
one has to conclude that the world is dangerously poised for 
catastrophy. 
The IMF was formed so that the world would not be 
faced with the above mentioned problems. But the major 
donors insist that LDCs abide by IMF dictates while they 
operate outside of the IMF, because they would fail IMF 
guidelines more dismally than the LDCs. Britain, in 
particular, draws heavily from the I-MF and so does the U.S. 
^Newsweek, December 12, 1983. 
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from time to time. No LDC could run a balance of trade 
deficit for ten years, have an unbalanced budget for several 
years and increase its national debt every year and be a 
recipient of IMF loans. So although the IMF has been able 
so far to have a certain semblance of international 
cooperation, its policy is geared towards the LDCs and not 
the DCs where bilateral agreements are the device for 
solving their problems. Yet the IMF was formed initially 
for cooperation between the DCs, but now we are told they 
are the most efficient advisers for LDCs. If the terms of 
agreement were the same for LDCs and DCs, the LDCs would be 
at a disadvantage because of their weaker economies and 
undeveloped position. 
The IMF and Jamaica 
The JLP might have been tempted to follow the IMF 
conditions to the letter, but how could the masses of people 
have benefitted if the public sector, which is of necessity 
the agent of help to them, is drastically curtailed? This 
points to one of the foremost problems the Manley government 
faced concerning the IMF. 
The facts presented in this paper will allow us to 
interpret and draw some conclusions about the developing 
world's problems, in general, and Jamaica's, in particular. 
It would be foolhardy to blame all the problems of the 
developing countries on the developed states and 
particularly on the U.S. The LDCs would be well advised if 
they take the advice of ul Haq to follow the Chinese model 
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of addressing mass poverty, rather than the econometric 
mystical one thousand dollar (U.S. $1,000) per capital 
income.8 Most developing countries have within their first 
five-year plan or ten-year plan to have a per capita income 
of $1,000, this being the mystical number most international 
organizations consider a country to be on the road to 
development. Also, it is preposterous that the LDCs should 
demand changes in the international economic order for the 
benefit of the elite in their countries. It would be 
circular and misleading if such a change did not incorporate 
and benefit the masses — a proposition easier said than 
done. Because of the years of deprivations, the masses in 
the LDCs have not learned what are the best measures to 
alleviate their suffering. The natural impulse is towards 
conspicuous consumption and not collective self improvement 
as shown in the Jamaican people’s choice of Seaga's 
economics. The demand will be for cars and not for the 
broader based public transportation. While one has to guard 
against a condescending attitude towards the masses, it is 
the duty of the leaders to make the necessary, but not 
always popular decisions for general development. 
The government has to lay down the priorities of full 
employment, increases in exports and decreases in imports. 
The IMF technical expertise is respected by most countries 
and can then help to alleviate the problem. 
^Mahbub ul Haq, p. 1 80. 
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The IMF acts not only in the role as an observer and 
analyst of monetary situations. It is also supposed to 
guide world monetary policies, with goals that are 
defined in the statutes of the IMF: monetary stability 
and free convertibility or a system of multilateral 
payments. On the other hand the members of the IMF 
represent sovereign nations which determine their own 
monetary policies, even in defiance of IMF advice.9 
Herein lies the crux of the matter. The IMF is a 
reputedbody of financial experts, it has a set ideology in 
the granting of loans. Barbara Ward advocates structural 
changes in the IMF itself, 
that the more liberal Keynesian Plan of a Clearing Union 
be adopted to alleviate the pressure on some $800 
billion U.S. dollars floating around the world. If 
countries lose faith in the U.S., there is a likelihood 
that the World Depression of the 1920s can be repeated. 
Cooperation is needed. It is necessary to change the 
structure of the IMF to reflect the Northern 
democracies, OPEC and the Third World, to all having a 
third of the votes each. In this forum, more meaningful 
decisions can be reached."'® 
Foreign Minister Nselka of Tanzania suggests that the 
capital fund be expanded, and he would rather change the 
present sixty-two percent to thirty-eight in favour of 
developed countries to that of fifty percent each for LDCs 
and DCs^ . 
The overtures of the Seaga government and the 
response of the U.S. and the IMF at the change of the 
government indicates that the IMF is used as an arm of 
U.S.foreign policy. If the organization is to play an 
9Barbara Wa^d, ’’Another Chance for the North " 
Foreign Affairs. Winter, 180-81, p. 386. 
1°Ibid., p. 188. 
11Africa News, April 12, 1980. 
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improved and responsible role in world reconstruction, it 
will have to reflect less bias in its operations. It would 
be instructive to the Jamaican government to be reminded 
that foreign investment had caused a boom in the economy 
before, but because of its failure to impact on the masses, 
it was short lived, and in the long term, not beneficial to 
the country. 
What they would have you believe is that we, if we abase 
oursleves at the seat of imperialist power in the world, 
that somehow money will come like manna from heaven. 
Well, let me tell you, comrades, we tried that from *62 
to '72; we tried the labor party approach from ’62 to 
’72 at a time when money was like dirt in the world, 
when there was every . . . climate in the world, for 
tourism, for aluminum expansion. And all that happened 
in Jamaica, unemployment rose from twelve to twenty-four 
percent. The few who were rich grew richer and richer 
and richer, and the poor grew poorer, and poorer and 
poorer. No way are we trying that in Jamaica again. No 
way! No way!12 
There are lessons to be learned by the several 
parties concerned. The U.S. should heed the call for a New 
Economic Order and allow the IMF technicians to give loans 
according to need (in so doing the IMF would have to 
differentiate between LDC the more needy the less the 
conditionality, and stricter conditionality to newly 
industrialized countries NICs) because in the final analysis 
the IMF needs to be a viable operation for meaningful long 
term goals. The IMF should change to reflect the hopes and 
aspirations of the world’s people. 
1980. 
I^Michael Manley, ABC Documenmtary, December 30, 
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The Politics of Change in Jamaica 
The Manley government of 1972-80 inherited a 
political system that was totally dependent on the world 
capitalist system. The country shared in the western boom 
of the 1960s. But the bulk of the profits were repratriated 
and a small middle class rose up with an increasingly 
deprived lower class. The unemployment problem in Jamaica 
has steadily worsened since the 1960s. 
The Manley government set out as one of its major 
objectives to reduce unemployment, to attack the 
inequalities in the society and improve the educational 
standard. He was somewhat successful in the latter, but not 
the others. 
The unemployment situation was affected by the 
international world upheaval. Shortly after Manley’s 
election victory in 1972 a major world crisis occurred. The 
OPEC boycott of oil exportation to the west and the increase 
in oil prices meant contraction in the international 
community. Jamaica, a country that is 98% dependent on oil 
imports, had to severly cut back on her overall production 
capacity (manufactured goods, transporation and use of 
public utilities).^ The OPEC increases merely exacerbated 
a worsening world trend of terms of trade against the LDCs. 
The government was hard pressed to maintain the level 
of employment, and it was almost impossible to reduce it. 
13jamaica: Development Issues and Economic Prospects 
World Bank Report No. 3781-JM, January 29, 1982. 
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The government introduced a massive work programme to impact 
on the urban poor. An attachment of the programme was the 
Adult Literacy Programme, which was intended to upgrade the 
skills of persons involved in the work programme. The 
government hoped that these persons would upgrade their 
skills, but the priority then was on unemployment not on the 
skill improvement. There were several critics of the 
programme especially the middle class who would drive by 
protesting the laziness of the workers and the unproductive 
nature of their work. Professor Bourne is of the opinion 
that these programs should be delayed for more emphasis on 
balance of payments, savings, investment and import 
substitution. 
What they failed to realize was the combined social 
value of the work programme. There is a miniumum wage that 
the workers received of $26 weekly, but it had the effect of 
giving them a definite pay check weekly that they could plan 
around. Also it had the multiplier effect of some fifty 
thousand additional consumers who would demand a higher 
consumption. It had the psychological effect of having 
something to do, and it forced persons employing domestic 
help to pay more because of the minimum wages. 
The government was very proud of their programme 
because it impacted on many of the inequalities, it provided 
employment and it upgraded education, although it put a 
burden on the available funds and caused deficits. There 
are other inititatives the government undertook as listed in 
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Chapter IV. The IMF was most adamant about the dissolution 
of the worker's programme because they felt it was 
unproductive and undue government interference, and that the 
funds would have greater utility in the hands of the private 
sector. 
The problem was that the programme cost the 
government $65 million and employed fifty thousand persons. 
In no other industry would $65 million hire more than a 
thousand workers. The difference between the Manley 
government and the IMF went to the heart of the contract. 
The government was most proud of its impact on unemployment 
and the work programs it initiated, but the IMF was opposed. 
The slight gains in employment in 1973-76 began eroding 
under the IMF agreement of 1977-80 and was one of the major 
factors in the government's break with the organization. 
The Manley Government's Fight for a NIEO 
The Manley government's foreign policy concerned the 
Western capitalist world. Like fellow Third World leader 
Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, he attacked the 
international inequalities that adversely affected their 
countries. In the words of Nyerere: 
to buy a seven-ton truck in 1981, his country had to 
produce four times as much cotton, or three times as 
much coffee, or ten times as much tobacco, as it took to 
purchase the same vehicle five years earlier.14 
The terms of trade have turned adversely against the LDCs, 
1^Time, January 10, 1983, P* 46. 
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yet there is no talk in the developed countries or the IMF 
of ways and means to address these problems. The GATT and 
UNCTAD had both failed hence the call for a NIEO by the 
Group of 77. At least the Ford and Carter administrations 
listened, but President Reagan would have nothing to do 
about the Third World plight. 
In the economy of 1978-80 interests rates were very 
high and it was not easy to obtain loans anywhere. The IMF 
seal of good housekeeping was necessary for loans so 
countries could not afford to default. By 1983 there was a 
real threat of default. New York Financier Felix Rohatyn 
says, "The possibility of a country defaulting rather than 
accepting the IMF austerity demands cannot be dismissed out 
of hand."15 And Stuart Greenbaum observed, 
Imagine you are a Latin dictator deep in debt. If you 
(accept IMF terms) and cut back on imports you get riots 
in the streets. If you accept default, you are 
ostracized by the world capital markets. Now if the 
first approach leaves you swinging from a tree branch, 
you know you are going to go the default route. 
The Manley government was committed to achieving equality 
and reducing unemployment in Jamaica, but the international 
lending climate had contracted, and Jamaica was faced with 
addressing its historical problems under austere IMF terms. 
It is little wonder that the government, having failed the 
IMF test of 1979, broke off relations with the organization 
in 1980 because the IMF was not willing to relax any of its 
1 ^Newsweek, December 5, 1983, p. 52. 
l6Ibid., p. 48. 
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conditions favouring the private sector and a more 
restricted economy. 
Recommendations 
1. There is need for political meeting of minds of 
the world’s people to create an improved monetary system so 
that all can benefit from as equitable as possible a system. 
The world at present is on the brink on financial bankruptcy 
that will affect the capitalist countries, the developing 
countries and the socialist in devastating descending 
degree. One needs not be idealistic to recommend 
comprehensive solutions that in the past appeared 
unthinkable to the myopic world powers. What is at stake is 
man's very survival as the southern countries are becoming 
more desperate as the threat of mass starvation becomes more 
real. 
2. The IMF should be restructured to live up to its 
potential as a world clearing union or central bank. In 
performing the role of a central bank, it would lay out 
fundamental conditions for eligibility to all member states. 
The least developed of the LDCs should get preferential 
treatment until they reach a determined level of self- 
sustained growth (See Chapter II). Then they would be 
liable for conditionality like the rest of other states. 
The World System should be on a barter system with 
international money available from the central bank to 
equate any difference or short falls between trading 
partners. The system would guarantee compliance by the fear 
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of becoming a pariah, if a particular country defaults on 
their commitments. In such a system the major obstacle 
would be how to control the multinational corporations, 
which at present make decisions outside of their national 
government and are oblivious to international organizations 
except for the regulatory ones. 
3. The IMF automatic devaluation of LDCs currency 
should be stopped (in the past this is standard IMF 
recommendation), until a comprehensive system, based on 
resources, importance of resources, availability and equity 
in trading are calculated. The present system favours the 
DCs . 
The rationale for devaluation is that it limits 
imports and expands exports. But the LDCs are generally 
exporting at their maximum in raw materials and secondary 
manfacturing goods. A devaluation for them means less 
revenue for their products. In the case of Jamaica, most 
Jamaican goods are in demand because of uniqueness. Blue 
Mountain Coffee fetches the higest price for coffee in the 
world, yet it is impossible to double production because of 
limited land area where it is grown; the same can be said 
for Royal Jamaica cigars. Jamaican bauxite production has 
fallen off although the price has been devalued to one third 
that of 1973 in 1980. This has effectively nullified the 
bauxite levy imposed in 1973* One is not suggesting that 
the demand for bauxite is inelastic but Jamaican bauxite is 
of strategic importance to the U.S. It is easily rained and 
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is close to U.S. smelters, thereby creating a more favoured 
demand by U.S. companies. On the Jamaican side there is the 
possibility of new markets in Europe and the Soviet Union. 
These examples indicate that LDCs’ problems do not 
necessarily respond to the economic prescriptions given by 
the DCs. 
The middle class in Jamaica has not readily cut back 
on consumption, hence the Seaga government, like the Manley 
government, has drastically curtailed the importation of 
cars and household appliances, but still there is a thriving 
black market in these goods. The food items that were 
allowed to be imported by the Seaga government were used by 
the middle class to differentiate themselves from the masses 
who previously could hardly afford them and definitely 
cannot now. Unlike the developed economies, devaluation 
means increased hardships for the masses. 
In addition, the threat of devaluation exacerbates 
the flight of capital. One would be foolish to keep one's 
money in a state that will devalue because it is worth less 
in international exchange. Yet the IMF recommended 
devaluation in a society already suffering from capital 
flight. 
4. Multinational corporations should be controlled 
by their national governments and monitored by the IMF. 
They have been able over the years to move money and 
employment from country to country. In addition they are 
the greatest borrowers of funds from the national banks in 
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the countries in which they operate. This new impulse of 
imperialism should be curtailed. The problem not only 
affects LDCs, it affects U.S. workers. A system has to be 
worked out by which the nation states that are the home 
countries of the multinationals and the IMF manage 
international capital and tranfers because the present 
system is out of control. 
This might well be the second most important concern, 
other than restructuring of the IMF, and it might be as 
difficult or more so to change. The MNCs are a law unto 
themselves, and because they are not soverign states they do 
not fall under the dictates of any international 
organization. In several cases, their sales exceed the GNP 
of many middle industrial countries and all but a few LDCs. 
It might take the collapse of the present system for them to 
take heed. It is, therefore, a conflictual relationship 
between them and the call for a New International Economic 
Order. 
5. There should be more international concern for 
the plight of the world's poor. Developmental plans should 
be made to arrest their decline, and targets set for a 
minimum standard of living. The IMF and the World Bank 
should make special efforts to alleviate their sufferings. 
They should address water systems for the drought areas, 
storage bins for years of good harvest, educate the populace 
to understand their plight, and be more assertive in 
population control in certain LDCs. 
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6. The political directorate in Jamaica should be 
more sensitive in effecting changes. By its very nature, 
change is revolutionary and a people are always resistant to 
change, even if it is in their best interests. There were 
too many voices in the Manley government defining their 
particular notion of change which led to confusion. 
7. There is need for ongoing political education of 
the populace. The major problem faced by the Jamaican 
people is its conspicuous consumption patterned after the 
Americans. The country should not try to copy the American 
standard of living. Yet there has never been a government 
strong enough to lay down the strict, austere programs 
needed to curb that trend. Most governments bowed to the 
strong pressure from the middle class in demanding more and 
replicating the United States standards. The individual 
governments’ should determine what areas to cut back on in 
the national economy rather than the IMF. 
8. The Manley government erred in its analysis of 
the dependency school. Jamaica is not a fourth world LDC, 
hence the Cardosa analysis is more appropriate than Frank's. 
The options open to Manley were to adopt an accomodation 
attitude that would satisfy the emerging middle class. This 
would entail the importation of technology and catering to 
the capitalist markets of the west. The other choice was to 
make a radical break from the capitalist system towards a 
Cuban style development. 
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9. The half way socialism of Manley was doomed to 
fail. The middle classes were too entrenched and they would 
always offer fierce resistance to any encroachment of their 
perceived rights. The Manley government itself was too 
splintered for the task on hand. Within the government 
itself, there were those that were opposed to socialism and 
were pro-IMF. For the structural changes that were needed, 
it would have taken a united party and possibly a one party 
system to implement them. The Manley government, if it was 
re-elected, would have had to define its strategy of 
development more clearly and would either have to have 
followed a socialist path of development or a capitalist one 
rather than the half way measures between socialism and 
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APPENDIX À 
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 
OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
The Governments on whose behalf the present Agree¬ 
ment is signed agree as follows: 
Introductory Article 
(i) The International Monetary Fund is established 
and shall operate in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement as originally 
adopted and subsequently amended. 
(ii) To enable the Fund to conduct its operations 
and transactions, the Fund shall maintain a 
General Department and a Special Drawing 
Rights Department. Membership in the Fund 
shall give the right to participation in the 
Special Drawing Rights Department. 
(iii) Operations and transactions authorized by this 
Agreement shall be conducted through the 
General Department, consisting in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement of the 
General Resources Account, the Special Dis¬ 
bursement Account, and the Investment Ac¬ 
count; except that operations and transactions 
involving special drawing rights shall be con¬ 





The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are: 
(i) To promote international monetary coopera¬ 
tion through a permanent institution which 
provides the machinery for consultation and 
collaboration on international monetary prob¬ 
lems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade, and to contribute thereby 
to the promotion and maintenance of high 
levels of employment and real income and to the 
development of the productive resources of all 
members as primary objectives of economic 
policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain 
orderly exchange arrangements among mem¬ 
bers, and to avoid competitive exchange depre¬ 
ciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral 
system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and in the 
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions 
which hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the 
general resources of the Fund temporarily 
available to them under adequate safeguards, 
thus providing them with opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments 
without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the 
duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium 
II. Membership; III. Quotas and Subscriptions 
Art. II, Sec. 
Art. III. Set 
in the international balances of payments of 
members. 
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by 
the purposes set forth in this Article. 
Article II 
Membership 
Section 1. Original members 
The original members of the Fund shall be those of the 
countries represented at the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference whose governments accept member¬ 
ship before December 31, 1945. 
Section 2. Other members 
Membership shall be open to other countries at such 
times and in accordance with such terms as may be 
prescribed by the Board of Governors. These terms, 
including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on 
principles consistent with those applied to other countries 
that are already members. 
Article III 
Quotas and Subscriptions 
Section 1. Quotas and payment of subscriptions 
Each member shall be assigned a quota expressed in 
special drawing rights. The quotas of the members 
represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference which accept membership before Decem¬ 
ber 31, 1945 shall be those set forth in Schedule A. The 
quotas of other members shall be determined by the Board 
Art. ill. Sec. 2-3 
III. Quotas and Subscriptions 
of Governors. The subscription of each member shall be 
equal to its quota and shall be paid in full to the Fund at 
the appropriate depository. 
Section 2. Adjustment of quotas 
(a) The Board of Governors shall at intervals of not 
more than five years conduct a general review, and if it 
deems it appropriate propose an adjustment, of the quotas 
of the members. It may also, if it thinks fit, consider at any 
other time the adjustment of any particular quota at the 
request of the member concerned. 
(ft) The Fund may at any time propose an increase in 
the quotas of those members of the Fund that were 
members on August 31, 1975 in proportion to their quotas 
on that date in a cumulative amount not in excess of 
amounts transferred under Article V, Section 12(/) (i) and 
(j) from the Special Disbursement Account to the General 
Resources Account. 
(c) An eighty-five percent majority of the total voting 
power shall be required for any change in quotas. 
(d) The quota of a member shall not be changed until 
the member has consented and until payment has been 
made unless payment is deemed to have been made in 
accordance with Section 3(ft) of this Article. 
Section 3. Payments when quotas are changed 
(a) Each member which consents to an increase in its 
quota under Section 2(a) of this Article shall, within a 
period determined by the Fund, pay to the Fund twenty- 
five percent of the increase in special drawing rights, but 
the Board of Governors may prescribe that this payment 
may be made, on the same basis for all members, in whole 
or in part in the currencies of other members specified, 
Art. III. Sé 
III. Quotas and Subscriptions 
with their concurrence, by the Fund, or in the member’s 
own currency. A non-participant shall pay in the cur¬ 
rencies of other members specified by the Fund, with their 
concurrence, a proportion of the increase corresponding to 
the proportion to be paid in special drawing rights by 
participants. The balance of the increase shall be paid by 
the member in its own currency. The Fund’s holdings of a 
member’s currency shall not be increased above the level at 
which they would be subject to charges under Article V, 
Section 8 (ft) (ii), as a result of payments by other members 
under this provision. 
(ft) Each member which consents to an increase in its 
quota under Section 2(ft) of this Article shall be deemed to 
have paid to the Fund an amount of subscription equal to 
such increase. 
(c) If a member consents to a reduction in its quota, the 
Fund shall, within sixty days, pay to the member an 
amount equal to the reduction. The payment shall be made 
in the member’s currency and in such amount of special 
drawing rights or the currencies of other members 
specified, with their concurrence, by the Fund as is 
necessary to prevent the reduction of the Fund’s holdings 
of the currency below the new quota, provided that in 
exceptional circumstances the Fund may reduce its 
holdings of the currency below the new quota by payment 
to the member in its own currency. 
(d) A seventy percent majority of the total voting power 
shall be required for any decision under (a) above, except 
for the determination of a period and the specification of 
currencies under that provision. 
Section 4. Substitution of securities for currency 
The Fund shall accept from any member, in place of any 
part of the member’s currency in the General Resources 
APPEwOJ.X 3 
Executive Directors and Voting Power 
on April 30, 1980 
General Special Drawing 
Department Rights Department 
Director Casting 
Alternate Votes of 
APPOINTED 
Sam Y. Cross 
Donald E. Syvrud 
United States 
John Anson 




Germany, Fed. Rep. of 






Mahsoun B. Jalal 
Yusuf A. Nimatallah 
Saudi Arabia 
ELECTED 
Joaquin Muns (Spain) 









H.O. Ruding (Netherlands) 






Bernard J. Drabble (Canada) 







Lamberto Dini (Italy) 




















84,300 84,300 19.83 84,300 19.8? 
29,500 29,500 6.94 29.500 6 94 
21,810 21,SU) 5.13 21.810 5.13 
19,440 19,440 4.57 19,440 4.57 
16,840 16,840 3.96 16,840 3.96 























1,970 17,170 4.04 17,170 4.04 
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Robert J. Whitelaw Australia 8,150 
(Australia) Korea 1,850 
Richard J. Lang (AYw Zealand) New Zealand 2,570 
Papua New Guinea 550 
Philippines 2,350 
Seychelles 263 
Solomon Islands 271 
Western Samoa 280 
Mohamed Finaish (Libya) Bahrain 450 









Svrian Arab Republic 880 
United Arab Emirates 1,450 
Yemen Arab Republic 380 
Yemen. People's 
Deni. Rep. of 660 
Jacques de Groote (Belgium) Austria 3,550 
Heinrich G. Schneider Belgium 9,150 
(Austria) Luxembourg 560 
Turkey 2,250 
Jahangir Amuzegar (Iran) Afghanistan 700 






Alexandre Kafka (Brazil) Brazil 6,900 
Josi (uihricl-Pena Colombia 2.180 






Trinidad and Tobago 1,070 
S.D. Deshmukh (India) Bangladesh 1.770 
Edmund Eramudugollu India 11,700 
1Sri Lanka) Sri Lanka 1,440 
Matti Vanhala (Finland) Denmark 3,350 




Bvanti Kharmawan (Indonesia) Burma 980 
Savcnaca Siwatibau (Fiji) Fiji 430 
Indonesia 5,050 


















16,284 3.83 16,284 3.83 
15,589 3.67 15,589 3.67 
15,510 3.65 15,510 3.65 
15,040 3.54 15,040 3.54 
15,020 3.53 15,020 3.53 
14,910 3.51 14,910 3.51 
14.710 3.46 14,710 3.46 
3.30 14,040 3.30 14,040 





















Festus G. Mogae (Botswana) Botswana 340 
Semyano Kiingi (Uganda) Burundi 480 
Ethiopia 610 












Zambia 1,660 13,760 3.24 13,760 3.24 
Samuel Nana-Sinkam (Cameroon) Benin 410 
Abdcrrahmanc Alfidja (Niger) Cameroon 700 




Equatorial Guinea 350 
Gabon 550 
Guinea-Bissau 289 







Sfto Tomé and Principe 270 
Senegal 670 
Togo 440 
Upper Volta 410 
Zaïre 1,770 11,322 2.66 11.322 2.66 
Francisco Garces (Chile) Argentina 5,600 
Julio C. Gutierrez Bolivia 700 
(Paraguay) Chile 2,420 
Ecuador 950 
Paraguay 480 
Uruguay 1.090 11,240 2.64 11.240 2.64 
410.515 96.55 2 410.515 3 96.55 2 
'Voting power varies on certain matters pertaining to the Gen¬ 
eral Department with use of the Fund’s resources in that Depart¬ 
ment. In voting on matters relating exclusively to the Special 
Drawing Rights Department, only the number of votes allotted 
to members which are participants may be cast. 
2 The sum of the individual percentages may differ from the 
percentages of the totals because of rounding. 
:'This total does not include the voles of China, Egypt. Demo¬ 
cratic Kampuchea, and South Africa, which did not participate 
in the 1978 Regular Election of Executive Directors, and of 
Cape Verde. Djibouti, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, 
which became members after that election. The combined votes 
of those members total 14.650—3.45 per cent of the total voting 
power. 
APPENDIX C 
Content of Second Amendment 
' The topics on which modifications of the Articles are included in 
the Second Amendment do not correspond to the list of possible 
amendments in Part II of the Outline. For example, there are no pro- 
. visions authorizing the establishment of a substitution account through 
which members might exchange gold or reserve currencies for SDRs 
in order to give members a preferred asset, enhance the role of the 
SDR and contribute to the decline of gold, and give the Fund better 
control over international liquidity. Nor is there provision for a link 
between the allocation of SDRs and development assistance, or for an 
obligation of members to consult the Fund on the introduction or inten¬ 
sification for balance of payments reasons of restrictions on trade or 
other current account measures in order to enable the Fund to deter¬ 
mine that these actions are indeed justified by the state of the balance 
of payments. 
Topics such as these were included in the list of possible amend¬ 
ments not because there was widespread sentiment in favor of them in 
the Committee of Twenty, but, on the contrary, because there were 
opposing and strongly held views about them. The inclusion of them 
in the list was a compromise that bought time, but, as it turned out, 
not agreement. Draft amendments on these topics were prepared and 
discussed, some eagerly and others fitfully, but the proposals were 
abandoned when it became apparent that agreement was still impossi¬ 
ble even after consideration of them at the ministerial level in the 
Interim Committee. 
* Proposed Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International 




the Second Amendment. Whether these changes will succeed in help¬ 
ing, to depose gold from its traditional sovereign status cannot be 
foreseen. Much will depend on the way in which members behave in 
relation to gold. 
The main holders of gold entered into an agreement among them¬ 
selves that was intended to avoid frustration of the objective of the 
Second Amendment in relation to gold. Although the agreement was 
considered by some members a necessary condition for concurrence 
in the new provisions on gold, the agreement bound the parties for an 
initial period of no more than two years. The Fund’s powers to ensure 
that members avoid actions incompatible with the objective of the Sec¬ 
ond Amendment are limited or at best unclear. The language in wh:ch 
these powers are expressed was affected by the determination cf some 
members to go as far as possible in separating the Fund from gold in 
the hope that eventually there would be a complete divorce. Gear au¬ 
thority over the behavior of members in connection with gold was 
considered undesirable by these members because it would preserve a 
relationship between the Fund and gold. So strong was this conviction 
that it did not seem paradoxical to oppose jurisdiction even if it were 
expressly granted for the purpose of promoting a reduction in the role 
of gold. Other members could have accepted this jurisdiction provided 
that it was coupled with similar authority over reserve currencies. Re¬ 
sistance to this proposal is another reason why the provision was 
drafted in terms of the surveillance of international liquidity instead of 
jurisdiction to control the activities of members in relation to gold. . 
A concomitant objective of the Second Amendment, stated twice 
for emphasis, is to make the SDR the principal reserve asset of the 
international monetary system. For this purpose; numerous improve¬ 
ments or potential improvements have been made in the SDR that 
could give it more of the characteristics of legal tender among mone¬ 
tary authorities. One of these improvements is the right of participants 
in the Special Drawing Rights Department to discharge many obliga¬ 
tions to the Fund in SDRs. Another is the right of participants to trans¬ 
fer SDRs between themselves by agreement, coupled with freedom for 
the transferor to enter into these transactions even if it has no economic 
need to use reserves. A third improvement that may have à similar 
effect is the power of the Fund to permit participants to use SDRs in 
operations other than those specifically authorized by the Articles. • 
If one asks what are the most important aspects of the Second 
Amendment, few observers would fail to mention the provisions on 
exchange arrangements. In legalizing freedom for members to choose 
their exchange arrangements, including floating, the Second Amend¬ 
ment represents a complete departure from the central feature of the 
original Articles, the par value system. An objective of the new pro¬ 
visions, however, is “a stable system of exchange rates.” The em¬ 
phasis in these provisions shifts from stable exchange rates to the or¬ 
derly economic and financial conditions that will promote a stable 
system of exchange rates. The thought that has inspired the provisions 
is the well-known theory that flexible exchange rates, though free to 
vary, are a highly stable system unless instability in them is produced 
by underlying economic tensions and uncertainties. 
In order to achieve a stable system, members are subject to certain 
obligations in relation to their external and domestic policies, and the 
Fund is required to maintain surveillance of the compliance of mem¬ 
ber. with their obligations. 
If the convoluted economic language of these provisions were translated 
into ethical principles, it might be said that members will be required to 
• strive for order; stability, and fairness in conducting those domestic and 
external policies that can affect exchange relationships. In one provision 
the word “orderly” appears four times and “stability” or “stable” three 
times, but these numbers should not be regarded as measurements of im¬ 
portance because there is only one reference involving fairness, and even 
that one is to unfairness.4 
If the exchange arrangements of the future do result in considerable 
stability, the new provisions on gold might then seem to be a more 
dramatic feature of the Second Amendment. The objective with re¬ 
spect to gold is a gradual reduction in its role in the international mon¬ 
etary system. This aim is pursued by immediate and radical changes in 
the role of gold in the Fund itself. Abolition of an official price for 
gold, prohibition of any function as a denominator in exchange ar¬ 
rangements, elimination of the obligations of the Fund and members 
to transfer or receive gold under the Articles, and disposition of part 
of the Fund's holdings of gold are among the radical innovations of 
4 Joseph Cold, “A Report on Certain Recent Legal Developments in the Interna¬ 
tional Monetary Fund," Vuntlerbih Journal of Transnational Law (Nashville, Ten¬ 
nessee) Vol. 9 (1976), p. 231. 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CHRONOLOGY 
1944 
July 1-22 International Monetary and Financial Conference of the United and 
Associated Nations at Bretton Woods. New Hampsnire. agrees to 






Bretton Woods Agreements Act signed by President Truman. 
Lend-lease aid terminated by U S 
Export-Import Bank authorizes loan of S550 million to France 
1946 




Executive Directors of IMF take up their functions. 
Export-Import Bank authorizes an additional loan of 5650 miiiion to 
France. 
July 15 President Truman signs bill approving Anglo-American Loan Agree¬ 
ment, providing loan of S3.75 billion to U.K. 
1947 
March 12 President Truman asks Congress for S400 million special assistance to 



























IMF extends its first loan: $25 million to France. 
Secretary of State Marshall, in speech at Harvard, proposes Euro¬ 
pean Recovery Program (ERP). 
U.K. restores convertibility of pound. 
U K. suspends convertibility of pound. 
President Truman asks a special session of Congress to provide 
$597 million “interim aid” for Austria, China. France, and Italy 
until the European Recovery Program can get under way. 
France abandons its par value and adopts a multiple exchange rate. 
IMF decides that countries receiving U.S. assistance under ERP 
should not normally borrow dollars from Fund. 
President signs bill appropriating initial $4 billion for European 
Recovery Program and $2 billion for other foreign assistance. 
Exchange rates of European countries devalued in amounts rang¬ 
ing from 30.5 percent for pound sterling to 12.3 percent for Belgian 
franc. Many non-European countries also devalue. 
European Payments Union (EPU) established by recipients of ERP 
assistance. 
Canada adopts floating exchange rate. 
Japan joins IMF. 
France is extended IMF standby credit of $263 million. 
U.K. borrows $561 million from IMF and is extended a standby 
credit of $739 million. 
France draws $263 million from Fund. 








European Economic Community (EEC) comes into existence. 
France is extended IMF standby credit of 5131 million. 
France draws S131 million from Fund. 
Ten European countries restore the convertibility of their currencies 
for nonresidents. Five other European countries soon follow. EPU 
eliminated. 
December 29 France devalues the franc hy 14.8 percent. 
1959 




Price in London gold market rises, touching S40 per ounce. 




U.S. and seven other countries begin to sell gold in London market 
President Eisenhower issues directive instituting measures to reduce 
U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. 
1961 




U.S. Treasury initiates operations in foreign exchange markets 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
formally comes into existence. 
1962 
January 5 Proposal for IMF to borrow from ten industrial countries—General 
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB)—approved. 
February 13 
May 1 
Federal Reserve adopts procedures for foreign currency operations. 
Canada reestablishes a par value for its currency. 
1963 
July 18 President Kennedy proposes interest equalization tax on American 
purchases of foreign securities. 
October Deputies of Group of Ten begin a nine-month study of "functioning 




























International study group of 32 economists completes report. Interna¬ 
tional Monetary Arrangements: The Problem of Choice 
Group of Ten Study Group on Creation of Reserve Assets organized. 
Group of Ten issues report on functioning of international monetary 
system. 
Newly elected Labour Government decides against devaluation of 
sterling. 
U.K. imposes 15 percent surcharge on imports of manufactures. 
First use of GAB as U.K. borrowing of SI billion from IMF is an¬ 
nounced. 
Bank of England raises Bank rate from 5 to 7 percent. 
Credits of S3 billion extended to U.K. by U.S. and ten other countries, 
plus BIS. 
President de Gaulle calls for return to gold standard. 
President Johnson announces extension of restraints on U.S. capital 
outflows to bank loans and corporate investment overseas. 
IMF ouota increase agreed. 
U.K. draws additional SI.4 billion from IMF. 
Report of Study Group on Reserve Assets circulated to governments. 
French Finance Minister Giscard d’Estaing rejects a return to gold 
standard 
Secretary of the Treasury Fowler proposes an international monetary 
conference to consider “improvements in international monetary ar¬ 
rangements.” 
Report of Study Group on Reserve Assets published. 
U.K. Government announces new wage-price policy. 
Federal Reserve and other central banks enter exchange markets to 
support sterling. 
Group of Ten instructs deputies to undertake “contingency planning” 
to meet future reserve needs. 
Federal Reserve raises discount rate from 4 to 4.5 percent. 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing replaced by Michel Debré as French Minis¬ 
ter of Economy and Finance. 
President de Gaulle meets with his senior officials and adopts stand 
against “contingency planning" for a new reserve asset. 
Chronology 199 
July 20 British Government announces drastic stabilization pro¬ 
September 13 
gram. 
Increase in credit lines to Bank of England from Federal 
Reserve and other central banks. 
1967 
January S-9 French Finance Minister Debré in an interview in Le Monde 
raises possibility of a future increase in official price of gold. 




Bundesbank begins to ease restrictive monetary policy. 
U.K. completes repayment of debts to Federal Reserve and 
other central banks. 
April 17-18 Finance Ministers of EEC, meeting in Munich, agree on joint 
position on SDR. 





July 17-18, August 26 
President de Gaulle rejects proposal that U.K. join EEC. 
Six day Arab-Israeli war begins. 
U.K. draws on central bank swap lines again. 
Ministers and Governors of Group of Ten meet in London 
to iron out differences on SDR. 
August 
September 
President Johnson asks for 10 percent income tax surcharge. 
Outline of SDR Facility approvea at IMF annual meeting in 
Rio de Janeiro. 
November 11-12 Magnitude of a possible British devaluation discussed at 
Basie meeting of central bank governors. 
November 14 British government announces October trade deficit, the larg¬ 
est on record. 
November 16 
November 17 
British Cabinet formally decides on devaluation. 
Bank of England sells more than $1 billion in foreign ex¬ 
change market to support sterling exchange rate. 
November 18 Britain announces 14.3 percent devaluation of pound, from 
S2.80 to S2.40. President Johnson issues statement reaffirm¬ 
ing intention of U.S. to maintain official price of gold at S35 
November 26 
per ounce. 
Governors of central banks of active members of gold pool 
meet in Frankfurt and agree both to continue pool sales and 
to support existing pattern of exchange rates. 



























President Johnson announces stringent balance-of-payments pro¬ 
gram involving mandatory capital controls. 
Senator Javits issues statement calling for suspension of converti¬ 
bility of dollar and abandonment of gold pool. 
Canada exempted from U.S. capital controls. 
Central bankers meet in Basie and are persuaded by Chairman 
Martin to continue gold pool. 
FOMC agrees to increase Federal Reserve swap network by S2.8 
billion. 
London gold market closed. 
Meeting of active gold pool members in Washington establishes 
two-tier gold arrangement and abandons gold pool. 
UK. introduces stringent budget. 
At Stockholm, Group of Ten. with France reserving its position, 
resolves final issues on establishment of SDR. 
London gold market reopened. 
Student and worker urnsings in France. 
France draws SI00 million on Federal Reserve swap. 
France sells S400 million of gold to LT.S. and three European 
countries. 
Income tax surcharge arid expenditure ceiling is signed into law by 
President Johnson. 
Speculation in exenange markets on a revaluation of German 
mark. 
Basie arrangements to guarantee sterling balances announced. 
Speculation on exenange rate changes in Europe; Bundesbank 
takes in S2.8 billion. 
President de Gaulle says devaluation of franc would be “worst 
form of absurdity.” 
France announce-, cut in budget: Germany announces increased 
taxes on expions and reduced taxes on imports. 
Ministers and Governors of Group of Ten meet in Bonn to deal 
with foreign exchange crisis. 
In nationwide address. President de Gaulle announces refusal to 
devalue franc. President Johnson supports him. 
U.S. eases controls on capital outflows. 
After losing referendum. President de Gaulle resigns and is suc¬ 
ceeded in June by Georges Pompidou. Giscard d'Estaing reenters 





























German Finance Minister Strauss suggests publicly that Ger¬ 
many might revalue mark as part of a multilateral realign¬ 
ment. 
Bundesbank takes in S4 billion in order to hold exchange rate. 
German cabinet rejects revaluation “for eternity.” 
Germany introduces new controls on inflows of funds. 
SDR amendment enters into force. 
France devalues the franc by 11.1 percent 
Germany lets the mark float. 
Germany establishes new par value, up 9.3 percent. 
Germany’s reserves fall by more than $5 billion, including sale 
of S500 million of gold to U.S. 
First allocation of SDRs, in the amount of $3.4 billion. 
IMF quota increase agreed. 
Canadian dollar floats. 
EEC sets 1980 as target date for monetary and economic union. 
IMF publishes report on The Roie of Exchange Raies in the 
Adjustment of Internationa/ Payments. 
U.S. has balance-of-payments deficit of $9.8 billion. 
Second allocation of SDRs—S3 billion. 
U.S. Treasury official tells press that the U.S. expects no change 
in exchange rates. 
Germany acquires $3 billion of foreign exchange, in holding 
exchange rate. 
German Economics Minister Schiller proposes joint float of 
European currencies to Hamburg meeting of EEC Finance Min¬ 
isters. French Minister Giscard d'Estamg proposes devaluation 
of dollar. 
Bundesbank suspends purchases of dollars in forward market. 
German economic research institutes recommend mat the mark 
float. 
Bundesbank takes in $1 billion. Secretary Connallv issues state¬ 
ment saying “no change in the structure of exchange panties is 
necessary or anticipated.” 
Bundesbank takes in $1 billion m first hour and then suspends 
official operations in foreign exchange market. 
EEC Finance Ministers meet in Brussels and again reject Schil¬ 
ler's proposal for joint float. 
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Austria revalues by S percent and Switzerland by 7.1 
percent. 
Germany and the Netherlands let their currencies float. 
Secretary Connally declares, in a speech at Munich: *'We 
are not going to devalue. We are not going to change the 
price of gold." 
Japan announces “eight point program” to reduce its 
balance-of-payments surplus. 
President Nixon meets with Connally and Shultz and 
quietly decides that a drastic change in U.S. policies, 
domestic and international, is needed. 
Subcommittee of Joint Economic Committee recom¬ 
mends revaluation of foreign currencies or float of dollar. 
President Nixon and top economic officials go to Camp 
David. 
President Nixon announces price-wage freeze. 10 percent 
import surcharge, and suspension of convertibility of dol¬ 
lar into gold and other reserve assets. 
Bank of Japan takes in S2 billion in attempt to hold 
exchange rate. 
France rejects German proposal for joint float of Euro¬ 
pean currencies and establishes two-tier foreign exchange 
market. 
Bank of Japan takes in another S2 billion and then de¬ 
cides to let yen float 
Schweitzer, on “Toaav" television program, suggests 
devaluation of dollar in terms of gold as a U.S. “contribu¬ 
tion" to restoration of monetary stability. 
Deputies of Group of Ten meet in Pans and U.S. unveils 
its objective to achieve a swing of SI3 billion in its bal¬ 
ance of payments. 
Group of Ten meets in Rome and discusses “hypotheti¬ 
cal" devaluation of dollar but fails to agree on a realign¬ 
ment of exchange rates. 
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau announces that Can¬ 
ada's dollar would float even after a realignment of other 
currencies. 
Presidents Pompidou and Nixon meet in the Azores and 
announce agreement on a devaluation of the dollar and 
a revaluation “of some other currencies.” 
Group of Ten meets at Smithsonian Institution in Wfash- 
ington and agrees on a realignment of currencies, includ¬ 
ing devaluation of dollar. 
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Under Secretary Volcker visits major capitals on 31.000-mile trip. 
Foreign exchange markets “closed" in Europe and Japan. U.S. an¬ 
nounces 10 percent devaluation of dollar. 
Japan adopts floating exchange rate, followed by Italy and Switzer¬ 
land. 
Exchange markets reopen. 
European central banks purchase S3.6 billion and “close” foreign 
exchange markets. 
EEC Finance Ministers meet in Brussels to consider joint float and 
requests for U.S. actions. 
Finance Ministers of 14 countries meet in Paris. 
EEC Ministers announce joint float of “six” currencies (while Britain. 
Italy, and Ireland float independently). Germany revalues mark by 3 
percent. 
Austria revalues its currency by 2.25 percent. 
Finance Ministers of 14 countries meet again. Sweden and Norway 
associate their currencies with EEC snake. 
Federal Reserve resumes intervention in foreign exchange markets 
and expands swap network. 
Committee of Twenty releases First Outline of Reform and agrees to 
July 31, 1974, deadline for completion of its work. 
Oil embargo imposed and oil price raised during Arab-lsraeli 
War. 
Central bank governors, meeting in Basle, terminate two-tier gold 
agreement. 
Oil price raised again, quadrupling it from level of early October. 
Committee of Twenty, meeting in Rome, decides to adopt evolution¬ 
ary approach to reform. 
French franc drops out of EEC snake. 
U.S. terminates controls on outflows of capital. 
Germany relaxes restrictions on inflows of capital. 
EEC Finance Ministers, meeting at Zeist in the Netherlands, adopt 
a position on the future role of gold. 
Committee of Tw enty issues Outline of Reform, including "immedi¬ 
ate steps,” and concludes its work. 
Herstatt Bank of Cologne (Germany) fails. 




















Central bank governors of Germany, Switzerland, and U.S. meet 
in London and agree on more concerted intervention to maintain 
orderly markets. 
Federal Reserve sells $600 million of foreign currencies, drawn 
under swap network. 
French franc rejoins EEC snake. 
Interim Committee and Group of Ten, meeting in Washington, 
agTee on treatment of gold. 
Six heads of government, meeting at Rambouillet, acknowledge 
“rapprochement" between France and U.S. on exchange rate sys¬ 
tem. 
Interim Committee, meeting in Kingston. Jamaica, completes in¬ 
terim reform, with agreement on IMF quota increases, exchange 
rate system, treatment of gold. Trust Fund. 
France drops out of EEC snake. 
IMF holds the first of its gold auctions, the proceeds of which will 
finance the Trust Fund. 
British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey announces 
request to IMF for standby arrangement of S3.9 billion 
German mark revalued against other snake currencies py 2 to 6 
percent. 
A group of private economists from Western Europe. Jaran. and 
North America, meeting at the Brookings Institution, recom¬ 
mended that Germany. Japan, and the United States adopt more 
stimulative domestic policies, in view of recent lull in economic 
expansion. 
OPEC announces two-tier increase in oil prices: 10 percent by 11 
countries and 5 percent by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emir¬ 
ates. 
IMF carries out first in a series of four annual restitutions of gold 
to member countries at SDR 35 per ounce 
Following IMF approval of a drawing of SDR 3.4 billion by the 
United Kingdom, it was announced at the BIS that the central 
banks of seven countries would make available S3 billion to Brit¬ 



















Dollar strengthens in foreign exchange markets. 
Bundesbank terminates 100 percent marginal reserve require¬ 
ment on bank liabilities to non-residents. 
Jacques de Larosiere succeeds H. Johannes Witteveen as 
Managing Director of IMF. 
European Council (heads of government of European Com¬ 
munities) decides to establish a European Monetary System as 
a “zone of monetary stability.” 
Dollar depreciates 7 percent. 
At economic summit meeting in Bonn, Chancellor Schmidt 
pledges to achieve higher rate of growth of German economy. 
President Carter promises to strengthen anti-inflation efforts 
and to phase out regulation of oil prices in the United States. 
President Carter, in a press conference, expresses concern over 
decline of dollar. The next day the Federal Reserve announced 
an increase in the discount rate by 1/2 percentage point and 
on August 28 it announced elimination of the 4 percent reserve 
requirement on foreign borrowings of American banks. On 
August 22 the Treasury announced that monthly gold auc¬ 
tions would be raised from 300.000 ounces to 750.000 ounces. 
Federal Reserve and Treasury sell equivalent of S2.5 billion to 
support dollar. 
IMF quotas increased to SDR 39 billion. 
Interim Committee, meeting in Washington, recommends an 
increase in IMF quotas of at least 50 percent and allocations 
of SDRs of SDR 4 to 6 billion per year for three years. 
German mark revalued in snake by 2 percent against Dutch 
guilder and Belgian franc and by 4 percent against Danish and 
Norwegian krones 
President Carter announces a three-pan anti-inflation pro¬ 
gram. 
Dollar depreciates 2.7 percent. 
President Caner, U.S. Treasury, and Federal Reserve an¬ 
nounce measures to stabilize and strengthen the dollar, includ¬ 
ing mobilization of S30 billion of foreign exchange, increased 
sales of gold, and a 1 percent advance in the discount rate. 
Saudi Arabia assumes a twenty-first seat on the IMF Executive 
Board, having become entitled to appoint a Director by virtue 
of being the second largest creditor of the Fund. 
IMF borrows SDR 777 million from Germany and Japan, 
under GAB. to help finance a drawing by the United States in 





















August 1-October 6 
Unrest in Iran leads to drop in its oil production and exports. 
OPEC raises oil prices 14.5 percent. 
France delays inauguration of European Monetary System 
(EMS). 
IMF allocates S4 billion of SDRs and raises their rate of 
interest from 4 to 6 percent. 
Reconstitution requirement on SDR reduced from 30 to 15 
percent. 
Bank of Japan reduces from 100 to 50 percent marginal reserve 
requirement on deposits of non-residents. 
Bundesbank raises bank rate and announces an increase in 
reserve requirements. 
Switzerland terminates ban on non-resident purchases of Swiss 
securities. 
IMF supplementary financing facility enters into force. 
Interim Committee recommends active consideration of a vol¬ 
untary substitution account in the Fund. 
EMS begins to operate. 
Official OPEC price raised 9 percent to $14.55 per barrel, and 
members are left free to add premia to this price. 
U.S. Treasun, announces that its monthly gold auctions will 
be reduced by half to 750.000 ounces. 
OPEC announces 24 percent increase, to $18 pier barrel, in 
official price, with a permitted maximum of $23.50. 
Prime Minister Thatcher's government liberalizes exchange 
controls. 
Federal Reserve and Treasury sell equivalent of $5.4 billion to 
support dollar. 
EMS parities adjusted for first time as mark is revalued 5 
percent against Danish krone and 2 percent against French 
franc. Belgian franc, Dutch guilder. Italian lira, and Irish 
pound. 
Federal Reserve announces 1 percent increase in discount rate 
to 12 percent, an 8 percent marginal reserve requirement on 
managed liabilities, and a change in operating procedures to 
give greater emphasis to supply of bank reserves and less em¬ 
phasis to federal funds rate. 
























U.S. blocks official Iranian assets in the United States, following 
a statement from the Iranian government of plans to withdraw 
deposits from U.S. banks. 
Danish krone devalued by 5 percent against other EMS curren¬ 
cies. 
OPEC Ministers fail to agree on a new price and each country 
may set its own price. On January 1, prices ranged from S24 to 
S36 per barrel. 
IMF allocates $4 billion of SDRs. 
London gold price reaches S850 per ounce and then falls $200 
in next two days. 
Switzerland relaxes controls on capital inflows. 
Germany, in current account deficit, announces that it will sell 
government notes to certain OPEC countries. 
Prime rate charged by U.S. banks reaches 20 percent. 
IMF decides that the People's Republic of China represents 
China in the Fund. 
Interim Committee, meeting at Hamburg, fails to agree on fea¬ 
tures of a substitution account and expresses “its intention to 
continue its work on this subject.” 
Saudi Arabia agrees to purchase Japanese government bonds in 
amounts up te S2.4 billion per year. 
IMF conducts its final gold auction, completing four-year pro¬ 
gram under which 25 million ounces were auctioned for the 
benefit of the Trust Fund. 
OPEC sets a price range of S32 to $37 per barrel. 
Prime rate charged by U.S. banks reduced from 11.5 to 11 
percent, the lowest rate of the year. 
Bundesbank cuts reserve requirement by 10 percent. 
China’s IMF quota is increased to SDR 1.2 billion, making it the 
eighth largest in the Fund, and giving it the right to have an 
elected Executive Director. The result is to enlarge the Executive 
Board to twenty-two. 
IMF decides, effective January 1. to simplify the valuation of 
SDR by basing it on five currencies (U.S. dollar, German mark, 
Franch franc, Japanese yen and British pound). 
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve purchase S3.4 billion of for¬ 
eign currencies as dollar appreciates. 

























Japan liberalizes foreign exchange regulations. 
OPEC sets a price range of S32 to S41 per barrel. 
Prime rate charged by U.S. banks reaches 21.5 percent. 
IMF allocates SDR 4.1 billion of SDRs. 
Greece becomes the tenth member of EEC. 
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve purchase S4.5 billion of for¬ 
eign currencies. 
Bundesbank suspends Lombard lending facility for German 
banks at fixed interest rate. Market interest rates rise sharply. 
IMF decides to enlarge access of members to Fund resources 
relative to size of quotas. 
Italian lira devaluated t percent in EMS. 
IMF announces that Saudi Arabia will lend SDR 8 billion to 
Fund over two years. Saudi quota is increased from SDR 1 
billion to SDR 2.1 billion. 
U.S prime rate lowered to 17 percent. 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Regan announces policy of not inter¬ 
vening regularly in the foreign exchange markets. 
IMF term:r.jie' reconstitution r-.Guirement on SDR. 
IMF increase' interest rate on '•DR from 80 to 100 percent of 
average of short-term tnteresi rates in five largest countries. 
U.S. prime rate reaches 20.5 percent. 
Dollar, after appreciating for 2 year, reaches a peak against most 
other currencies. 
U.S. prime ra’e reduced in first of a series of steps. 
In an EMS realignment, mark and guilder are revalued by 5.5 
percent and French franc and lira are devalued by 3 percent. 
OPEC agrees on a Saudi price of $34 per barrel and a maximum 
of S38 for other countries. 
Hungary applies for membership in IMF. 
Poland applies for membership in IMF. 
APPENDIX E 
01 «cornaijnn with the International Tlonetsry Fuat! ccrane-jcwU 
ir. ;-->vember, 1376 but Owing • to the 1amine; <.:e of ths Jaiierul 
Lisction so fine! decisions -«re taken at that time. 
In April of this year negotiations were re—opened by 
preiiaalnery talk» In ieshlngcon. This Viis followed by missions 
from the IMF which conducted further discussions in Jamaica in 
.Siy end June. These discussions identified substantiel areas of 
agreement between the Government of Jamaica and the Fund staff 
or: the economic policies that needed to be pursued in order to 
needy our critical beisnee of payments situation and to enable 
a satisfactory rate of economic growth to be achieved and maintained. 
There remained, however, certain critical areas of disagreement 
in relation to important aspects of fiscal and monetary policy 
end in relation to the timing of the rsnedial measures that had 
to be undertaken. 
It was accordingly decided to meet with the Managing 
Director of the Fund in Washington with a view to seeing if these 
differences could be resolved. Accordingly, a delegation consisting 
of myself, Senator the Hon. Pichard Fletcher, Minister of State 
in the Ministry of Finance, and the Honourable G. Arthur Crown, 
Governor of the Bunk of Jamaica, visited Washington during the 
last week of Jane. Ac a result of our meeting with the 
Managing Director nnb further discussions with the Fund staff in 
Washington, there was a satisfactory resolution of the outstanding 
problems, and an understanding reached with the management on 
proposals for a Stand-by Arrangement which would be submitted to 
the Board of the IMF. The mein features of this understanding ere 
as follows: 
Jamaica will have the right to purchase (i.e. borrow) 
from the Fund foreign exchange aguivalent to vppronimatoly 
US$74.6 million. These proceeds represent 3 1/3 enlarged 
credit tranches. The purchase would be phnsed OV.T e 
period ending June 1979, the phasing being such th»t 
2 enlarged credit tranches or approxisvetuly USlAt.B 
million would be made within the financial year ending 
210 
31st Kars* 1970. The .first ai these triachci or 
•pprrurimstcly 0522.4 million would be node «nilafal» 
so approval by the Fund Board erf the stand-by armijc*-nt. 
Shis epprovsl Is 'expected by the middle at August 1977. 
The second tranche -would be available la two equal 
•parts la Ore robes 1777 and herch 2975, There -are no 
mnriiti nm attached -ta the drawing ~of the ii*at tranche 
but. the drawings la tccraiwr aad subsequently will be 
subject to the broad condition that the comprehensive 
program* of economic stabilization and reconstruction 
which the Government has adopted and uhlch has been 
approved by the fund, oust be strictly carried out. 
The Programme 
The Programme covers the areas of incomes policy, fiscal 
policy, balance of payments, exchange control end exchange rate 
policy. 
1. Incomes Policy 
The aim of the incomes policy is to ensure that money 
incomes do not roce ahead of reel production in such a 
wey as to result In an inflationary spiral that will 
not only cause severe hardship on those least able to 
bear it but also destroy tha possibility of the 
required growth in export earnings. The- details of 
this policy ere set out in « separate Ministry Paper. 
2. Fiscal Policy 
The aim of. this programme is to restrict the use of 
poney ermation in financing the budget to such rjnour.tr 
as will not spore inflation or create further pressures 
on the balance of payments. In order to achieve this 
objective it has been agreed that accomodstion from 
the Banking system (including the Bank of Jamaica) will 
not exceed by more than 145 million the amount of foreign 
loens obtained for balance ox payments support. It has 
been further agreed that there should be limits on total 
foreign loens with a special Unit on loans with a maturity 
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of on* to five ycut which should he restricted to o 
Mxlsuiu of ÎT5 Billion far -this financial y>s. Tha 
purpose of this latter restriction is to ensure that 
our defat burden la kept within msnagwable 11 ni to is 
succeeding jezrs Kith these pareneinrs ~rc anticipate 
-that us will he able to finance a budget of approximately 
11.2 billion this year. ' la order to achieve this -target 
uithout dislocation of Taajar progrsnnas -the most careful 
control and monitoring of public expenditure v/ill be 
required so as to eliminate all traces of waste and 
non-essential expenditure in the public sector. Zt is 
expected that adherence to this progranme will enable 
the Government to maintain its essential social progr.-.nmcs 
including the elements of the Production Plan which are 
dependent on the Bud gat and carry on their nom .il 
Government activity without inflationary side effects. 
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J. Th* third area dealt with in the programme is Monetary 
policy and the balance of payments. It ia expected 
that by following the income» policy and fiscal programs? 
above that transactions involving foreign payments and 
receipts, when the inflow of foreign borrowing are taken 
into account, will result in an improvement in the ne: 
reserves of JÏ30 million by 31st Kerch 1978, i.e. in¬ 
creasing net reserves from JS154 Million at 31st March 
1977 to J312<* Million at 31st March 1973. Vo expect 
also if ell these assumptions hold to be able to anet tha 
expended ieport terget of epproximntoly JSSOO Million et 
tha Basic Rate. 
4. The fourth area of the programme deals with exchange 
control restrictions and exchange rate policy. 
(a) The Government will, as In the past, make full 
provision for the payment of the interest and 
debt service charges due on its own foreign debt 
end on any guaranteed debt. Foreign exchange will 
be available for all other Government foreign payments. 
Throughout this entire period of stringency, the 
Government has on no occasion missed a payment due 
on any of its own obligations by even one day. 
(b) Foreign exchange vill be provided on a current 
basis to mact payment» due for imports on the 
basis of the payment schedule set out in the imports 
licence. 
(c) As regards service payments in the Private Sector, 
i.e. current payments other than for imports, it is 
intended that payments such as interest vill within 
e reasonable period be put on a current basis. 
Thero will be a change however in the method of 
dealing vith payments such as royalties, trede narks, 
corami osions, fees, management expenses, insurances, 
•tc. In the past, these matters have been regarded 
essentially as Exchange Control problems with the 







being taken to have these payments oxaainwd by a broadly 
based group from a wider perspective, talcing into account 
the country's overall economic and social interests. 
Justification for the payment of royalty c.g. would be 
examined as to whether or not the particular process is 
relewant to the roqui re merits of Jamaica or whether tiers 
is not some local substitute -for the process. Ones a 
decision has been taken to approve o payment under any 
of these headings, the asount due would be put on a 
current basis for remittance abroad. 
Applications for foreign exchange which meet all the 
criteria under the existing guidelines will be so dealt 
with that any backlog of payments would be cleared by 
31st December 1977» 
Arrears which have been accumulated in respect of 
interest payments and other servies payments which ere 
bona fide end not disguised capital transfers will be 
clioinctcd by 30th June 1973. 
As regards non-business payments such as holiday travel, 
migrants incomes, etc. it is not possible to make any 
statement at this time, but it is intended to review 
the matter by Hay 1973 in the light of the then existing 
Balance of Payments position. 
As regards payments of principal due on private business 
debt, it is not possible at this stage to give any 
specific schedule or timetable. Applications will be 
dealt with on an ad hoc basis depending on thw ovailability 
of foreign exchange from time to time. A full review 
will be mr.de of the position by May 1978. 
As will be seen from the above, even though the 
Government cannot liberalise all payments, it docs not 
intend to intensify the existing restrictions nor to 
introduce new restrictions on current pnyments. 
The Government intends to keep its exchange rate policy 
under continuous review since this is on important instru¬ 
ment in onabling us to meet our balance of payments targets. 
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5> The CûTtmn«nt «ill mdirtilct a first review in October of this 
• year to 4ti»rain« whether tin Budget and other forecast* arm on 
stress. 
There vili bo a farther major review in March 1973 by which 
* tie» it is expected that the Government*» 5~jmar pl.in would be 
mvaiXehlm. Th» intention then would be -to determine in 
conjunction with tfao Budget for 1978/1979 whet will be the 
specific policies for the fiscal, balance of payments, and 
monetary sectors for the ensuing yecr. 
Xt would then be deterniaed whether we would proceed to 
utilise the ramaining one and one—third enlarged credit 
tranches for 1973 or whether we would seek to work out with 
the fund a new agreement for the use of the Extended Fund 
Facility. The Extended Fund Facility involves an Agreement 
with the Ftind on a 3-year programme and would provide further 
access to Fund resources during that period. 
6. It is importent to stress that the programme presented by 
the Government to the Fund is merely one aspect of an economic 
progranao which the Government itself has to institute and 
whether or not there vere discussions with the Fund, Government 
would have had to establish a programme which would ensure 
viability both in its domestic operations and in its 
foreign operations. 
One of the iuportnnt advantages which derives from an endorsement 
by tho Fund of the Govomaerrt's economic programme is the willingness of 
foreign Governments, international institutions and private financicl 
Institutions to accept this endorsement as on indication that the country is 
pursuing a path which would justify these institutions in making assistance 
and credits avcilablo. 
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It la cxpoctcd there lore that innvclintely following the 
conclusion of the ~und agreoaent there will be several areas of bilater! 
multilateral and private resources which will be available to Jamaica. 
Th^so will be announced iron time to tlae when they become available 
hut our preliminary estimates for this financial year, -including Fund 
Resources, totals approximately $190 million. This does not include 
institutional loans such as from the World Bank already spoken for and 
in the Budget. 
DAVID CD on; 
Deputy Prieie Minister and 
Minister of Finance 
File No. *>06/C? 
APPENDIX F 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: 
A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
A CASE STUDY OF JAMAICA 
1972 - 1980 
1. How would you define development? 
la. Dudley Seers defines development as In what ways 
do you agree or disagree with this? 
lb. Would you use his definition as a working framework 
for Jamaica? 
lc. Has the Manley Government effectively changed any of the 
above parameters? 
2. What were the major factors that caused a deviation 
from or failure to achieve these plans? 
3. What should be the Government's role in development? 
4. Do you advocate a free market system, a planned system, 
or some combination of the two? 
5. In what area is Jamaica weakest in the above? 
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What were its areas of strength? 
To what extent has the country's development corres¬ 
ponded with its development plan? 
Is the tax structure geared to help development? 
Explain your answer. Which segment of the popu¬ 
lation should shoulder the burden of development? 
State briefly your impressions of the IMF as a viable 
arm for development. 
How effective is the IMF in helping developing 
countries? 
From what you know, has the IMF structure made for a 
more effective management of the world's economy? If 
not, suggest a more preferable structure. 
Do you think the IMF is politically neutral? 
Are there any changes you would make in the IMF? 
Is there a need for the IMF to become more represent¬ 
ative? 
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15. Is the issuance of Special Drawing Rights a step in 
the right direction to solve the world's liquidity 
reserves problems? Comment on its likely impact. 
16. Do you believe OPEC has adopted the proper strategy 
in demanding a more realistic pricing for their oil? 
17. Would you characterize the 1980 elections as IMF 
influence? 
18. Did the IMF act fairly in not granting waivers toward 
Jamaica in light of natural disasters (1979)? 
19. Are the new IMF arrangements to the benefit of Jamaica? 
Explain. 
